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This dissertation is a critical exploration of the changing social world of policy-making 
in the British central government. It examines new forms of governance that engage 
international corporations and non-governmental organisations into the making of state 
policy in the UK. It focuses on a case of one transnationally mobile blueprint for a 
collaborative anti-corruption policy. Implemented in the Whitehall, this policy, called the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), has had profound effects on how 
government officials exercise their authority.  
 
I describe the EITI as a densely scripted model for policy, organised around an 
infrastructure of official collective forms, which structurally gear its implementation to 
consensual deliberation. I suggest that this formal set-up makes necessary constant social 
work of negotiating difference and maintaining relationships. This leads me to argue that 
the institutions of the UK EITI not only provide a social and political forum for the 
negotiation of disclosure rules, but set in motion complex social and political dynamics, 
and engender epistemic and ethical dilemmas, that simultaneously contributed to, and 
undermined, policy-making.  
 
My dissertation sheds new light on the increasingly networked, transnational character of 
‘domestic’ policy-making. It analyses the political, social and affective dimensions of 
collaborative policy-making, and explains how ethical and epistemic dilemmas that arise 
from collaboration of civil servants and their ‘stakeholders’, affect the policy. Opening 
up the ‘black box’ of the UK EITI in order to recuperate its sociality and understand the 
agency of official abstractions enabling it, this thesis explores how British civil servants 
and their expert stakeholders, navigate the terrain of statecraft transformed by their 
collaboration.  
 
Collaboration, I contend, transforms policy-making because it brings into play social 
interests, relations, and practices, which are rarely associated with state bureaucracies. At 
the same time, the ways in which this collaboration is formally organised, restrict the 
government’s control over the policy that it makes. Affecting policy-making within the 
government, collaboration results in processes of governance beyond government.
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Introduction  
 
 
Figure 0.1. Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 1 Victoria Street. Photo by 
Steph Gray, used under CC licence. Source: 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/lesteph/4953754824  
 
“This is where it all started,”—announced Eddie Rich1 to an audience of about 70 that 
sparsely filled a vast meeting room in the 1 Victoria Street Conference Centre in London. 
“I can see George Lowham2 here—he’s been here from the very beginning. And Global 
Witness, is there anyone from Global Witness?” A young man rose in a back row near 
me. Eddie nodded. The UK, Eddie said, “has made a full circle”. Now, on the 19th of April 
2016, was an occasion to remember the progress made.  
 
In 1999, he explained, Global Witness, then a small London-based non-governmental 
organisation (NGO), published an investigative report about Angola. It exposed 
corruption at the heart of the Angolan government and denounced the elites’ misuse of 
petroleum revenues received from international oil companies. American and European 
companies produced oil off the Angolan shore and paid vast licence fees, taxes and one-
                                                 
1 Real name. All other names, except for Jonas Moberg and people named in public-access documents and 
the press (founders of Global Witness, philanthropists, government ministers), are pseudonyms. I discuss 
anonymity in the ethics section later in this chapter. 
2 Former Executive Vice President of a large international mining corporation. 
 2 
off bonuses to the government for the right to extract, but this money never reached public 
hospitals and schools, argued the campaigners. Instead, the government embezzled it, and 
used it to finance private mansions and arms purchases for the civil war. The campaigners 
suggested that the first step to fighting such corruption, was knowing how much the 
government earned from the oil companies. Corruption could be curbed if only there was 
transparency of government revenues, but since there was no direct way to influence the 
government, Global Witness proposed that oil companies should publicly disclose what 
they paid to the government.  
 
This was the beginning of the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign, now a 
transnational coalition counting more than 800 NGOs as its members. In 2002, Global 
Witness and other founding members of PWYP approached the British government with 
a proposal for a policy that would require extractive companies3 operating in Angola to 
publish their payments to the government. Such public disclosures would give Angolan 
citizens and civil society information about the state’s revenues, which would in turn 
allow them to hold their government to account for its use of oil money. Transparency 
was a step towards accountability, accountability—towards reducing corruption; and less 
corruption meant more development.  
 
But companies on whom Global Witness wanted to impose such reporting duties, said 
Eddie, “couldn’t do it alone”. Therefore, responding to Global Witness’ advocacy, in 
September 2002 the British government initiated a voluntary partnership that would bring 
together governments, companies, and civil society (NGOs like Global Witness with an 
interest in financial disclosures) in different countries to negotiate among themselves how 
best to make payments and revenues more transparent. The partnership took form of a 
working multi-stakeholder4 group (MSG) of formally equal “constituencies” 
(accordingly, Government, Companies, and Civil Society5) that gathered in participant 
countries and each represented different collective interests with regards to disclosures. 
                                                 
3 Throughout the thesis, I will use the adjective “extractive” as a synonym for adjectival phrase “oil, gas 
and mining”, as in: extractive operation; and the plural noun—extractives—as a shorthand for extractive 
companies or industries. Overall, extraction stands for the extraction of natural resources. This follows my 
informants’ use of the term. 
4 Stakeholder denotes an interested party. In the EITI context, it refers to one of the three constituencies. 
Throughout the thesis I rely on my informants’ terms to describe the constituent elements of the EITI. My 
use of the terms is therefore descriptive, not analytical. I explain this below. 
5 I will use upper case throughout the thesis to distinguish the formal EITI constituencies from other uses 
of the terms industry, government and civil society. 
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This partnership became known as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, or 
the EITI. Central to it is the EITI Standard—a set of requirements and recommendations, 
which primarily concern not the production of transparency as such, but the relational 
infrastructures of collaboration, in which this production is negotiated. The Standard 
governs the implementation of the EITI in each participant country. This makes it a 
mobile policy blueprint, which the stakeholders have to interpret and adapt to particular 
contexts of implementation. As Eddie Rich said on other occasions, by bringing together 
actors who would normally be hostile to one another’s interests, the Initiative creates a 
collaborative arena that serves a forum for dialogue, cooperation and conflict resolution, 
the utility of which transcends the EITI itself. This dissertation is a critical exploration of 
this idea. It aims to describe and analyse what happens within the space of collaboration 
that is the EITI, and how the sociality of policy-making transforms the policy, and is 
transformed by it.  
 
Since the launch of the EITI, many countries signed up to, and implemented it.6 Today it 
is a “global standard” for disclosures to which many refer as the exemplary policy on 
transparency. In the first decade since its launch, claimed Eddie, it had helped to make 
transparent trillions of pounds of natural resource revenues in other developing countries, 
improving the management of these resources, and fostering economic development. 
Throughout the EITI’s existence—first as part of the UK’s international development 
policy, and later as an independent international organisation—the UK government had 
supported the EITI financially and politically: the Department for International 
Development provided monetary and technical assistance to countries willing to 
implement it, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office promoted the EITI model 
among potential participants. The EITI enjoyed a cross-party political support: initiated 
by a Labour government, it received further endorsement of the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition. The 2015 election manifesto of the Conservative Party pledged to 
“push for all countries to sign up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative” 
(Conservative Party 2015: 11). In 2013, the UK itself signed up to implement the EITI.  
 
“The British Government can be proud of its leadership record in promoting extractives’ 
transparency”,—said Eddie. “The UK had made a full circle”—from conceiving and 
                                                 
6 51 countries at the time of writing in January 2017. Angola never became a participant country. See The 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. (Accessed 15 February 2017), available from https://eiti.org. 
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setting the EITI in motion as a blueprint for an anti-corruption and development policy, 
to eventually implementing this blueprint. The occasion for Eddie Rich’s speech was the 
publication of the first annual report of the UK Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative. He knew EITI’s history better than anyone else: as a young official7 at the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID) in the early 2000s, he had been part of 
the team of civil servants who worked on designing the institutional arrangements for the 
future EITI, before pursuing a career in other parts of DfID. Later, when the EITI became 
an independent organisation headed by an International Secretariat in Oslo, Eddie was 
recruited as the deputy head of the Secretariat.8 Standing in front of his audience, Eddie 
could see many familiar faces: some people who had been there “from the very 
beginning”, and many others who joined along the way.  
 
Gathered for the occasion, there were representatives of large international 
corporations—BP, Shell and ExxonMobil among them—which supported the EITI in 
Britain and elsewhere; there was a man from the International Council on Mining and 
Metals, who coordinated the representation of mining companies on the International 
Board of the EITI; also there, were several campaigners from the International Secretariat 
and the UK branch of the Publish What You Pay coalition—a collective body largely 
synonymous with the EITI constituency of Civil Society wherever the EITI is 
implemented. There too was the campaigner from Global Witness, one of whose 
colleagues, absent from the gathering, had simultaneously been a member of the UK 
EITI’s multi-stakeholder and the EITI International Board. Finally, there were numerous 
government officials—some of them from the departments taking part in the UK EITI 
and represented on its stakeholder group, others responsible for promoting EITI abroad. 
 
The reader will encounter these people on the pages of this dissertation as protagonists of 
my ethnography of the UK EITI and NGO campaigns in the UK. During my fieldwork in 
London in 2014-15, I met them in the conference rooms of Global Witness, headquarters 
of Publish What You Pay, and in 1 Victoria Street, where the imposing brutalist building 
of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) housed a team of civil 
servants coordinating the implementation of the UK EITI and other transparency policies. 
                                                 
7 Throughout the thesis, I use civil servant, official and bureaucrat interchangeably.  
8 The Secretariat was headed by another long-term EITI insider, Jonas Moberg, who had collaborated with 
Rich when EITI was still DfID’s initiative; another EITI body, the International Board, was chaired by 
Clare Short, former DfID Secretary of State under whose leadership the Initiative came into existence. 
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My research began in May 2014 as a study of anti-corruption campaigns focusing on 
extractive industries, but very soon extended to government policies they were trying to 
influence. From February to July 2015, I worked as a trainee civil servant at the UK EITI 
Secretariat at BIS, observing the work of officials, participating in meetings of the multi-
stakeholder group, and following its members from the meeting rooms at BIS to the 
offices of their organisations, and to restaurants and pubs across London where we met 
with some of them after work. I also studied the internal departmental archives of BIS 
which held rich materials on the emergence and cross-departmental negotiations of the 
EITI model in 2002-3. The archival documents shed light on the history of the EITI in 
ways that complicate and contradict the official narratives about the policy, such as the 
one offered by Eddie in his speech.  
 
The result of my research is a historically-informed ethnography of the negotiation and 
implementation of the EITI in Great Britain. In what follows, I describe the aims and 
questions of my dissertation, relate them to the case of the UK EITI, and situate the 
dissertation in relation to the relevant disciplinary literature. I then provide an outline of 
the chapters, and conclude this introduction with a discussion of methodological and 
ethical considerations of my research.  
Aims and questions of the dissertation 
The world of government policy9 that I experienced during my fieldwork crossed the 
assumed boundaries between the public and the private, the state and the civil society, the 
national and the international, and stretched far beyond the government itself. It formed 
a complex social landscape of organisational relations and personal alliances; 
bureaucratic forms and forensic knowledge practices; political interests and competing 
visions of the public good that played out in the ethical projects of anti-corruption 
campaigning and civil service professionalism. 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to describe and understand how this world is made and 
inhabited by government officials and their non-governmental partners. I do so by 
focusing on the UK EITI, and this focus entails studying the social and organisational 
context where the policy was negotiated, bringing into view anti-corruption campaigns, 
investigations which inform them, and other transparency policies implemented at the 
same time (Tate 2015). The formal set-up of the EITI (with the multi-stakeholder group, 
                                                 
9 I borrow the term “policy world” from Chris Shore and Susan Wright (2011); see also Checketts (2016). 
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the three constituencies and the secretariat), puts relational complexity at the heart of the 
policy, making the navigation of social relationships and negotiation of compromises the 
key problem for the officials of the UK EITI Secretariat. This social complexity is further 
exacerbated by the fact that civil servants’ control over the policy is challenged on the 
one hand by the international EITI Standard that provides a blueprint for the policy’s 
content and procedures, and on the other, by the stakeholders, who collectively negotiate 
how to translate this blueprint into practice. All this makes the UK EITI a fascinating and 
informative case for the study of contemporary forms of statecraft, where collaboration 
between the government and various stakeholders is elevated to the status of policy aim.  
 
It is the practices and limits of collaboration between government officials and their NGO 
stakeholders; their relations, commitments and projects that inform it; and the ways in 
which it governs the implementation of the EITI Standard in the UK, that are the object 
of my ethnography.  
 
Collaboration, enacted through the collective form of the multi-stakeholder group, is so 
central to the EITI that in their book Beyond Governments, Eddie Rich and Jonas Moberg 
(2015) have theorised the organisation of the EITI as a form of “collective governance”. 
Defining collective governance as “the formal engagement of representatives of 
government, civil society and companies in decision-making and in public policy 
discussions” (2015: 4), Rich and Moberg have suggested that such collaboration is a 
response to an “increasingly complex world of shifting balances of power between 
constituencies in society” (2015: 11). In this context of increased societal pluralism, the 
EITI embodies a larger historical shift: from state governments, to multi-stakeholder 
governance. Hence their book’s title, and the question in the title of this thesis, which I 
borrow from them. “The world used to be run by states”, Rich and Moberg write:  
now the world has four centres of power—governments, companies, finance and 
civil society […]. Governments everywhere are losing out to cross-border 
networks. […] Perhaps diplomacy between states is dying. Long live 
collaboration between state and non-state actors. […] The old models of nation-
states do not adequately capture the complexity of governance in the 21st century. 
This fragmented world is deeply unsettling and unpredictable for governments. 
They are still the arbiter of public policy but have to work differently to maintain 
their mandate. (2015: 8-11) 
 
 7 
In this thesis, I seek to respond (Riles 2006: 1-5) to Rich and Moberg’s arguments by 
interrogating them ethnographically. Using their insights as guides and counterpoints to 
description and analysis, I ask: how does collective governance happen in the context of 
the UK EITI? More specifically, how did the collaborative model of the EITI emerge? 
How does this official model play out in the context of the UK EITI, and why? Finally, 
how does the sociality of collective governance of disclosures shape, impinge on, and 
limit the policy itself? 
 
These ethnographically specific questions speak to broader concerns about sociality and 
effects of policy. This thesis therefore seeks to describe and explain how and by whom 
policy is “made” and governed; and how agendas, commitments and ethical projects of 
those who make it, and their relations with each other, shape policy models, and are 
themselves transformed by them. 
 
As a result, this thesis follows the “circle” that the EITI made from Global Witness’ 
campaign, through an initial policy design developed by UK officials and their partners 
within the country and abroad and its promotion as a blueprint for transparency in 
‘developing’ countries, to the implementation of this blueprint in the supposedly 
‘developed’ UK a decade later. This narrative arc brings together actors that, even if not 
perforce personally acquainted, are connected through official documents and formalised 
knowledge, mediating institutional relations through time and space.  
 
This highlights the fact that policy—to the extent that it is possible at all to speak of this 
assemblage of paperwork, meetings and corridor talk, networks of people, things and 
ideas as a single entity—mediates not only between the state and its subjects of rule 
(Shore and Wright 1997), but also between those involved in making and implementing 
it (Mosse 2005; 2011). In so far as this is the case, my ethnographic exploration of 
government policy provides an opportunity to investigate forms and practices of 
regulation and ordering in the contexts where they are drafted and debated. It allows to 
do so without presuming in advance that these contexts are necessarily co-extensive with 
the state; or that the scale of a supposedly “national” policy is that of a nation; or, finally, 
that the effects of government policy are to be found among the social actors it aims to 
govern, rather than among the very officials who designed and carried it out. I therefore 
seek to understand how government policy is made within non-governmental advocacy 
organisations, such as Global Witness; how these organisations’ participation in 
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collaborative policy-making arenas, such as the UK EITI, implicates national policies in 
transnational political projects; and how such collaboration affects and transforms the 
very governmental institutions that make it possible.  
 
Whereas much literature in anthropology of policy focuses on what policy does or does 
not do once it is made (see below), I am interested in what policy makes, and how it is 
made. This entails treating as ethnographic artefacts the forms that are often assumed as 
self-evident, such as the distinctions between policy and implementation, “national” and 
“global”, government and governance, the governmental and the non-governmental.  
The case of the UK EITI 
My dissertation brings these problems into view by focusing on the complexities of the 
(UK) EITI. This policy establishes an institutional arena for its own implementation, and 
necessitates coordination across government departments, NGOs and corporations—
actors which, as one informant put it to me, “wouldn’t normally work together.” The EITI 
is both structured through the Standard, and negotiated within the framework established 
by it, so that it does not make sense to differentiate between the making, negotiation and 
implementation of policy. Let me dwell on the key elements of the formal set-up of the 
EITI in order to better situate the ethnographic questions I have raised so far. 
 
As already mentioned, the EITI Standard is a blueprint for the policy that is the same for 
all countries participating in the EITI. It requires that both the participant government and 
extractive companies operating on its territory disclose their revenues and payments. 
Disclosures have to be published in annual country reports, opening resource revenue 
flows to public scrutiny. An independent in-country audit must verify the figures and 
compare—“reconcile”—payment and revenue data. Any mismatches could indicate 
corruption and must be explained.  
 
Besides requiring certain kinds of disclosures, the Standard also stipulates a number of 
procedural rules that govern the EITI’s implementation in countries that signed up to roll 
it out as a national policy. Most significantly, in its role as a tool of meta-governance, the 
Standard mandates that each implementing country establish a tripartite multi-stakeholder 
group (MSG). Made up of representatives of the three constituencies, it brings together 
officials from various government departments, representatives of different extractive 
companies and industry associations, and NGO campaigners. The Standard further 
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establishes rules about how MSGs should function. The MSG is a collective deliberative 
body where decisions are normally made by consensus in official meetings, which means 
that intricate diplomacy and a process of formal and informal negotiations usually precede 
any important resolution. This is because the MSG has to decide how to translate the 
requirements of the EITI Standard into national rules about disclosures. Importantly, 
members of the group are expected to represent their constituencies (e.g. a government 
official from DfID has to be aware that s/he speaks on behalf of the Government 
constituency), rather than particular organisations. Since rifts and disagreements within 
constituencies are common, there are also internal negotiations and consultations. The 
multi-stakeholder group is usually coordinated and assisted by a national EITI 
secretariat—in the UK it is staffed by three civil servants, who work with the group as a 
whole rather than with its Government constituency only.  
 
The EITI’s national structures are replicated internationally: there is a multi-stakeholder 
International Board that audits and oversees countries’ compliance with the EITI 
Standard, and the International Secretariat, whose staff provide logistical support for the 
Board and give advice to the several thousand people involved in implementing the EITI 
around the world through their membership in national MSGs and national secretariats.  
 
There is a further complication concerning the legal status of the EITI. In the UK, as in 
most implementing countries, it is a formally voluntary policy, lacking the status of 
legislation. Once the government has signed up to implement it, it has to follow rules set 
out in the Standard, which works as a form of soft law; yet, the reporting policy thus 
implemented is not legally binding for extractive companies that are expected to report. 
Unless the EITI is turned into a national law, there is no juridical way in which the 
government can force companies to report—a fact patently obvious in the UK EITI’s first 
report, where most mining companies expected to disclose their payments, did not do so. 
At the same time, if companies fail to report, the EITI International Board may refuse to 
“validate” the country as compliant with the EITI Standard. 
 
This tension points to another ambivalence about the EITI, namely, that for all political 
and practical purposes it is a policy signed up to and paid for by the government, and yet 
the government remains only one of the three equal parties negotiating and implementing 
it. If the government does not control the content of the policy because it is mandated by 
the Standard, it also cannot firmly control how the Standard is negotiated and translated 
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into national policy by the multi-stakeholder group. Taken together, these complexities 
of policy and practice make MSGs into political arenas where parties lacking in legal 
means to force their agendas onto each other, must rely on other ways of advancing their 
interests. As a result, much of the debates and negotiations taking place within MSGs 
happen at a meta-level: they are about the governance of governance, which makes them 
interesting as ethnographic objects.  
 
In the UK, the EITI is something of a political curiosity: a policy model originally 
developed as an item of regulatory export—a tool of fixing the problem of 
underdevelopment and corruption at a distance—, it eventually returned to the very 
institutions in the supposedly developed and transparent state that had created it. It was 
introduced in 2013 as a national policy because, as many of my informants insisted, the 
government (DfID and FCO) had found it increasingly hard to promote the EITI model 
abroad without the credibility of “walking the walk” themselves. After a decade of 
supporting the EITI in other countries, the UK government made a commitment to “set 
an example” of transparency to others. This framing of the UK instance of the EITI model 
as a model of implementation for others, was supported by Global Witness and its allies 
in the Publish What You Pay coalition, who, largely uninterested in the EITI’s 
transparency effects in the UK, wanted to make it into an exemplary policy that they could 
point to in their campaigns overseas. The same was true, some officials claimed, of the 
international companies supporting the policy. I will expand on these issues and their 
implications for the making of the UK EITI, throughout the dissertation. 
 
While the Government was just one of the three equal constituencies on the multi-
stakeholder group, the UK EITI still remained a government policy, and thereby a part of 
the context of mundane bureaucratic work of civil servants, who also worked on other 
policies. Similarly, NGO campaigners saw the UK EITI as just one element of a larger 
“jigsaw of global transparency” (to quote one informant)—an element that was 
functionally, conceptually and socially connected to other anti-corruption policies in the 
UK and elsewhere, which made up a single landscape.  
 
The other elements of this jigsaw served as implicit points of reference and targets of 
critique for NGO campaigners and corporate representatives, in their discussions about 
how best to implement the EITI Standard in Britain. These were the so-called mandatory 
disclosures policies—regulations obligating extractive companies registered or traded on 
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stock markets in certain jurisdictions (Canada, EU countries and the US) to disclose their 
payments for extraction to governments all over the world. They had their origin in the 
same campaign by Global Witness and PWYP as the EITI. But unlike the EITI, they were 
obligatory, and thus a major point of contention between Global Witness and their PWYP 
allies (who advocated for these stringent rules in many countries simultaneously), and 
most major international oil, gas and mining companies (which would have to comply 
with these rules). In the EU, mandatory disclosure rules were enshrined in Chapter 10 of 
the new EU Accounting Directive,10 passed in 2013. As will all EU law, the UK had to 
transpose it into national legislation. The work of preparing the primary law and the 
regulations interpreting it in the UK, was done by several civil servants from the 
Corporate Governance team at BIS—the same team that hosted the UK EITI Secretariat. 
In fact, when announcing in May 2013 that the government would sign up to the EITI, 
David Cameron pledged that it would also swiftly transpose Chapter 10 into national law 
in order to signal the British government’s championship of the extractives’ transparency 
agenda. To complicate the matters, officials working on these mandatory disclosure rules 
(which became known as the Reports on Payment to Governments Regulations 2014) 
collaborated with practically the same NGO and corporate stakeholders, who took part in 
the UK EITI. “They are the same people, exactly the same people,”—told me one civil 
servant. When I began to research the UK EITI, I quickly realised that there were multiple 
conceptual and social overlaps between the UK EITI and the mandatory disclosures 
policy. If understanding the rationalities and practices of NGO campaigns on 
transparency required studying the UK EITI, understanding the UK EITI in its turn made 
it necessary to follow its conceptual and social interdependencies with the mandatory 
disclosures policy.  
 
During my fieldwork, the UK EITI’s multiple internal and external connections became 
a matter of conflict between the stakeholders involved in it. Despite the UK EITI’s formal 
structures presuming (and requiring official performance of) the separation of one 
constituency from another; the UK EITI from the mandatory disclosures policy and other 
instances of EITI implementation abroad; and all of them from the umbrella structures of 
the international EITI, participants of this policy world crossed these formal divisions of 
jurisdiction and scale with remarkable ease, at times even manipulating the scalar 
                                                 
10 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual 
financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, 
amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC. OJ L 182, 29.6.2013: 19–76  
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ambivalence they inhabited. The result was a collaborative national policy—the UK 
EITI—where few were interested in its national effects, instead pursuing it as a site of 
political intervention and exemplification elsewhere. To understand how and why this 
happened, this thesis explores how the collaborative policy model of collective 
governance began to change relations and practices of government from which it had 
emerged and in which it was enacted. In particular, it does so by investigating how the 
social complexities of the UK EITI fold back onto themselves at a moment of political 
and moral conflict among the stakeholders. 
 
The UK EITI is a particularly good case for the study of practices of government because 
it is both an instrument and a site of governance. To paraphrase David Mosse's argument 
about development projects, it is neither separate nor constituted independently from “the 
different goals, interests, ambitions, social relationships and passions of the many people 
and institutions brought together in [the policy’s] ‘long chain of organisation’” (2005: 24, 
emphasis and citation omitted). The EITI, as I have suggested, is not only a model for a 
policy replicated with variations across many countries, but also a blueprint for a set of 
institutions and forms of collaboration, through which the policy is negotiated and 
implemented in each instance. Opening up the ‘black box’ of this policy in order to 
recuperate its sociality and understand the “agency of official abstractions” enabling it 
(Bear 2015: 24), allows me to explore how British civil servants and expert stakeholders 
who have become their partners in governing, navigate the terrain of statecraft 
transformed by their collaboration.  
Anthropology of policy 
Since Laura Nader (1969) formulated her programme for “reinventing” anthropology by 
calling for the study of powerful elites and institutions shaping lives of ordinary citizens, 
many anthropologists have taken forth her agenda. In numerous ethnographies (Bear 
2015; Ferguson 1990; Fortun 2001; Gilbert 2015; Li 2007; Müller 2013a; Shore and 
Wright 1997; Shore, Wright and Pero 2011; Stryker and González 2014; Welker 2014), 
Nader’s call to “study up” has lived on as a political programme of critical deconstruction 
of bureaucratic and corporate domination. But Nader’s injunction was also an invitation 
to a methodological reflection for a discipline in a moment of crisis, as she warned that 
“[t]he consequence of not studying up as well as down are serious in terms of developing 
adequate theory and description” of power (1969: 290). Thus, an increasing number of 
scholars have chosen to break with the tradition of power critique for the sake of 
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‘adequacy’ of theory and, above all, description (Holmes 2014; Holm Vohnsen 2011; Hull 
2012; Lea 2008; Mathur 2016; Mosse 2005; Riles 2001, 2011; Yarrow 2011; Yarrow and 
Venkatesan 2012).  
 
Within this vibrant and growing field of literature, some anthropologists have chosen to 
study government policy. With few exceptions (e.g. Alexander 2002; Crewe 2015; 
Checketts 2016; Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Holmes 2014; Holm Vohnsen 2011; Lea 
2008; Maybin 2016; Neumann 2012; Tate 2015), their attention has focused on settings 
where policies are implemented, rather than made—debated, negotiated, drafted, etc. As 
a result, we know much more about how forms of government and topographies of 
statecraft are constituted in encounters between state agents and their clients, or through 
mundane documentary practices at the bottom of administrative hierarchies, than in sites 
where, for example, lobbyists and campaigners meet ministers and policy officials, where 
laws are written and regulations negotiated. In these high corridors of power, in offices 
and meeting rooms of ministerial buildings, the state—but also those with whom ‘it’ 
interacts—look differently. 
 
My thesis contributes to correcting this ethnographic deficit by focusing on a central 
government department and painting a detailed picture of the social world of policy. 
Seeking to contribute to anthropological understandings of policy and the state, my 
ethnography takes forward two related concerns from the literature on the topic: one is 
about the effects of policy, the other, about the relation between policy and practice. As I 
will explain below, I approach these problems from the perspective of anthropology of 
international development, which because of its focus on development projects and 
expertise (Ferguson 1990; Li 2005, 2007; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005, 2011; 
Yarrow and Venkatesan 2012; Yarrow 2011), has been particularly influential in defining 
ethnographic approaches to government policy (see, e.g. Shore and Wright 1997, 2011; 
Holm Vohnsen 2012; Checketts 2016).  
 
Of particular importance, has been James Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics Machine (1990). 
Focusing on a ‘failed’ development project, Ferguson asks: what were the project’s 
effects, even if its implementation did not achieve the desired results? He finds that 
through the advancement of infrastructure, the project brought about a side effect of 
increasing the power and reach of Lesotho’s state bureaucracy in rural areas that it had 
previously not penetrated. The insight that effects of a development intervention could be 
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found outside of its intended purview—coherent with Foucault’s impersonal view of 
power as operating without so much as awareness of its subjects (see in particular 
Ferguson 1990: 18)—has since inspired productive research in anthropology of public 
policy, where scholars have investigated what interventions ‘do’ (Li 2005), how they 
create new subjectivities and forms of domination (Nyqvist 2011), and how these are 
justified and sustained through design of policy models and expert depoliticisation 
(Müller 2013b; for representative collections of critical scholarship, see Shore and Wright 
1997; Shore, Wright and Però 2011). Developing an agenda for an anthropology of policy, 
Shore and Wright remark the “productive, performative and continually contested” (2011: 
1) character of policy, and suggest to focus on the organisational work that goes into 
making “fragmented activities [of policy] appear coherent” (1997: 5). Similarly, Nina 
Holm Vohnsen has argued in her study of a welfare policy in Denmark, that  
[t]he closer we look at the moments in which decisions pertaining to the project 
[i.e. the policy] are made, the more the project dissolves into a multiplicity of 
logics and strivings for conflicting goals and it seems that in those moments the 
project relates to the politically adopted project in nothing but name. (Holm 
Vohnsen 2012: 35)  
 
Throughout the thesis, I will build on these suggestions to explore the effects of the 
collaborative set-up of the UK EITI, its multiple logics, and the discourses and practices 
that make it cohere.  
 
Importantly for my argument, this critical literature on development and policy has itself 
been criticised for its tendencies to reduce people’s ideas and acts to “the supposedly 
more ‘real’ agendas [of domination] that analysts then ‘uncover’” (Yarrow 2011: 5); and 
for obstructing a more nuanced ethnographic understanding of historical, social and 
ethical specificities of projects and policies (Mosse and Lewis 2006). A valid and 
welcome correction, this methodological criticism does not detract from the usefulness 
of critical deconstruction in detecting the hidden structures and effects of policy 
interventions—even if the question of what these structures and effects are, and where 
they are to be found, should be resolved ethnographically rather than ideologically. More 
on this below. 
 
Addressing questions raised by Ferguson, David Mosse (2005) suggests that judgments 
about ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of development projects must be understood in relation to 
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the disjuncture between policy (models and texts) and practice (the situated activities of 
implementation). He argues that policy success and failure are socially produced. Rather 
than being effects of good or bad implementation, they result from changes in policy’s 
“networks of support and validation” (see Latour 1996), which make practices of 
implementation (il)legitimate. This move brings Mosse to question the direction of the 
relation between policy and practice. His analysis focuses on the complexity of 
articulations (of translation, reproduction and subversion) between policy texts and 
practices, suggesting that “policy models are poor guides to understanding the practices, 
events and effects of development actors, which are shaped by the relationships and 
interests and cultures of specific organizational settings” (Mosse 2004: 663).  
 
This methodological move—in itself a response to the critical-deconstructive 
anthropology of development—seeks to “reinstate the complex agency of actors in 
development at every level” (Mosse 2005: 6), and through that, to allow for a richer 
ethnographic understanding of ideas, practices, relationships and commitments of these 
actors (e.g., see contributions to Mosse and Lewis 2005; Mosse 2011; Venkatesan and 
Yarrow 2012). The new possibilities opened up by this move are partly an effect of the 
chosen scale of inquiry, partly of its suspension of critique. The coherence of policy, so 
often the target of critical deconstruction, at a closer look appears an effect of situated 
practice (Yarrow 2011: 147-8)—not only of the negotiation of power, but also of 
knowledge-making (Green 2012) and moral reasoning (Trundle 2012; Yarrow 2011: 6-
15). Suspending critique in favour of a methodological/ethnographic deconstruction, 
these scholars find that there is more to policy than domination and governmentality—a 
point that I develop on ethnographically throughout this dissertation. 
 
The ethnographic programme proposed by Mosse (2004, 2005) is made possible by the 
productive tension between the notions of policy and practice. As I have already noted, 
Most ethnographies of policy and development projects focus on their implementation, 
rather than drafting and design. This empirical bias, so often a result of the politics of 
research access, makes the dichotomy of policy and practice relatively unproblematic.  
 
In this thesis, however, I explore a social arena where policy is practice, namely, where 
the official abstractions of the UK EITI (policy, in Mosse’s terms), are the object of 
practices of drafting, negotiation, and translation. Through this focus, I seek to develop 
our understanding of the complex and non-linear relations between official policy texts 
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and abstractions on the one hand, and social practices and relationships through which 
these are made, elaborated on and enacted, on the other.  
 
I seek to understand how official formalisations (Stinchcombe 2001) of policy emerge 
from situated practices, epistemic and ethical commitments of government officials and 
their NGO partners; and how these formalisations then come to have their own effects 
within the arena of the UK government in which they are debated, negotiated, and put to 
use. Exploring the social life of policy within the government, rather than in the sites of 
policy’s implementation,11 allows me to shed light on policies, and in particular the EITI 
model of collective governance, as complex, historically and culturally situated fora of 
human relations.  
 
Building on the emerging body of ethnographic analyses of government, governance and 
management that do not assume that power and authority is all there is to governing (Lea 
2008; Bear 2015; Bear and Mathur 2016; Telesca 2015; Mathur 2016; Brown 2016), this 
dissertation takes forward the project of ethnographic inquiry into practical, epistemic 
and ethical dimensions of governmental work and campaigning, seeking to understand 
these as lived practice. I see my task, and accordingly my contribution to the anthropology 
of policy and the state, as detailed ethnographic description that brings to life the various 
ways in which the practice of collaborative policy making is complex—conceptually, 
ethically, relationally, and politically. Ultimately, the suspension of deconstructive 
critique for the sake of ethnographic nuance, allows me to produce a better-informed and 
richer account of an under-documented subject, and leads to critical insights that are 
unattainable if the critique of power/ideology is the primary aim of research (Yarrow 
2008). These insights form the basis for my theoretical contribution to the anthropology 
of policy and the state, which I discuss in the Conclusion. 
Outline of the dissertation 
Chapter One sets the scene for the rest of the dissertation by providing an overview of the 
two sites of my fieldwork in London: the anti-corruption NGOs, and the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills. Chapter Two examines one of these NGOs, Global 
Witness, as a site where campaigners develop proposals for anti-corruption policies. It 
                                                 
11 In the case of the UK EITI, as I have noted, it is difficult to distinguish between making and 
implementation of policy. The closest approximation to implementation, in this context, would be the 
practices of corporate and governmental reporting under the UK EITI’s rules. My focus, as already 
explained, is elsewhere. 
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focuses on the making of one investigative report about opacity and potential corruption 
in the oil industry. Through my ethnography, I seek to understand how Global Witness 
employees who investigate offshore corporate networks, deal with the problem of 
knowing corruption and making it visible, and how the forensic and interpretive moves 
they make, lead them to advocate for particular policy solutions to corruption in the 
extractives. Global Witness’ campaigns, based on investigations such as the one I analyse, 
have been central to the problematisation of transparency, and development of specific 
policies such as the EITI. Chapter Two, therefore, provides a basis for my ethnography 
of these policies in the UK. 
 
In Chapters Three and Four I deal with the emergence of the discursive and social 
conditions of possibility of the EITI in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Chapter Three 
focuses on the advocacy campaign that grew out of Global Witness’ investigation of 
corruption and conflict in Angola. It explores how Global Witness campaigners 
legitimised transparency of extractive corporations as a solution to the problem of 
government corruption in Angola. The chapter then describes several conceptual and 
rhetorical shifts in the campaign through which this solution was turned into an abstract 
policy model that could be applied to any resource-rich developing country. I argue that 
this model was developed as situated political knowledge which campaigners deployed 
in attempts to persuade powerful actors about the importance of extractives’ transparency. 
Finally, I suggest a tentative explanation of why these attempts eventually succeeded, 
when in Spring 2002 the UK government took up Global Witness’ proposal, which later 
became the EITI. 
 
Chapter Four demonstrates how Global Witness’ original policy proposal, which 
recommended mandatory disclosures of corporate payments to governments, was 
radically transformed in the context of cross-departmental negotiations in the UK 
government. Tracing this transformation, I describe how the design of the emergent policy 
was amended to accommodate various interests and conflicts within the government, and 
later changed further in order to attract the broadest possible support from other G8 
countries, the World Bank and numerous corporations. The result of these moves was the 
emergence of the multi-stakeholder model of the EITI, whose voluntary, participatory set-
up directly reflected the need to accommodate interests and agendas of the various parties 
involved in negotiating it. I thus show how the mechanisms for collaborative deliberation 
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that characterise the EITI model today, were initially shaped by organisational concerns 
and conflicts within the British government. 
 
When these mechanisms came to be implemented in the UK in 2014-15, they engendered 
extraordinary social complexity within the UK government, and led to a conflict among 
EITI stakeholders. Chapters Five, Six and Seven deal with these problems. Chapter Five 
begins with the government’s official reasons for implementing the UK EITI—namely, 
to promote transparency abroad by making the UK EITI into an example of British 
leadership on matters of anti-corruption. It explores how and why both government 
officials and NGO campaigners sought to use the nationally implemented the UK EITI as 
a tool of foreign influencing. Examining the dynamics and social arrangements through 
which the UK EITI was made into an arena and a tool of transnational campaigning, this 
chapter develops our understanding of the politics of collective governance.  
 
Chapter Six further develops this theme, exploring the complex ways in which the 
implementation of the UK EITI became entangled with that of the extractives’ mandatory 
reporting policy. Unpacking how this entanglement resulted in a conflict between NGO 
and corporate stakeholders, I suggest that the conflict signaled the limits that collective 
governance may put to the authority of government officials. More precisely, I 
demonstrate that the conflict was a result of both the NGO and corporate representatives’ 
attempts to use the space of collaboration opened up to them by BIS official, as a way of 
settling scores with regards to similar transparency policies in other countries. My 
exploration of officials’ and campaigners’ narratives of these events leads me to suggest 
that the process of collective governance is a result not only of power relations and tactics 
of rule, but also of ethical projects pursued by its various parties.  
 
If Chapter Five and Six demonstrate the relational complexities of collective governance, 
and the ways in which these shape and undermine policy-making, Chapter Seven turns to 
the problem of stability in the face of unruly sociality of stakeholder collaboration. The 
chapter explores the (unsuccessful) attempts of the staff of the UK EITI Secretariat to 
prevent the conflict, described in Chapter Six, from engulfing their policy. It analyses 
how officials sought to reinstate the formal separation between the UK EITI and the 
mandatory reporting policy, collapsed by the conceptual and social overlaps between 
them. This allows me to focus on the role of detachment and formality in the civil 
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servants’ attempts to maintain and order social relationships that underpin, yet at the same 
time destabilise, the implementation of the UK EITI. 
 
The Conclusion brings together and summarises the main arguments of this thesis. 
Drawing out their implications for the anthropology of policy and the state, I elaborate on 
the central problem of this dissertation: the effects of collective governance on the very 
institutions of government within which it is situated. I argue that the conflict and frictions 
I describe in earlier chapters, occurred because of the formal arrangements and social 
dynamics of collective governance, rather than in spite of them. Collaboration, I contend, 
transforms policy-making because it brings into play informal social relations and 
practices which are rarely associated with state bureaucracies. At the same time, the ways 
in which this collaboration is formally organised, restrict the government’s control over 
the policy that it makes. In this manner, collaborative policy-making results in processes 
of governance ‘beyond’ the government. 
Methods and ethics 
This dissertation is based on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork in London in 2014-15, 
where I first studied anti-corruption investigators and campaigners working for various 
NGOs (discussed below), and later spent six months as a participant observant at BIS, 
with the UK EITI Secretariat and the multi-stakeholder group it coordinated. In this final 
part of the Introduction, I comment on methods, sources, terminology and ethics of this 
research.  
Interviews and participant observation 
Tracing the diffuse social world of anti-corruption policy-making, between May 2014 
and July 2015, I conducted ca. 90 formal semi-structured interviews with government 
officials from BIS and campaigners representing ten different anti-corruption/pro-
transparency NGOs. A third of these interviews were repeated; some grew into lasting 
friendships, from which many more informal conversations flowed. I observed anti-
corruption public conferences, report launches, debates, as well as focused, invitation-
only discussions with policymakers, military commanders, and representatives of 
international organisations. I also acted as a consultant researcher on transparency and 
anti-corruption in the UK and Ukraine for two NGOs (the Natural Resource Governance 
Institute and Transparency International UK), and translated documents from Ukrainian 
for the latter. The blurring of boundaries between research subjects and partners, in fact, 
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was a persistent feature of my fieldwork (Douglas-Jones 2012; Holmes and Marcus 
2005). I could not, however, secure a lasting period of participant observation in an 
NGO—for reasons explained below.  
 
I started to attend meetings of the UK EITI in November 2014, and from February to  late 
July 2015, I worked as a trainee civil servant at the UK EITI Secretariat. The Secretariat, 
as already mentioned, was based at the Corporate Governance team at the Department for 
Business, Innovations and Skills, whose officials also implemented the extractives’ 
mandatory reporting policy. While at BIS, I took part in regular team meetings and helped 
other members of the team with their workload (that did not concern extractives’ 
transparency) in order to better understand the organisational context of the UK EITI 
Secretariat. However, I spent most of my time at BIS assisting the officials of the 
Secretariat with the day-to-day management of the policy. This meant participating in 
different kinds of meetings (multi-stakeholder group and working sub-group meetings, 
officials’ and time-table meetings, informal brainstorming sessions and unofficial 
“chats”—usually held in person, and sometimes by conference calls) which happened as 
often as four times a week. Most of these took place at BIS or other government 
departments, and sometimes at Global Witness’ offices. 
 
Between 20 and 25 people participated in these regular meetings, representing different 
government departments (BIS, Department for Energy and Climate Change, Department 
for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, HM Revenue and 
Customs and the Treasury), companies and industry associations (Aggregate Industries, 
BP, Exxon, Mining Association of the UK Mineral Products Association, Oil and Gas 
UK, Shell) and NGOs (Global Witness, Natural Resource Governance Institute, Publish 
What You Pay UK, Transparency International UK), as well as a (former) member of 
Parliament and his associates. Eddie Rich from the EITI International Secretariat, and 
delegations from other EITI-implementing countries, were occasional guests. 
 
Working with the UK EITI Secretariat meant being in the middle of constant email 
exchange between different stakeholders (as a temporary member of the Secretariat’s 
staff I was copied in most emails), which was useful because much of the business of 
managing the policy happened by email. Other than that, my work at the Secretariat 
involved drafting position papers and memos (on subjects ranging from the licensing 
regime for the North Sea oil and gas extraction, to local council planning permissions for 
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quarrying sites), and authoring a section of the UK EITI’s first annual report. Finally, I 
also attended public conferences and training sessions both related to the (UK) EITI, and 
to the broader “policy profession” of the civil service (e.g. on how to draft laws and 
“manage” the ministers). 
 
All in all, this made for field-work of high intensity punctuated by periods of relative 
calm, which, in its course, reflected the ebbs and flows of the work of professionals I had 
chosen to study. 
 
I must note that for a variety of reasons I have not been able to interview as many corporate representatives 
involved in the UK EITI, as it would have been desirable. I interviewed four officials from companies and 
industry lobby groups. Others proved difficult to reach and arrange meetings with because of their busy 
schedules or lack of interest in research. (This in itself is a good indication of the place of the UK EITI in 
their work: it was one of the many other things and government fora where they had to participate.) My 
semi-official role as a member of staff of the UK EITI Secretariat might have made it more difficult to 
access these people as a researcher (unlike in the case the NGO campaigners, with whom I had had contacts 
since before I joined the Secretariat). At the same time, however, I observed numerous UK EITI meetings 
in which Industry representatives were active participants; spoke to them privately after these meetings; 
and had access to current and archived correspondence between officials and corporate representatives. 
Because of this, the lack of interviews does not impair my understanding of the policy and the Industry 
members’ participation in it. 
Archival and other documentary sources  
This thesis relies heavily on publicly available NGO and government reports, and 
published minutes of the UK multi-stakeholder group meetings. To corroborate some 
interviews with civil servants, I have also used materials from a Freedom of Information 
request filed against BIS officials by Global Witness campaigners. Last, but not least, in 
order to understand the development of the EITI, I have relied on materials in BIS’ digital 
archives. During my time at BIS, the department was undergoing an overhaul of its 
electronic filing system, meaning that there was no central archive of current documents. 
Recent documents and official emails were stored on a shared virtual drive accessible to 
team members. However, an old electronic system12 was still in place; it held copies of 
electronic and scanned paper correspondence between officials of different departments, 
                                                 
12 To which I refer as the BIS Matrix Archive—by the name of the electronic system (the “Matrix”) on the 
departmental intranet in which these documents were stored. I cite these documents indicating their type, 
date, and file number. I do not know the current name and location of the archival folders I accessed because 
BIS has been united with another department in Summer 2016, and the Matrix filing system has been 
overhauled. 
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as well as internal memos and position papers. None of these documents were classified, 
and I was allowed by a competent official to see them and take notes of them for my 
research. The documents were about cross-departmental discussions about the EITI that 
took place in 2002-3, although some were from later years. As this was a storage of 
documents that concerned institutional ancestor of BIS—the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI)—it inevitably did not contain the correspondence and papers about the 
EITI in which DTI officials were not copied in. These omissions are identifiable, and 
mostly concern discussions held within other departments working on the EITI in those 
years. DTI was, however, included in all “write-rounds” (cross-departmental 
consultations) concerning important decisions about EITI, which makes the BIS archive 
a reliable source of evidence about the policy’s early development.  
 
The main challenge to an ethnographic reading of these documents is relating them to 
everyday organisational practices from which they resulted, especially in view of what 
my and others’ (e.g. Hull 2012; Mathur 2016) ethnographic insights have taught me about 
the complex relationship between writing and other bureaucratic practices. Of course, 
these documents are artefacts of bureaucratic knowledge (Riles 2006) and instruments of 
organisational coordination. As much official writing, they operate a certain mode of 
formalisation, abstraction and deletion (Law 1994). Unlike many official documents, the 
formality of which obscures who is to account for the account (Munro 1996), which 
complicates the task of reading them sociologically, the archived email exchanges I 
analyse are rich sources of information about the social world of policy-making. They 
allow for a nuanced understanding of organisational dynamics, and debates about policy, 
within the British government. This is because these documents are rather heterogeneous: 
for example, unlike official ministerial letters, which would, as a rule, be carefully drafted 
by several officials, intra-departmental emails between civil servants at DTI frequently 
express opinions and disagreements which would not normally be voiced in official 
letters. These varying degrees of formality, as well as the fact that these documents bear 
traces of the contexts of their own creation, allowed me to gain a reliable understanding 
of written debates about the emergent EITI, and triangulate these with reports of meetings, 
official memoranda, NGOs’ own published appeals, etc. I rely on these materials in 
Chapters Three and Four, where I predominantly focus on the discursive construction of 
the EITI.  
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Finally, the reader might rightly ask whether the ten-year gap between the chapters using 
archival sources to trace the emergence of the EITI from 1999 to 2003, and the chapters 
on the EITI’s implementation in the UK in 2014-15, constrains my analysis in any way. 
To this I would respond that the main ideas and structures of the EITI, whose influence I 
explored during my fieldwork in 2014-15, took shape already in 2002-3, a period richly 
documented in the BIS archives. It is true that between 2003 and 2013, when the UK 
finally signed up to the EITI, the Initiative underwent many significant changes: it became 
an independent international organisation, its structures consolidated, and rules were 
expanded and codified (on which I comment in various chapters). However, the core of 
the EITI—the idea that disclosures should be negotiated within a collaborative tripartite 
group of stakeholders—remained the same. This is what allows me to trace throughout 
the thesis (with necessary qualifications about continuity and change) how this core idea 
of collaborative governance made a “full circle” from its origins in a complex dynamic 
of negotiation and conflict within the UK government, to its eventual ‘return’ to the very 
institutions that had devised it in the first place. 
 
Before I proceed, note that except for published government and NGO reports, I provide 
references to all cited primary sources (such as emails, parliamentary evidence, speeches 
and newspaper interviews) in the footnotes to the main text, rather than in the final list of 
references. 
Terminology 
As the reader will notice, throughout the thesis I use terms such as ‘corruption’, 
‘transparency’, ‘accountability’, ‘stakeholder’, ‘multi-stakeholder group’, etc. As policy 
is a language-borne practice that constructs the reality in which it seeks to intervene 
(Apthorpe and Gasper 1996), I seek to use these terms in the way that my informants used 
them. Without deploying them as descriptive terms, I would lose something important 
about the ideas and practices I describe, because it is through references to ill-defined 
entities such as ‘corruption’ and linguistic shifters such as ‘transparency’, that the EITI 
gains its appeal and effectiveness as a policy.  
 
The same goes for the classificatory notions of Government, Industry and Civil 
Society13—the three official constituencies of the (UK) EITI. These are formal labels for 
                                                 
13 As noted earlier, the capital letter usage of these terms is meant to mark the difference between the official 
EITI classification of constituencies, and the ordinary usage. 
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imagined collectives that are performed within the arena of the multi-stakeholder group. 
The multi-stakeholder set-up of the EITI hinges on an idea of social pluralism: there are 
different constituencies with their own interests within the society, and in order to make 
effective policy, collective interests of these constituencies must be represented in the 
process of governance (Rich and Moberg 2015; see also Croce and Salvatore 2015). As I 
discuss in Chapters Three and Four, this organisation of the policy reflects its origins in 
concerns about government corruption, which led campaigners at Global Witness to 
propose that governments should be made accountable to their citizens and civil society 
with the help of extractive companies. For the EITI, this has meant that the Government 
constituency of stakeholders is not seen as representing citizens of the government’s 
country. Instead, it is the Civil Society constituency that claims the representation of the 
wider public of supposedly concerned citizens. Arguably, this organisation of the EITI 
has been informed by a general idea of civil society as a relational artefact defined by that 
which it is not: the structures of social organisation that are neither the state nor the market 
(Hann 1996; Taylor 1990). In the context of the UK EITI, the Civil Society constituency 
is a self-organised group of people who supposedly represent a wider array of civic 
organisations; likewise, the Government constituency are expected to speak on behalf of 
the British government as a whole, and the Industry, to represent extractive companies. 
 
In practice, however, these organisational categories map awkwardly onto the social 
groups they are expected to represent. Each of the constituencies has mechanisms for 
internal consultations in order to ensure inclusion and representation of broader views. At 
the same time, the representativeness of people attending the UK EITI multi-stakeholder 
group is a constant issue of contention. For example, the Civil Society constituency 
effectively lacks any representation of trade unions (unions approached by the 
constituency coordinator were not interested in being subsumed under the category of 
Civil Society) or communities affected by extraction (these usually are organised as 
informal networks, or lack time and funds to come for UK EITI meetings to London). 
Instead, many members of the constituency work for international NGOs or those who, 
like Global Witness, are heavily invested in campaigning on problems of international 
development, rather than on UK-specific problems. In a similar fashion, government 
officials are often divided along the departmental lines, and a unitary Government 
position requires much negotiation. All this creates very interesting tensions, which I 
explore in the thesis.  
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My informants understood these caveats well and regularly reflected on them. Yet, they 
continued using the official classificatory terms in ways that blurred the real differences 
between, say, Civil Society (the formal EITI constituency) and civil society (the sphere 
of civic self-organisation), strengthening the constituencies’ claims to representation. 
This is an interesting ethnographic problem, and following my informants’ usage of these 
terms helps me make sense of it. 
Ethics  
All interviews were conducted with informed consent of the participants, and parties to 
the meetings I observed were at all times aware of my identity as a researcher. Most 
formal interviews were recorded (audio, with consent), and I took personal notes of the 
meetings. I also recorded (with consent) several meetings and brainstorming sessions with 
officials.  
 
I have anonymised all names and identities of my informants, and used pseudonyms. 
There are several people to whom I refer by their real name—notably, those who, like the 
top officials of the EITI International Secretariat (Eddie Rich and Jonas Moberg), 
directors of NGOs (Simon Taylor at Global Witness) or government ministers (Jo 
Swinson), are readily identifiable by virtue of their positions and publicly available 
documents. However, as with the anonymised research participants, I have often chosen 
to eschew attributing views and statements to particular people in order to provide further 
protection. Likewise, I have not used personal stories and gossip, which abounded at BIS, 
as in any organisation. In my use of archival materials, I have anonymised all 
protagonists, referring to them by their organisational positions. It is worth noting that 
quotes from archival materials are paraphrases of the original documents, as I recorded 
them in my notes during fieldwork. I have sought to preserve the meaning and general 
style of the original documents. 
 
I have chosen to keep names of organisations and titles of policies, because these are 
relevant for a correct portrayal of ethnographic problems that my thesis deals with. As a 
result, some of my informants’ identities will be intelligible to knowledgeable insiders. I 
had notified officials at BIS responsible for my research access of this possibility from 
the outset. After the change of government in summer 2016, BIS has been merged with 
the Department of Energy and Climate Change, into the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy, which should provide a further layer of protection for identities 
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of some informants. In accordance with the nature of official consent for participant 
observation at BIS, I have not divulged any matters that could be considered confidential 
or sensitive. At no point did I have access to any confidential, or otherwise classified, 
documents. Moreover, sensitivity of information is also a function of time.  
 
Finally, as this thesis deal with issues of collaboration and conflict, it is inevitable that 
my ethnography has an edge to it, simply by virtue of multiple perspectives on single 
events, and because of inevitable differences between my own and my informants’ 
interpretations (Mosse 2006). I hope that by now this edge has been blunted by the 
passage of time. 
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Chapter One 
Setting the scene: anti-corruption NGOs and the government 
 
To understand the social world of policy-making, we need to understand the professional 
and institutional contexts inhabited by its protagonists. This is because policy is made not 
just in the offices of government institutions, but also increasingly within various 
advocacy organisations (Tate 2015: 7), and in new spaces of collaboration such as the 
ones I analyse in this dissertation. This chapter provides an overview of the two sites of 
my fieldwork in London: the capital’s anti-corruption NGO ‘scene’, and the 
government’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. I begin by describing the 
NGOs involved in campaigning for transparency and accountability. I then proceed to 
give an overview of the British civil service, the place of the UK EITI in it, and the 
policy’s relation to another set of regulations about extractives’ transparency. Setting the 
scene for the rest of the dissertation, this description of the field sites will help the reader 
to navigate the institutional contexts of my ethnography.  
Anti-corruption NGOs as a field site 
I began my fieldwork in late May 2014 with the aim of studying how ‘transparency’ was 
produced and enacted as an epistemic and ethical virtue among anti-corruption 
campaigners in London who specialised in extractive industries. That this thesis does not 
take transparency as the object of its ethnography, reflects one of my fieldwork 
discoveries: namely, that as an explicit value and aim, transparency was present in the 
campaigners’ day-to-day work only marginally—as an often unreflected-upon orientation 
of diverse knowledge practices, such as investigations, drafting of policy submissions, 
and negotiations with officials. Transparency was the explicit goal of campaigning, and 
most campaigners shared a rather simple understanding of it as the publication of certain 
kinds of information. At the same time, anti-corruption campaigning itself turned out to 
be a complex social arena. Focusing on relations and practices of those working in anti-
corruption NGOs appeared to me a more productive, and emically significant, way of 
approaching the subject of transparency as a public good (Bear and Mathur 2015). 
 
Anti-corruption campaigning interested me because of what various scholars have 
documented as the explosion of transparency (Tsoukas 1997; Strathern 2000a; see also 
contributions to Boström and Garsten 2008; Garsten and Lindh de Montoya 2008) and 
associated “audit cultures” (Strathern 2000b) in all types of organisations, supported by 
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the growth in number, size, and professionalisation of various pro-transparency NGOs 
and development programmes (de Sousa, Larmour and Hindess 2009). London, the 
capital of the United Kingdom, a city of more than 8 million people and a major financial 
hub, has become the home base for many such transparency organisations. Most of them 
are charities and not-for-profit companies, but there are also numerous corporate 
consultancies and business intelligence firms who have seized on the commercial 
opportunity of analysing corruption as a business risk, and certifying transparency of 
business transactions (e.g. Control Risk and Risk Advisory Group, and most large 
accounting and legal firms).  
 
The work of anti-corruption campaigners fascinated me because working in the public 
interest (as they saw it), they advocated for changes in government and corporate policies, 
and seemed to be rather effective at that. Having started my fieldwork, I discovered a 
dazzling variety of NGOs in London that in one or another way worked on issues of 
transparency, accountability anti-corruption. Some NGOs were radical grass-root 
networks of activists, others, well-established organisations with up to a hundred 
employees. Many of them focused exclusively on the questions of transparency and anti-
corruption (e.g. Global Witness, Corruption Watch UK, National Resource Governance 
Institute, Publish What You Pay, Publish What You Fund, Transparency and 
Accountability Initiative, Transparency International UK), but there were others—large 
international development charities (ActionAid, Christian Aid, Oxfam, ONE Campaign, 
Tearfund)—who took transparency as a tool of international development and ‘good 
governance’ and had teams working on different development issues. Finally, among 
those organisations working on transparency and anti-corruption, one could find a variety 
of sectoral specialisations: defence, pharmaceuticals, international aid, extractive 
industries, land, offshore finance, money laundering and taxation, and so on. Large 
organisations—most notably Global Witness—were organised in specialised teams 
focusing on a variety of sectors, whereas others specialised only in one or two (e.g. 
Publish What You Pay—in extractives).  
 
Going to regular anti-corruption talks and conferences organised by one or another of 
these organisations, I realised that despite the variety of different NGOs and their 
coalitions, the world of transparency campaigning in London was in fact small and 
densely connected—intellectually, institutionally, and socially. The anti-corruption 
scene, as one informant put it to me, was “incestuous”, pointing to a profusion of 
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interpersonal connections forming the foil to more explicit institutional ones (see Riles 
2001). People working for different organisations with different sectoral foci, knew each 
other personally, cultivated friendships (some of them had known each other from school 
or university), or even intimate relationships. Connections often formed on the margins 
of professional meetings. As government institutions that these organisations lobbied 
were often the same, the NGOs coordinated their activities through formal coalitions such 
as the BOND Anti-Corruption group, Open Government Partnership, and Publish What 
You Pay Campaign.  
 
These various connections extended to the world of private and public organisations: 
lawyers, accountants, due diligence investigators, academics, police and military officers, 
parliamentarians and government officials, frequently attended anti-corruption 
conferences organised by different NGOs at lavish locations in central London, and came 
to closed working meetings with the likes of Transparency International UK and Global 
Witness. All these interrelationships were sustained by funding sources, which many 
NGOs shared: first of all, the UK Department for International Development and 
international aid ministries of other European countries; and secondly, private 
foundations, most notably George Soros’ Open Society Foundation (OSF), which has 
been instrumental to the growth of Global Witness and emergence and functioning of the 
Publish What You Pay coalition in 2002. Up until the end of my fieldwork, the 
International Secretariat of PWYP was based at the London office of the OSF in 
Westminster. To understand campaigning on extractives’ transparency, I ended up 
interviewing and hanging out with many people working on transparency in other topical 
fields. It was essential to grasp what was specific to the extractive industries campaign, 
and what was general to the broader transparency scene. 
 
These dense connections also troubled my assumptions about the scale of campaigning, 
demonstrating that my idea of ‘national’ campaigns (advocating for policies in the UK) 
as distinct from the ‘transnational’ ones, was obsolete. The neat classification of national 
and international coalitions, national and international NGOs, which some campaigners 
upheld as a public representation of their work, dissolved into a rather messy field of 
relationships where goals and boundaries of organisations were ambivalent, and 
campaigners worked to make national policies into exemplars of transparency exportable 
to other countries. This, as I later learned, was the main challenge to policy-makers who 
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invited NGO campaigners to collaborate on undertakings such as the UK EITI, and indeed 
became a prominent theme of this thesis.  
 
Drawing on this part of my fieldwork, in this dissertation I have focused on Global 
Witness and allied NGOs participating in the UK branch of the Publish What You Pay 
campaign (particularly, the coordinator of the PWYP UK, the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute, and Transparency International UK). The growth of Global Witness 
over the two decades of its existence (between 1995 and 2015) from an organisation of 
three to one of about 100 spread between two offices (one in London, the other in 
Washington, D.C.), and of the membership of PWYP coalition from about ten in 2002 to 
more than 800 in 2015, reflect the progressive institutionalisation of anti-corruption 
campaigning in the UK and many other countries. At the time of my fieldwork, Global 
Witness was organised around a number of topical campaigns: land, banking, conflict 
minerals and oil among them. I talked mostly with people from the Oil Team, but also 
interviewed their colleagues from other parts of the organisation.  
 
Campaigning is a knowledge-intensive enterprise that requires coordination of many 
people doing different kinds of work, often from different organisations. Within Global 
Witness and other large organisations, there is a horizontal and vertical division of labour 
between researchers and investigators who write specialised reports (Chapter Two); 
campaigners who use these reports to write policy submissions which they then discuss 
in meetings with government officials; communication officers supporting the 
campaigners; lawyers checking reports for accuracy and libel; and various kinds of 
campaign managers. The roles of researcher and campaigner, however, were often 
blurred. Throughout the thesis, I refer to ‘campaigners” as a catch-all term for the NGO 
employees, given that most of those I had contact with, were indeed involved in advocacy.  
 
Most campaigners at Global Witness whom I interviewed were men14 between their late 
20s and late 30s,15 British, educated mostly in humanities and social sciences in Oxbridge 
and Russel Group universities. Except for the gender, the situation was replicated across 
other organisations campaigning on extractives transparency. (Government officials 
                                                 
14 My impression was that the Oil Campaign was particularly male-dominated at the time of my research. 
This has changed since. 
15 Unlike at Transparency International UK, whose staff tended to be more equally split by gender, as well 
as younger (in their mid- and late 20s) and less experienced. 
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working with these people, sometimes reflected on what they perceived as campaigners’ 
privileged social and educational backgrounds.) As is the case with many development-
related NGOs and charities (Nouvet and Jakimow 2016; Yarrow 2011), those who had 
chosen to work for these NGOs often saw their job as virtuous. They valued being able 
to work in a sector that they “felt passionate about” (many used this particular phrase) 
and which they considered publicly important. At the same time, however, campaigning 
was a highly professionalised activity (Sampson 2005) in which people developed skills 
that could be transferred to a job in an organisation not focused on transparency. Their 
careers often began not in campaigning proper, but academia, law and journalism. Many 
NGO workers I met during the fieldwork, had come to anti-corruption from other charities 
dealing with international development, human rights and poverty, and these career 
moves further testify to the professionalisation of the ‘world’ of NGOs. 
 
As I explain in Chapter Two, it proved impossible, despite my many attempts, to obtain 
permission to conduct participant observation within the offices of these organisations. 
Campaign managers at Global Witness were wary of inviting an anthropologist into an 
office where the employees were discussing ongoing investigations; another NGO invited 
me in, but kept postponing the starting date, and the head of yet another one suggested 
they would allow me to work with them if I changed my research project to include 
corporations, and then reported on the content of my interviews back to them. Needless 
to say, this was not an option. But unlike the NGO management, rank-and-file 
campaigners turned out to be very forthcoming and generous with their time, and over 
the course of the fieldwork, we had repeated interviews with the ones involved in the 
extractives transparency campaigns. 
The civil service as a field site 
One of the very early outcomes of these interviews was the realisation that to properly 
understand the extractives-related advocacy of Global Witness’ and Publish What You 
Pay, I had to research those whom they sought to influence—that is, civil servants within 
the UK government. Among the main targets of their campaigning was the Department 
for Business, Innovations and Skills, which within its Business Environment Directorate 
hosted the Corporate Framework, Accountability and Governance Team (I refer to it as 
the Corporate Governance team). It was a group of about a dozen civil servants 
developing a number of corporate reporting and transparency regulations. Two of these 
policies were about extractives. One of them was the UK Extractive Industries 
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Transparency Initiative; the other, the extractives’ mandatory reporting policy resulting 
from Chapter 10 of the EU Accounting Directive, and called the Reports on Payments to 
Governments Regulations 2014. The former was a multi-stakeholder, voluntary process; 
the latter, a mandatory set of regulations, implemented in consultation with the same 
stakeholders that participated in the UK EITI. Global Witness and members of PWYP 
UK took interest and participated in both. I sought permission to conduct participant 
observation within the structures of the UK EITI. This was how I arrived at the current 
framing of my research—a double focus on the NGO campaigns, and policies they sought 
to influence.  
 
Elizabeth Pierce, the head of the UK EITI Secretariat and a senior manager within the 
BIS Corporate Governance team, was forthcoming and welcomed the idea. Having 
obtained agreement from members of the UK multi-stakeholder group and responsible 
officials within BIS, at the beginning of February 2015 I started my period of participant 
observation in the Department as an unpaid intern. I was allowed to fully take part in UK 
EITI proceedings, observe office work, read emails and access archival materials, and use 
what I learned for purposes of research.  
 
This extraordinary access wasn’t peculiar to me—rather, the fact that I was allowed to 
research that which is usually believed to be a difficult to access domain, evidences the 
model of voluntary collaboration on which the EITI is built. But at the same time, it 
reminds us of the dark other of the shift towards collective governance—namely, cuts to 
the funding and size of the civil service motivated by the policy of austerity, which leave 
government officials in need of external parties to take up some of the workload. The 
number of employees at BIS shrank by 20% under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government in 2010-15 (Institute for Government 2015: 59). This reduction was 
disproportionate for the most junior grades of the administrative hierarchy (ibid.: 63). 
Elizabeth said that whereas even ten years before a person at her grade16 would be 
expected to manage a team of ten, in 2015 she had only three other people under her 
management. This left her with less junior officials to do the same amount of work and, 
she thought, decreased the quality of advice she could give to ministers. Less time was 
spent on “thinking” and more, on “doing”, she complained.  
 
                                                 
16 Grade 7—senior manager, the first line of officials who already provide advice to ministers personally. 
It is immediately below the lowest grade of Senior Civil Service (see Drewry and Butcher 1988: 23-27). 
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The work that ten years ago would have been delegated to a subordinate executive officer, 
now had often to be done directly by Elizabeth. Her team, making up the Secretariat of 
the UK EITI, was three strong: Elizabeth herself, Aimée Poole (a Higher Executive 
Officer) and Stewart Barber (an Executive Officer). My participation in the team did not 
so much reduce the workload within the Secretariat, as allowed the team to take over the 
control of some of the policy work from the participants of the UK EITI multi-stakeholder 
group. This often sped up the implementation of the policy, because unlike the staff of 
the Secretariat, who devoted most of their working time to the UK EITI, the stakeholders 
contributed a day or two a week at most.  
The place of the Corporate Governance team in the civil service 
In the UK, the civil service is a permanent state bureaucracy numbering ca. 410,000 
people17 (Institute for Government 2015) who form the core of government dedicated to 
making policy. Civil servants—from administrative officers at the bottom of the 
hierarchy, to permanent secretaries, the mandarins heading governmental departments 
and responding directly to politically appointed Secretaries of State (i.e. ministers that are 
members of the Cabinet)—are politically neutral. This means that their personal political 
opinions should not influence their work and ability to provide impartial advice to 
ministers, whatever political force they represent (Drewry and Butcher 1988).  
 
The UK Government is headed by the Prime Minister, who does not head up a separate 
department (although the PM’s private office is widely known as Number 10,18 and 
wields considerable political power) but presides over the entire executive branch of the 
state. The PM—David Cameron (Conservative) at the time of my fieldwork—governs 
through meetings of the Cabinet, a collegial body most of whose members are Secretaries 
of State (chief ministers) for specific government departments. The Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills was one such department. Its responsibility was for 
regulating corporate reporting and governance, supporting the competitiveness of big 
businesses and regulating competition, and creating policy to stimulate innovation and 
the uptake of new skills among students. Secretaries of State are political heads of 
departments, and underneath them, there is usually a number of junior ministers with 
portfolios in particular policy areas. When I began fieldwork, Vince Cable (Liberal 
Democrat) was the Business Secretary, and Jo Swinson (Liberal Democrat) the junior 
                                                 
17 The figure is for March 2015, and is ca. 80,000 less compared to March 2010. 
18 For n. 10 Downing Street, London, where it is located. 
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minister with responsibility, inter alia, for corporate governance. After the general 
election of May 2015, which saw the end of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
and the rise of the majority Conservative government, Sajid Javid became the Secretary 
of State, and Baroness Lucy Neville-Rolphe the junior minister responsible for the UK 
EITI. 
  
Government departments are the political and intellectual core of the civil service, and 
are also known as ‘Whitehall’ (after the street in Westminster, London, where many of 
them are located). It is here that policy is officially made—devised, drafted, proposed to 
the Parliament in forms of laws and statutory instruments. The opposition between parts 
of the civil service making and implementing policy, which emerged historically with the 
expansion of governmental intervention and the growth of the welfare state (Hennessy 
1989; McLeod 1988), has in recent decades become less prominent, as policy 
implementation—the delivery of actual services to citizens and companies—has been 
increasingly transferred to so-called executive agencies which may or may not be part of 
the civil service, but remain accountable to relevant Secretaries of State (Drewry and 
Butcher 1988). There is another division: between administrative (formerly clerical) staff 
and the “open structure”19 comprising the top seven grades of the administrative hierarchy 
(from seven to one) involved in the formulation of policy, provision of advice to 
ministers, and departmental management. Finally, another important distinction is that 
between “generalists” and “specialists”—civil servants whose previous specialisation and 
expertise are not deemed relevant to the job they would be doing within the civil service 
(most civil servants), and those whose jobs rely on such skills (lawyers, accountants, 
economists and statisticians). This is not to say that generalists do not require highly 
specialised knowledge for working on policies such as the UK EITI—rather, that they 
acquire such knowledge on the job and could, in principle, start working on a new policy 
from one day to the next.  
 
The Corporate Governance team of the Business Environment Directorate at BIS, which 
hosted the UK EITI Secretariat, was staffed by generalists. It was headed by Charlotte 
Reid-Wills, a senior civil servant involved in both the UK EITI (as the chair of the multi-
stakeholder group) and in the policy on extractives’ mandatory reporting. There were six 
Grade 7 officials, among whom Elizabeth and her colleague Catherine Barnes, who 
                                                 
19 Thus called because a civil servant can be appointed for a position within it from the private or the third 
sector without first having to rise in the ranks of the civil service. 
 35 
worked on the mandatory transparency reporting policy, eight civil servants ranging in 
position from Executive Officer to Senior Executive Officer, and one administrative 
assistant. Gradations of seniority reflected age and experience in the civil service: 
Charlotte was in her early to mid 50s, with a long experience in the government; her 
subordinate Grade 7 officials were between early and late 40s, and the different Executive 
Officers were between their late 20s and mid-30s. These officials worked on a number of 
different policies, each of them in one or another way related to corporate accounting, 
reporting, shareholder participation etc. 
The organisational context of the UK EITI Secretariat 
With the permission to do fieldwork within BIS obtained, and my security check passed, 
on the first working day of February 2015 I appeared in the lobby of the Department’s 
building in 1 Victoria street in Westminster, London. Elizabeth met and led me up the 
stairs and through the corridors to the wing hosting her directorate. I had already been to 
her office once, on a rushed visit; now I had a chance to study it better.  
 
The Secretariat provided the coordination, mediation, logistical and administrative work 
necessary for the MSG's functioning. In her role as the head of the UK EITI Secretariat, 
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Elizabeth had an allegiance to the MSG as a whole, not to the Government20 constituency. 
At the same time, she—as well as Aimée Poole and Stewart Barber—remained a civil 
servant and thus a government employee, whose responsibility it was to see that the MSG 
produced the first UK EITI report in time and accordingly to the EITI Standard’s 
requirements. Achieving this involved persuading the stakeholders to work together, do 
some of the work for them, and, quite often, finding ways to bypass conflicts between 
and within the stakeholder constituencies.  
 
As Elizabeth led me through the long, well-lit corridors of the BIS building towards her 
office, I saw glass-walled, soundproof meeting rooms with people bent over papers or 
lying back in their chairs, and lounge areas with formica tables and low sofas (“For 
informal meetings”, explained Elizabeth). There were whiteboards on the walls of open-
plan office spaces, and wallpapers with smiling faces of happy BIS employees. It all 
looked more like the London office of Google, or a sleek start-up incubator somewhere 
in Shoreditch, than a government building (“BIS is a department of mavericks, they walk 
barefoot on carpeted floors!”—I recalled friend's words of warning.) Elizabeth had 
                                                 
20 Of course, it was more complicated than that. I discuss the Secretariat’s formal independence and the 
vicissitudes of demonstrating it in Chapter Seven. 
Figure 1.1. The office of the Corporate Governance team at BIS. Author’s photo. 
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worked in this building for more than a decade, having started when BIS was still the 
Department of Trade and Industry.  
A large cartoon bee plastered on a glass wall welcomed us as we entered the offices of 
the Business Environment directorate (or BE, hence the totem animal). The wing of the 
building hosting the office was divided by a wall, with two long rooms on each side. We 
turned to the right, where in the third of five rows of desks, each consisting of two sets of 
three large adjacent desks facing each other and separated by a low plastic barrier, 
Elizabeth had her working place. Next to her, sat Aimée and Stewart, the other Secretariat 
officials. I was offered to choose a desk. There were several free ones, as the previous 
round of austerity cuts to the personnel, and “flexible” working arrangements 
encouraging officials to work from home or other government buildings left the BE office 
part-empty. I settled on the one close to the three Secretariat officers.21 
 
In the following hours and days, I explored the office and the department building. In 
front of the entrance to the BE wing, sitting between its two rooms, was a pantry; on the 
other side of the office, there was a printing pool and an emergency staircase. It would 
                                                 
21 In the office, everyone was free to choose where they sat; each person had their personal drawer, where 
they stored their encrypted BIS laptop that could be connected to any workstation in the building. “Smart”, 
“flexible” working was encouraged. People still preferred to stick to their own team. 
Figure 1.2. Office corridors. Author’s photo. 
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take you some ten strides if you were hastening from the kitchenette—trying not to spill 
your freshly-made cup of tea— to the other side to wrestle with a printer jamming your 
documents. The ‘corridor’ you would have to walk through was lined with desks on one 
side, and book shelves and personal drawers, on the other. Above the drawers, the walls 
were covered with posters about productivity, management relations and development 
opportunities. “C-O-M-P-E-T-E”, said one, spelling out the imperatives of good 
government regulation.22 “No-one reads that crap, it was put up ages ago!”—protested 
one official at my attempt to take a photograph.  
 
Having understood from my interviews and official documents that the UK EITI 
Secretariat was a group of civil servants nominally separate from the organisational 
structures of BIS, it was revealing to see that this institutional division did not translate 
into a spatial one. The Secretariat was run from several desks in the middle of an open-
plan office (Figure 3) where everyone participated, if not in the work of everyone else, 
then at least in the witty and often cynical banter about work. This was, then, the space 
where the extractive transparency policy was devised and drafted, and from where the 
Secretariat officials coordinated much of the UK EITI’s implementation. I had to quickly 
learn that when Aimée and Stewart rolled up in their chairs to Elizabeth, I had better come 
close, too, as it meant that a document or an email was being discussed. Likewise, I 
learned to look around before speaking, to check whether the BE Director or Deputy 
Director could hear me. And it was not until several months into my stay at BIS, that the 
outsider’s impression that everyone around me was speaking in riddles, half-formed 
sentences and whispered truths, gave way to a better understanding of routine office 
conversations. 
  
It was immediately obvious that the Secretariat as an organisational entity ‘disappeared’ 
in the flow of everyday bureaucratic practice and sociality in the office, only to emerge 
again through officials’ formal performances and stance-taking in meetings (Irvine 1979), 
and through official policy artefacts that conjuring a web of organisational entities and 
social forms. It took me a bit more time to realise that, similarly to the Secretariat, the UK 
EITI itself was not a single entity, as the misleading simplicity of the word ‘policy’ 
suggested (Tate 2015: 7-9). For the bureaucrats at the Secretariat, who occupied the 
double positional identity of being both UK EITI officials and BIS civil servants, the UK 
                                                 
22 Competence, clear objectives, assessment of impact, exemptions and lighter regimes, target for burden 
reduction, and evaluation and enforcement. 
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EITI dissipated into a myriad of practices, the context for which was the officials’ day-
to-day work within the department. There was more to this work than just the EITI. Seen 
from the outside, so to speak, the UK EITI appeared as a constellation of the Secretariat 
and the three constituencies—a collaborative, participatory space of collective 
governance that opened up government policy to corporate and NGO representatives who 
took over many responsibilities of policy implementation. From this same perspective, 
the UK EITI was but one among many cases of the EITI implementation, a quasi-
governmental policy awkwardly relating to the usual ways of state work. And while 
Elizabeth, Aimée and Stewart often had to enact this perspective, the pragmatics of their 
work and their structural location within the civil service, meant that in the daily routine 
the UK EITI was for them just another project to work on. It was an object of bureaucratic 
practice, a matter of professional pride and satisfaction, for sure, yet it still remained 
something that they could stop working on from one moment to the next if assigned to a 
different policy, or offered a voluntary severance in the next expected round of civil 
service cuts. The fact that in this context they presented this assemblage of diverse 
practices, relationships, communicative events, and documents as one policy, indicates 
the civil servants’ “immersion in and accession to institutional logics” (Lea 2008: 228) of 
governmental work. Through this logic, the policy was enacted as something objectified, 
as an artefact of government’s instrumental rationality, and a tool of intervention into the 
‘real world’, itself imagined and constituted through policy artefacts (Riles 2001).  
The UK EITI and extractives’ mandatory reporting 
In so far as the UK EITI was not separate from other bureaucratic work that Elizabeth 
and her team were doing as civil servants—preparing annual reports, doing performance 
assessment, attending fortnightly team meetings and, most importantly, helping other 
colleagues with their work—it was also not separate from other policies at the Corporate 
Governance team and the Business Environment directorate. The head of the team, 
Charlotte Reid-Wills, was closely involved in the UK EITI as the chair of the UK multi-
stakeholder group. The team worked on a number of policies concerning corporate 
reporting and governance, among which the already mentioned policy on extractives’ 
mandatory reporting.  
 
Chapter 10, as the policy was known among the officials (for the chapter of the EU Accounting Directive 
from which it derived), was a result of years of campaigning by Global Witness and fellow NGOs. It was 
an heir to Global Witness' original idea of a policy on mandatory corporate disclosures of payments to 
governments, proposed to the government in 2003. Then, as I demonstrate in Chapters Three and 
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Four, their proposal was transformed through negotiations among several Whitehall departments, and 
between the government and the World Bank and G8 countries, eventually resulting in what became known 
as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Global Witness and the PWYP coalition continued to 
campaign for introducing a policy on mandatory reporting alongside the EITI, and eventually succeeded 
in the US and the EU. As I discuss in Chapter Six, officials form the Corporate Governance team 
(particularly Charlotte Reid-Wills) were involved in the EU negotiations of the Directive. These 
negotiations went in parallel with consultations with UK stakeholders—extractive corporations and 
members of the PWYP UK coalition—who wanted to influence the Directive’s rules. Later, when the UK 
government announced it would transpose the Chapter 10 into national law, the same officials prepared the 
primary and secondary law, and participated in developing an informal guidance for corporate reporting 
under the Chapter 10 rules. All of this happened in collaboration with the same stakeholders. The UK 
EITI was being implemented in parallel by their colleagues in the team, and the same stakeholders 
participated in it. During my fieldwork, these overlaps led to considerable frictions among the corporate 
and NGO participants, who had many disagreements about the mandatory reporting rules. The UK 
EITI and the mandatory reporting policy form the two poles between which the 
interactions among the protagonists of my ethnography unfolded.  
 
This chapter has provided a brief overview of the two sites of my fieldwork, touching on 
the main facts about the institutional and professional contexts in which the campaigners 
and the civil servants pursue their policy work. This outline will help the reader to 
navigate through the chapters of this thesis, in which I describe these people, their 
relationships, and their role in the social world of the UK EITI, in much greater detail. 
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Chapter Two 
Looking for a pattern in an anti-corruption investigation 
 
I met Mike in late October 2014. Our meeting followed a period of email exchange and 
two Skype conversations, despite both of us being in London. Since 2003, Mike had 
worked at the campaigning organisation Global Witness, where he led investigations into 
stories of corruption and embezzlement in the oil and gas, and banking sectors. While 
Mike mostly worked on cases from the former Soviet Union, Global Witness are perhaps 
better known for investigations into Cambodia’s illegal timber trade, Niger delta’s oil 
extraction, and Congo’s diamonds, and particularly into how corrupt management of 
natural resources fuels conflict and exacerbates poverty. The organisation’s campaigners 
have also used investigations to argue that the American and British offshore financial 
services industries, with secrecy and anonymity they offer, provide an infrastructure for 
such corruption. The organisation has published numerous reports with policy 
recommendations, and successfully engaged in advocacy to change corporate 
transparency policies in the UK, US and the European Union. It has also successfully 
campaigned to change the rules of the EITI, and some of its employees represented the 
Civil Society constituency in the UK EITI and the EITI International Board. Having come 
to do my fieldwork in London, I aimed to research anti-corruption investigations and 
campaigns, particularly those focusing on oil, gas and mining industries. I soon realised 
that to understand the campaigners’ work, I had to study it in relation to the targets of 
campaigning recommendations—namely, government officials and transparency policies 
they were implementing, or planned to implement.  
 
Mike was a knowledgeable source, as he had been involved in investigative work since 
the mid-2000s, and authored a number of reports. He agreed to an interview, albeit on the 
condition that we would not discuss his ongoing investigations. My research was 
potentially libellous;23 we would only talk about details of published reports that had been 
corroborated by robust evidence and checked by the organisation’s lawyers. We 
scheduled the meeting for 24 October, a Friday. It was late afternoon and I was waiting 
                                                 
23 At the time, Global Witness were involved in a legal dispute with an Israeli diamond billionaire whom 
they had accused of corruption, and who, under British information law, requested that the campaigners 
release all personal information about him that they held, which in Global Witness’ view would endanger 
their informants. Initially unaware of this dispute, I made a request to do participant observation at Global 
Witness’ offices. It was refused because my research was seen as potentially compromising the 
confidentiality of the organisation's ongoing work. 
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for Mike outside the Lloyds Chambers, an office building on the eastern side of the City’s 
Square Mile, where Global Witness had only recently moved to accommodate a 
constantly growing number of employees. 
 
As people were leaving the Chambers, I peered in their faces, trying to recognise Mike—
I had seen him once in a documentary on corruption in Central Asia produced by a major 
TV channel, in which he appeared as an expert on the region. When Mike came out, there 
was little about him of the stern, composed man I had seen on television. He was relaxed, 
chatty, casual. We went straight to a vodka bar in America Square, several hundred meters 
away. Inside, in soft red light, I could make out Soviet political posters hanging on the 
walls and even a lonely bust of Lenin welcoming visitors. The clientele were healthy-
looking, well-dressed City workers; Mike and I did not quite fit in. 
  
The bar was part of a chain called “Revolution”—something Mike didn’t miss to joke 
about. He took a great interest in Russian history and literature. “You see, if I wasn’t 
doing [my current job], I’d probably be looking at Pushkin’s poems, I’d be like, oh, he 
mentions a woman’s foot in this one, and he mentions a woman’s foot… I’d be looking 
at the same kind of thing: drawing parallels, doing word counts, you know, how many 
time does Pushkin use the word lyubov’…24 It’s the same thing!” Mike had spent 10 years 
investigating cases of graft that revealed relations between petroleum industry, finance 
and political corruption in the former Soviet Union. The sheer scale of his research, its at 
once scrupulously concrete and highly abstract character, and the skill of “piecing 
information together” into a “bigger picture”, made his work similar to that of a scholar 
(of structuralist inclinations) bent over Pushkin’s tomes. He thought himself an 
investigative journalist, but it was his Oxford degree in Russian that had gotten him the 
job in 2003. Since then, Mike learnt the skills required of a good sleuth. He took pride in 
his work: projects took months if not years to complete, and there was something 
rewarding for him just in “getting the information out there”, regardless of whether or not 
the investigation led to political change. Advocating for change through investigative 
reports, he said, was the job of campaigners—not investigators—at Global Witness. The 
organisation divided into several teams, each of them staffed with  both campaigners and 
investigators (or researchers), who collaborated on particular campaign topics. Mike was 
in the “Oil Team”. It is worth noting that such division of labour is typical in medium- 
                                                 
24 Love (Rus.). 
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and large-size advocacy organisations (for example, Transparency International UK or 
Natural Resource Governance Institute), and reflects the professionalisation and expert 
character of researchers’ and investigators’ work. 
 
Mike and I agreed to discuss one of his projects—an investigative report on Azerbaijan 
he had recently researched and co-authored with his colleague Bernard.25 Bernard was in 
his late twenties or early thirties—your typical Global Witness employee. When we met 
some months after my interview with Mike, we quickly established that we had several 
acquaintances in common in the world of London anti-corruption organisations. Since his 
student years, Bernard had been involved in anti-arms trade campaigns. Through his 
activism, he met someone who hired him as a research assistant for his book scrutinising 
corruption in the arms trade, whereby Bernard learned the basics of corporate 
investigations. At Global Witness, Bernard initial role was to do research, helping Mike 
with his Azerbaijan project.  
 
The project, as Mike remarked, was similar to the others he had done, and to 
investigations conducted by other teams at Global Witness both in terms of its methods 
and structure, and in the arguments and style of the final report.26 The report was entitled 
Azerbaijan Anonymous, and sought to expose how, as it puts it:  
little-known private companies are benefitting from deals struck by SOCAR, the 
State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, amassing assets worth hundreds of millions of 
dollars. The identity of the owners of many of these companies is unclear, as is 
why their companies were chosen to partner with SOCAR. (Global Witness 2013: 
9) 
 
When I first saw the report some months earlier, I was captivated by its central device—
a diagram depicting a networked structure of corporate ownership that had at its centre a 
name of a person, from which dozens of connections branched out to companies involved 
in deals with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR). In the course of my 
interview with Mike and, later, Bernard, I realised that the diagram not only embodied 
the results of their investigation, making visible presumably opaque and potentially 
                                                 
25 This was Bernard’s first investigation at Global Witness—he had joined after working for John 
Weichmann, a writer and founder of another investigative anti-corruption. I met Bernard much later, in 
April 2015. 
26 Both Mike and Bernard reflected on the similarities of their methods with investigative journalism and 
for-profit corporate investigations conducted for “due diligence” purposes. 
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corrupt business relationships in the way that was typical of most Global Witness’ reports, 
but had also been key to the investigative process itself. In this process, the investigators 
assembled and arranged information about social relations in a pattern of connectivity 
that further informed and structured their work.27 
 
Reconstructing Mike’s and Bernard’s investigation, and situating in a broader context of 
forensic and advocacy work at Global Witness and elsewhere, this chapter deals with the 
investigators’ expert practices and evidentiary procedures in order to understand how they 
come to know and expose corruption and corporate opacity. My aim is to explore how 
the problem of knowing graft and attributing responsibility for it, shapes campaigners’ 
understandings of how best to fight it.  
 
Based on interviews with a number of investigators and campaigners at Global Witness 
and other organisations, and using Mike and Bernard’s story of the making the Azerbaijan 
Anonymous report, this chapter asks: How do the investigators construct knowledge of 
the supposedly hidden realities of corruption? How do they make and present evidence 
underpinning their allegations of improper business practice, in order to attribute 
responsibility and demand accountability of people who, as they argue, take advantage of 
offshore secrecy and limited corporate liability? How is responsibility “created” (Laidlaw 
2014: 197-209) through practices of interpretation and representation that make visible 
agentive capacities of human persons, as opposed to corporate ones? What kind of 
expertise, epistemic and moral commitments does this work rely on? Let me sketch out 
the ethnographic problems which these questions address.  
 
*** 
The investigation, Mike explained, “pieced together” a web of links between deals that 
SOCAR struck with companies of unknown origin and ownership, showing the “unseen 
layer of things”. The report’s diagram of company ownership represented this web, and 
demonstrated that corporate entities registered in dozens of “offshore” jurisdictions, 
although at first sight unrelated, could be connected to one little known individual. The 
                                                 
27 See Law and Ruppert (2013: 230) on devices as patterned teleological arrangements. 
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report claimed that despite his privacy, 
this person was deeply involved in the 
Azerbaijani oil business and used the 
companies as a kind of a prosthetic tool 
to anonymously transact, and possibly 
hide, wealth originating from  
“dubious” deals with SOCAR. In Mike 
and Bernard’s opinion, these did not 
have legitimate economic rationale, 
and potentially dispossessed 
Azerbaijan’s government and its 
citizens from oil revenues that SOCAR 
would have accrued had it not been for 
this man’s involvement. So little was 
known about this person, and so 
profitable were his companies, that 
investigators wondered if he was 
merely a proxy for some powerful 
political figure.  
 
No corruption or other crime could be proven. But for investigators this case was 
indicative of a systemic malaise in Azerbaijan and elsewhere that allowed people to use 
“anonymous” companies in order to avoid accountability for their actions. 
 
The main recommendations of Azerbaijan Anonymous focused on improving and 
expanding the reporting requirements of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 
Azerbaijan was an EITI-compliant country, the report said, but the Initiative clearly had 
not prevented opaque oil deals from taking place: “The lack of transparency highlights 
gaps in the EITI, as it shows that countries can comply with its rules while large deals are 
being struck with very little transparency.” (Global Witness 2013: 3) Anonymity of 
company ownership and contracts made by SOCAR were such gaps, and the campaigners 
sought to use the report to argue that the Azerbaijani EITI had to force participating 
companies, including SOCAR, to disclose more information. 
 
Figure 2.1. The cover page of the report. 
Courtesy of Global Witness. 
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The report was part of a larger campaign28 of Global Witness which, as Mike put it to me, 
sought to demonstrate that “corruption is a world-wide international system”, enabled by 
companies “registered somewhere in a supposedly reputable jurisdiction”—for example, 
London. There (and in Washington, and Brussels), Global Witness use reports like 
Azerbaijan Anonymous to advocate for policies that supposedly make corporate 
ownership more transparent. This and other reports describe socio-politics effects 
(underdevelopment, embezzlement of public funds etc.) of the misuse of corporate 
structures and link them to structural and systemic causes—in the case of Azerbaijan 
Anonymous, opacity and limited liability of corporate entities,29 and the supposedly 
unaccountable character of the Azerbaijani oil industry.  
 
A brief note about Global Witness’ understanding of the role of corporate entities in the 
“shadow system” of corruption is in order; it will help me explain how and why the 
investigators search for and interpret information in the way they do. Put bluntly, the 
investigators’ problem is with the legal doctrine of corporate personality, which asserts 
that for the purposes of law, corporate entities are “persons”, i.e. can enter certain kinds 
of relationships, have rights and obligations30 which are separate from those who own, 
control or make up the corporation in a legal or sociological sense (Naffine 2003; see 
Bashkow 2010 for an anthropological treatment of the doctrine’s history). Many types of 
companies operate under limited liability, which greatly restricts the ways in which 
company’s directors or shareholders can be held responsible for actions and obligations 
that the law recognises as the company’s. Where this is paired with anonymity of 
company ownership (which is an element of services provided by so-called “offshore” 
jurisdictions, such as the British Virgin Islands, Jersey or Panama), cases such as the ones 
Azerbaijan Anonymous deals with, arise. 
 
                                                 
28 By “campaign”, following my informants, I understand an organised attempt to influence public policy, 
raise public awareness or achieve some other goal through orchestrated collective effort. This often includes 
publications, reports to Parliament, newsletters, demonstrations and so on. 
29 In this chapter, I use the terms “company”, “corporation” and “corporate entity” interchangeably. The 
latter term, however, is intended to highlight the emic view of companies as instruments created by legal 
technique and animated by human agency. 
30 For anthropologists, this claim brings to mind arguments about culturally specific classifications of who 
counts as person Bashkow 2014; Welker and Wood 2011; Welker, Partridge and Hardin 2011). Annelise 
Riles (2012) argues that corporate personality should be approached in terms of legal pragmatics. 
Nevertheless, in law itself the category of legal person is often infused with metaphysical properties 
normally associated with human (and non-human) persons in non-legal contexts (Naffine 2003). 
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Although Global Witness seek to address corruption as a system, the persuasiveness of 
their work relies on investigating specific cases. Evidential operations of the 
investigations demonstrate how between the deep causes and their broad social effects, 
lie actions of individuals like the one uncovered in the Azerbaijan Anonymous. 
Identification of actors who abuse “the system” (as both Mike and Bernard put it to me), 
allows the campaigners to attribute agency and responsibility for a variety of social ills to 
particular individuals and groups. This epistemic and moral problem of identifying an 
agent that can be held responsible for (potential) corruption is at the heart of most Global 
Witness investigations.31  
 
Investigations and campaigns to change government policies and EITI structures that they 
underpin, are a moral project aiming to remedy the ills of the socio-political order in 
various locations by reforming relations between corporations, states, and citizens. This 
project, as I want to demonstrate, begins with making corruption an object of knowledge, 
and the ways in which this happens, affect the recommendations and policy proposals that 
Global Witness and similar organisations advocate for. (I will discuss this in the 
conclusions.) Paying detailed ethnographic attention to these issues, this chapter sets the 
foundation for my inquiry in the rest of the thesis, where I will explore what happens 
when the campaigners’ moral project of reforming extractive capitalism through 
transparency, becomes entwined with government policies in the UK, implemented by 
civil servants with their own ethical commitments and visions of organisational order. 
 
My ethnography describes how Mike and Bernard reconstruct relations and actions 
supposedly obscured and “cut” (Strathern 1996) by the limited liability and opacity of 
companies they investigate. It attends to the work of relation and separation that inheres 
in the making of forensic knowledge about people “behind” anonymous corporate 
vehicles. In doing so, I follow the course of the investigation itself and describe operations 
and practices through which Mike and Bernard assemble investigative knowledge and 
proofs. I argue that the work that goes into making things transparent in the course of 
                                                 
31 But also of activist investigations more generally, as well as of investigative journalism and corporate 
due diligence investigations. I interviewed investigators from two different investigative NGOs (Global 
Witness and Corruption Watch UK), several investigative journalists, and a number of due diligent 
professionals from three corporate intelligence firms in London, two of which were multi-national. These 
people often described their work—or at least its practical aspect—as part of a broader community of 
practice comprising investigators working for NGOs, news organisations, and private companies. In other 
words, they suggested that method and problems of their work were often quite typical across organisations 
and countries, allowing people to move from NGO investigations to corporate due diligence firms, and the 
other way around.  
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investigation (which is made invisible in the final report) should not be taken for granted, 
as the immediacy presupposed by the visual metaphor would suggest. Contrary to the 
claims of some investigators (including Mike), who see this work as nothing more than 
an application of common sense, I argue that it relies on expert skills and aesthetic 
sensitivities that allow the investigators to find information and make sense of it by 
identifying “suspicious” patterns. 
 
Following investigators’ concern with diagramming, I make Azerbaijan Anonymous’ 
diagram the centre of my reconstructive32 inquiry. Reminiscent of kinship charts and 
Alfred Gell’s schemes of artistic oeuvre indexing distributed personhood (1998: 235), the 
corporate network chart in the report opens a window on investigators’ conceptions of 
agency and sociality, as well as their attempts to define what constitutes a “real” person 
to whom responsibility can be attributed in the anonymous world of offshore capitalism. 
The manner in which these conceptions and definitions were constituted and 
operationalised in the course of the investigation, is of empirical and theoretical interest 
to anthropology because of the novelty and public significance of the subject,33 and of the 
way it illuminates the classic disciplinary debates on agency and attributions of 
responsibility. My inquiry thus starts with this report—the objectified result34 of almost 
a year of investigative and editorial work.  
                                                 
32 Since I was not allowed to inquire about or observe any ongoing projects, my intention with the interviews 
was to reconstruct what an investigation could have looked like “in action” (Latour 1987). But such a 
reconstruction, based on post-factum interviews rather than observations, fails to apprehend the open-
ended, prospective character of the investigative knowledge practices. To somehow replicate the 
“hopefulness” (Miyazaki 2004) of these practices, I need to suspend temporarily the moment of 
ethnographic revelation about certain details of the investigations, thus inverting the premise from which I 
conducted the interviews: I always already knew its results. My quest to find out about investigative 
procedures was always already circumscribed by the knowledge about the result of these procedures. 
During fieldwork, I did not know whether I would find out enough about Mike and Bernard’ work by 
interviewing them. Just like their investigation, my research was an uncertain affair, to which this 
description provides a partial closure. These analogies make this chapter meta-ethnographic in that the 
ethnography can be read as an (allegoric) commentary on its own conditions of production (cf. Boyer 2008; 
Holmes and Marcus 2005). 
33 The problem of offshore secrecy and corporate services has been recently brought to the fore of the public 
debate on taxation and good citizenship by the so-called Panama Papers scandal, and Swiss and 
Luxembourg “leaks” before that. 
34 The report brought this work to the public—or rather, different publics. In its recommendations section, 
the publication explicitly addresses the multi-stakeholder group of Azerbaijan’s Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), the Azerbaijani government, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, the 
international EITI board, and the “international community”. In another sense, the public of the report are 
also the regular readers of Global Witness’ website, people subscribed to regular email notifications, and 
supporters of the organisation. 
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The investigation begins  
I brought my heavily annotated copy of Azerbaijan Anonymous to the interview with 
Mike.35 He seemed pleased with my numerous notes scribbled all over the report’s 40 
pages. As we talked, this colourful A4 booklet that lay on the pub table between us, 
became a point of reference to which we would return whenever the conversation took us 
too far in one direction. I found it useful to have a physical object that was a result and an 
embodiment of the practices of investigation; to my surprise, so did Mike and, later, 
Bernard, who would both leaf through the report during the interviews, picking out case 
studies, pointing to footnotes, and showing elements of the diagram, to give concrete 
examples of their work.  
 
As Mike and I started to talk about his investigation, I opened the report on the page with 
the diagram. It purported to represent a network of “non-transparent” companies with 
which the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) had made various deals. The 
diagram we both looked at showed multiple boxes of different colours (dark red for “joint 
ventures with SOCAR”, sea green for “contract holders with SOCAR”), company names 
printed inside them. The boxes were all linked up by lines signifying connections of 
several kinds. Most indicated shareholding. In the middle of the diagram, slightly apart 
from other boxes, was a larger rectangle inside which in a font instantly drawing the 
reader’s attention, was typed an Azeri name—the “only real name” in the diagram, 
explained Mike. The visual organisation of the chart suggested that the links led, in a 
centripetal manner, from companies on the diagram’s periphery to the “real name” at its 
centre. Yet at the beginning, the investigation did not focus on a particular set of 
companies, let alone a single person owning them. Everything that the diagram so 
persuasively rendered transparent in a recognisable visual code of an organisational chart, 
was still an uncharted territory. As Mike put it, “It was just, ‘Let’s have a look at these 
deals that have been cited by the Azeri observers as not very transparent.’” 
 
“We knew we wanted to do a piece on Azerbaijan because we’d been hearing from the 
Azeri civil society that SOCAR wasn’t very transparent.”—he explained. The most 
obvious place to start was the State Oil Company itself. On its web-site, and in the 
                                                 
35 Mike confessed to holding a copy of the report at home: “If you’re a poet, you want to keep a collection 
of your poems, and it’s the same kind of thing, I think.” Despite his clear sense of authorship, it was not 
acknowledged in the report—a standard Global Witness practice to protect its employees from libel 
litigation. 
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Azerbaijani corporate registry, it published lists of subsidiaries (companies it owned) and 
contract-holders, as well as annual reports and accounts that by their nature had to contain 
certain kinds of disclosures. These lists and disclosures, although incomplete, provided 
important clues. Mike explained: 
If SOCAR mentions it’s doing business with company X, then you go to [i.e. look 
for financial and legal documents of the] company X. If it’s got a subsidiary in 
Switzerland, you note down the name of that company. So, from that public 
information—which is not secret sources or anything like that—you just create a 
list of interesting people and companies. From that, […] we start to put names of 
these companies into company registry databases. So, the company registered in 
Switzerland has got a company record in Switzerland. Who is involved, who are 
the directors? Can we speak to the directors? Who are the shareholders, can we 
speak to the shareholders? Can we send letters to them and get more information? 
Are they going to be publishing their own annual accounts [most shareholders are 
other companies], which might add more information on the relation between 
them and the other company? So again, it’s not hidden information, it’s all out 
there, you just need someone to go in and really investigate it and put the pieces 
together. [Here and further, my emphasis—TF] 
 
The process that Mike describes here is the “follow the money” procedure, based on the 
idea that records of financial and corporate activities can index relations between 
corporate entities and/or people. The assumption, and the procedure itself, are typical to 
activist, journalistic and corporate investigations, and has even become an element of 
anti-terror and anti-money laundering operations As Marieke de Goede points out with 
regard to terrorism finance inquiries, “Through the idea that money trails do not lie [and 
we need to remember that corporate vehicles, represented in accounting records, 
essentially are money—TF], financial analysis came to hold the promise of unmediated 
and direct access to the mapping of terrorist networks.” (2012: 57) However, unlike these 
law enforcement investigations, Mike’s (or for that matter, most journalists’) procedures 
relied on publicly available information. His investigation took form of “screenwork” that 
collected and transformed already existing information into new knowledge, reminding 
of Dominic Boyer’s (2013) insightful ethnography of informational practices of 
contemporary news journalism in Germany. 
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In most countries, corporate entities are required to submit regular reports to special 
institutions—company registries36—who document companies’ creation and functioning. 
Depending on the country, the information in corporate registries can be public or not, 
and in function of the country’s accounting regime, the registries can require companies 
to submit various kinds of information and reports. Usually it is articles of association, 
notices of change of directors or registration address, and annual reports and accounts 
about the company’s financial standing.37 Today, accounting literacy—a good grasp of 
how to retrieve information from corporate accounts and make inferences from it—is the 
skill required not only of accountants and company directors, but also of financial 
journalists and investigators, and is taught in universities and specialised courses. Mike 
had learnt it while working for Global Witness, with time becoming so proficient that he 
started to teach financial investigations himself.38 
 
Money—that is, business activities and transactions—that Mike followed, could inform 
him about company’s relationships with its shareholders, contractors and subsidiaries. An 
investigation therefore was constituted by informational practices (Boyer 2013) that, for 
Bernard, were a matter of methodical “going through documents” and looking for 
                                                 
36 In Great Britain, it is the Companies House. 
37 As a director of an organisation allied with Global Witness put it in a lecture (Taggart 2014), in XIX-
century Britain, filing of these documents was part of the same legal-historic process by which the legal 
personality and limited liability of companies were constituted. In his opinion, reporting procedures and 
public availability of corporate records aimed to ensure public trust in company’s capacity to honour its 
obligations despite it being an entity outside of the mundane relational ways by which people held each 
other accountable. 
38 As did several other investigators whom I interviewed, including Bernard. This gives strong support to 
my earlier claim that techniques of Mike and Bernard’s investigation were typical to and thus representative 
of a community of practice extending beyond NGO investigators, to investigative and financial journalists 
and corporate due diligence professionals. At the beginning of my fieldwork, I decided that to understand 
the investigations that I wanted to study, I would need to learn basic techniques of accounting and 
investigative journalism. I attended a summer school on investigative journalism at the Centre for 
Investigative Journalism (CIJ) at Goldsmith’s, University of London. The school ran over three days in 
early July 2014, two of which were devoted to specialised workshops. The audience, as far as I could tell, 
were beginners like me and practitioners from journalism and NGOs who wanted to consolidate their 
knowledge (among them a researcher from Global Witness). One of the workshops was led by an 
established forensic accountant Raj Bairoloya. In his workshop, Bairolya explained the meaning of different 
elements of company accounts, and what one could infer from them about company’s business, and actions, 
interests and relationships of its owners. “What is revealed by the small print in the accounts, what is hiding 
behind the numbers, and who is in charge? […] Do the directors have political connections? Are the 
questions being raised by [company’s] activities? […] Are there a number of related companies forming 
part of a complex web?” All these questions, according to a guide to corporate accounts that Bairoliya 
published with the CIJ (Bairoliya 2014: 6), can be answered by finding “where the real story is in a set of 
company accounts”. Other courses at summer school focused on finding information in the UK Companies 
House and in corporate registries in other countries. Only after the course did I learn that Bairoliya had 
taught short training courses at Global Witness for a number of years; I also found out that he had taught 
together with Mike on a number of more in-depth CIJ courses over several years. Bernard, too, had taught 
classes on investigative techniques at the CIJ. 
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connections; and, for Mike, of “digesting” the information found in documents. It was a 
forensic undertaking that framed information as clues (or, retrospectively, as evidence) 
and sought to infer and reconstruct events, relationships and transactions from their 
documentary traces. As such, it worked within a semiotic convention, or an evidentiary 
paradigm (Ginzburg 1983; see also Eco and Sebeok 1983), in which information in 
company accounts indexed corporate connections and transactions, which themselves 
gave clues about relationships among people who owned the companies or otherwise 
“stood behind” (Mike) them. 
 
Starting with corporate documents on SOCAR’s website, Mike identified a number of 
joint ventures39 that SOCAR had established with private companies in various 
jurisdictions. Through corporate records of some of these joint ventures, Mike and 
Bernard found out about their shareholders, and the shareholders of the shareholders, and 
companies related to them, in the end constructing a chain of ownership that led from 
many of SOCAR’s joint ventures to one Singapore-registered company—Union Grand 
Energy PTE Ltd. (UGE). Examining whatever records they could find about UGE, the 
investigators established that the company did most of its business with SOCAR and its 
subsidiaries (Global Witness 2013). Moreover, said Bernard, there “seemed to be a pattern 
of one person sitting behind all these businesses”, that is, the deals with the State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan. Documents that Union Grand Energy at one point filed in 
Singapore stated that a certain Anar Aliyev was the legal owner of the company.  
 
But who was this man, the investigators asked themselves. There was little they could 
find about Aliyev; their contacts in Azerbaijan had not heard of him either. According to 
the returns that UGE and its subsidiaries had filed, Aliyev had to be a successful multi-
millionaire (Global Witness 2013: 9) Yet, he had virtually no public profile and the 
investigators did not manage to contact him; this was suspicious. At the same time, many 
of SOCAR’s joint ventures and associated companies were registered in so-called 
offshore “tax heavens” such as the British Virgin Islands, where there are few legal 
requirements about corporate disclosures. This allowed the companies to publicly 
disclose very little, if anything, about their operation and ownership. Such anonymity of 
ownership complicated Mike and Bernard’s task—they suspected that some of SOCAR’s 
joint ventures could be related (otherwise than through SOCAR itself), but there was little 
                                                 
39 That is, companies 50% owned by party A, and 50% owned by party B. 
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information available to substantiate their suspicion. Knowing who owned Union Grand 
Energy, Bernard and Mike repeatedly searched corporate registries of various offshore 
Figure 2.2. An ownership diagram. Source: Global Witness 2013: 18. Courtesy of 
Global Witness.  
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jurisdictions, using “Anar Aliyev” and names of companies he controlled as search terms. 
They were looking “for the same pattern”40 (Bernard). 
 
 
 
For the investigators, the pervasive lack of information about SOCAR’s oil trading and 
the ownership of its business partners, cast doubts over the legitimacy of these deals and 
generated suspicion: were these deals real, or a sham? Mike told me that evidence pointed 
to Aliyev’s “importance” to SOCAR, which “by extension that he [was] not known, 
raise[d] the question of how he got that role.” Was Aliyev even the real owner, or did he 
himself stand for someone else? Mike and Bernard’s evidence was incomplete and 
uncertain, and often allowed only for speculative inferences about the social reality 
behind the seemingly disconnected offshore companies. The pattern that Bernard was 
looking for had still not been “found”.41 
 
                                                 
40 I will return to the notion of “pattern” later in the chapter. 
41 It is remarkable how both investigators—and to my knowledge, many of their fellow campaigners and 
investigative journalists—used naturalistic terms to describe their informational practices. Information, 
connections, pattern, are all “found” or “revealed” or “uncovered”, as if they had objective reality 
independent of the epistemic practices that constitute them for the investigators. 
Box 1. The case of SOCAR Trading SA  
SOCAR Trading SA was one company they identified in this way was. Registered in 
Switzerland, it was owned by a Malta-registered Supra Holding Ltd. 50% of Supra Holding’s 
shared belonged to Anar Aliyev and a Russian businessman Valery Golovushkin (in both 
cases, owned through a chain of offshore companies); the other 50%, to the State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan. SOCAR Trading SA bought oil produced by SOCAR and re-sold it 
on the international market, with half of the profits going to the Aliyev and Golovushkin, 
instead of the State Oil Company. The business model seemed strange, the investigators 
explained to me. Why did SOCAR give away 50% of its business to private shareholders 
that, in this particular case, appeared to bring in no additional expertise or value? In 
Azerbaijan Anonymous, they listed different reasons for which SOCAR could have sought a 
private middleman to sell its oil, only to say that none of them was likely in the case of 
SOCAR Trading SA. In their opinion, the business model did not make economic sense and 
was difficult to justify. With time, SOCAR bought out the privately held shares of SOCAR 
Trading SA, at the same time reintroducing an analogous middleman company into its 
trading structures. The investigators claimed that complicated corporate structures 
obfuscated the ownership of SOCAR’s partners. In their view, because SOCAR was state-
owned, was one of the main contributors to the state budget, and was widely believed to be 
politically controlled, such opacity, which had evidently been intentionally created, could 
indicate corruption (Global Witness 2013: 18-23).  
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Writing about due diligence techniques in offshore financial services in the British Virgin 
Islands, Bill Maurer suggests that “[i]n a field [of transactions] imagined to be 
characterised by highly abstract, de-contextualised, and rapidly (almost instantaneously) 
mobile capital, due diligence represents an effort to ground and recontextualise offshore 
activity in a social reality of social connection and of regard.” (Maurer 2005: 486) In a 
similar manner (although with a rather opposite aim), by making visible the connections 
between the seemingly unrelated companies and a person “behind” them, Mike and 
Bernard recontextualise SOCAR’s and Aliyev’s business deals in a social reality of 
personal links which is problematic precisely because it contravenes normative ideals of 
impersonal transactions. The density of these relationships, and lack of information that 
could explain why the companies are so intricately interconnected, warrant the 
investigators’ inferences about intentional agency behind them.  
 
In what follows, I will dwell in more detail on investigators’ knowledge practices and 
evidentiary procedures, and the expertise and aesthetic sensitivities they operationalise in 
order to “find” and “reveal” a pattern of connections. Explaining what these connections 
are, and how they are made, I will prepare the ground for a later discussion of the network 
diagram and attributions of agency it supports.  
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Connections and patterns: piecing the whole together  
SOCAR Trading SA (see Box 
1) was just one of the 
companies Mike and Bernard 
managed to associate with 
Anar Aliyev. Both 
investigators spoke about 
these associations in a manner 
that suggested their existence 
externally to the investigation 
itself; connections and patterns 
needed to be looked for and 
found and revealed; 
sometimes they revealed 
themselves; but it was less 
clear as to what exactly a 
connection was. Perhaps, this 
should not have surprised me, 
given that in English, 
connections and relations are 
often reified and appear as 
stand-alone entities (Strathern 
1995; 2014). But as Bernard and Mike spoke about connections in a way that made them 
appear almost independent of what they connected, I wondered what there was in 
common among particular instances of semiotic and social relations the investigators 
“discovered”. I asked Bernard about this when we met in late April 2014 at the offices of 
Global Witness. How exactly did he proceed “looking” for connections? What kind of 
information could indicate one? Bernard:  
You try to spot everywhere where [Anar] is a director, or shareholder, or any 
contact with the company […] and [you’re] correlating, Who else is at this 
address, and […] for example, you look at one of the companies, and it says, it’s 
[registered at] number 1 John Locke street, you look up [the address], and see 
what other companies are listed at number 1 John Locke street, because when 
people are trying to set up [many] companies [at the same time], they are going to 
set them up from the same building, if not.. Or use the same phone number […] 
Figure 2.3. Bernard showing me the connections. 
Author’s photo. 
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You can try to link addresses, phone numbers, people, all to see whether there is 
some kind of connection …  
 
What did these associations and correlations indicate? He explained:  
It’s quite tricky—often it means the same person. Sometime it means, the 
company doesn’t have any obvious business of any kind. Often you are looking, 
it’s a bit of a red flag if you look at what’s supposed to be a simple company and 
it doesn’t have a [representative web-site], it’s only got nominees [people acting 
as someone’s proxies for a remuneration] involved in the directorship. 
 
This explanation, necessarily vague, points not to an underlying definition or a conceptual 
model of connection, but to a certain practical judgment of the investigators about what 
is “suspicious” and thus worth taking into account in a particular case. Bernard, again: 
You kind of have your ‘suspicious bastard’ cap on as well. So, I went through all 
of the companies, and [I was thinking] ‘This one looks a bit dodgy’, ‘This one 
looks a bit dodgy’, ‘This one looks a bit dodgy’—some of them weren’t connected 
to Anar in the end. And I never figured out who, what they were really about. And 
some of them may’ve been legitimate as well, [they were] just unheard of, with 
very little public profile. […] By looking and searching in these jurisdictions and 
looking at all available paperwork you can get, from SOCAR, from his [Aliyev’s] 
companies, from others who might have done other deals in the same kinda nexus, 
you could build up a picture and you know we went down massive rabbit holes 
where I thought that maybe this company might be connected and went and found 
a legal case they had against them in some jurisdiction and searched through legal 
case to see if there’s any mention of Anar and there wasn’t, well, it wasn’t Anar. 
 
Two related things stand out it Bernard’s comment. One is the uncertainty of speculative 
inferences made from records and documents. To follow a connection, was to entertain a 
possibility that the speculation that X was connected to Y, would be corroborated once 
evidence of it was found. Sometimes, however, this led Bernard “down massive rabbit 
holes” that did not confirm his speculative hypothesis. On other occasions, despite the 
investigators’ strong persuasion that “there was a link”, they could not find enough, or the 
right kind of, evidence to substantiate their suspicion that Aliyev was involved in a 
particular company. “Most of this shareholding are obvious things”—Bernard said about 
this, —“but sometimes you find the link and you can’t quite work out why he’s linked to 
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where he is—you can’t find link in between, and then there are loads of loose links in the 
end, that didn’t connect to SOCAR and didn’t connect to anything as far as we could tell.”  
 
The process of investigation, of substantiating suspicion with evidence, was not linear42. 
Mike and Bernard did not work from one connection to another, node by node. Rather, 
there were many unconnected companies that they knew or suspected to be associated 
with Anar Aliyev, but they still had to find out how. In one case, for example, there was a 
similarity in the names of two companies, which suggested that they were linked, but 
Bernard could not find any documents that would corroborate the inference and help 
specify just what kind of link it was: “you go, well, obviously that’s the same guys [i.e. 
the same people set up the two companies in different jurisdictions], it’s very unlikely 
that there’s anything else going there, but we couldn’t quite figure out what they were 
actually doing, and how they were connected…” This suggests that the investigators’ 
situated knowledge, which they described in the idiom of revelation and assembling, is 
not a matter of discreet states of knowing/not knowing, but is more complex. It includes 
modalities of suspicion, hypothetical inference, and partial, uncertain and unconfirmed 
knowledge,43 which eventually all require confirmation and redescription through 
evidential protocols in order to stand a legal test. 
 
The second point that stands out in Bernard’s comment is that besides speculation, the 
ability to follow connections relies on a judgment about how a company record “looks”. 
Suspicion about activities and relationships described in company records is expressed in 
judgment that distinguished the normal from the abnormal, “legitimate” from “dodgy”. 
This abnormality is what the French sociologist Luc Boltanski (2014) captures with the 
term “mystery” in his account of the development of detective and spy fiction in Britain 
                                                 
42 Curiously, Bernard spoke of “working out” connection by going in one “direction”, or in the other, which 
is reminiscent of how the network diagram spatially orders the company ownership structures, providing a 
sense of expanse and direction. 
43 In a curious parallel, Marieke de Goede argues that the use of analysis of financial transactions to identify 
terrorist’s potential associates (“link analysis”) in the financial transactions provider SWIFT “can be 
understood as a purposefully speculative technology: the objective is not to trace the steps of known 
terrorists but to discover new leads and to identify the ‘unknown terrorist’.” (2012: 62). And commenting 
on the emergent infrastructure of financial records that banks are required to keep for anti-terrorist and anti-
money laundering purposes, she suggests that: “Producing actionable suspicion is arguably the main 
objective of financial datamining in a broad sense” (2012: 59). The work of suspicion here is markedly 
different from what I’ve described in the context of Global Witness’ inquiry. However, the parallel between 
the two brings to light the similarity in the underlying assumptions in the two cases—namely, that analysis 
of financial records allows for speculative inferences about people and their associates whose activity 
directly or indirectly (through a corporate vehicle) is thus recorded. Suspicion in this sense is what defines 
the process of inquiry. 
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and France. For Boltanski, a “mystery arises from an event […] that stands out in some 
way against a background […] or against the traces of a past event”. This background is 
constituted by prior experience and learning which give rise to expectations about a 
normal course of events. A mystery,44 in the sociologist’s account, is an event “whose 
character can be called abnormal, one that breaks with the way things present themselves 
under conditions that we take to be normal” (Boltanski 2014: 3, emphases removed). But 
if it may seem that a mystery—a dodgy-looking company—passively elicit suspicion of 
the sleuth, I want to stress the cultivated, practiced aspect of suspicion: seeing a company 
record as suspicious entails active evaluation of clues against one’s prior knowledge. 
Thus, Boltanski’s treatment of the structure of mystery calls for attention to personal 
knowledge and expertise on which an evaluation of normality of events relies. This 
judgment is based on an expectation of “reasonable” business practices—an expectation 
which is uncertain, and by no means unique to activist investigators.45 The very possibility 
that some companies may look “dodgy” for Bernard, is premised on investigative 
expertise in accounting practices, cultivated through practice. A “suspicious bastard cap” 
has to be earned, or learnt. 
 
In the course of my fieldwork, I interviewed not only investigators in campaigning 
organisations, but also people engaged in a similar kind of investigative work, but 
employed by private-sector, for-profit companies.46 These “due diligence” professionals, 
working at major risk consultancy companies in London, often reflected on how the 
procedural aspect of their work was almost identical to that of investigators like Mike and 
Bernard, or financial journalists.47 Trying to understand how one learnt what could be 
                                                 
44 The notion of mystery is essential to Boltanski’s account of the anxieties about the “reality of reality”, 
around which detective and spy narratives are constructed (2014: 15). These anxieties, Boltanski argues 
(2014: 32-5; 224-39; 260-7), are not fictional or literary—sociology, too, is in the business of “unveiling” 
the real reality behind the apparent one, although one difference between the conspiracy form of novels, 
and hermeneutic of suspicion (Ricoeur 1970) of critical social science, is how the two impose limits on the 
enterprise of unveiling, and the styles of causal attributions they make. (See also Keane 2010 for the ethical 
work of evaluation of “the surface of things”—appearances and forms of social action). 
45 Bill Maurer (2005) points out the ethical scrutiny underwriting due diligence checks in the offshore 
financial industry. However, where Global Witness investigators seek to expose personal connections 
whose existence indexes possible corruption, due diligence techniques tend to place trust in customers who 
become known and “contextualised” precisely through personal references and relationships. 
46 Some of them were familiar with Global Witness’ reports and mined them for clues for their own 
investigations. 
47 And, sure enough, they were—at least as far as I can tell from their own descriptions of tools, databases 
and methods they used. Even the terminology and tropes they employed to describe their work was similar 
to that of investigators in advocacy organisations. As a reflection on the similarity of skills and methods 
required for these differently organised kinds of investigation, I can cite a number of occasions when both 
due diligence and NGO investigators spoke about moving from a private firm to an NGO or vice versa. 
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considered suspicious, I turned to Eleanor, an informant and friend who had worked for 
a due diligence department of a large risk consultancy firm in London. She recalled how 
on her first day at work, she was handed over a number of corporate records. “My boss 
told me, ‘Dig around these records and find whether there’s anything suspicious.’ ‘What 
does she want from me?’ I thought.” Eleanor explained her puzzlement about the demand: 
what could be suspicious about a set of tables and numbers? I asked if she remembered 
when and how she realised what the boss wanted. No, Eleanor said: she didn’t have a 
moment when she would register that she had learned, or was learning. This must have 
been gradual and implicit in the process of working with the records. The problem with 
her first assignment was, she mused, that she joined at the end of the project and had not 
observed it all along, and so did not know much about the person whose business they 
were investigating. “It’s difficult to know how people learn [what’s suspicious or not]”, 
she explained, “but when you see [an investigation] from the beginning to the end, and 
the client tells you about a lead, you kind of understand where to start looking from.” 
Bernard had a similar observation, when (protesting against my interpretation of 
“suspicion” in an earlier draft of this chapter) he said that when one does investigations, 
one almost always knows what he or she is looking for. Just as there is a learnt expectation 
of normal business practices (e.g. that a person that has nothing to hide will not use 
offshore companies), so an investigator learns about the common ways in which people 
use companies and financial transactions to disguise illicit activities. Such investigative 
expertise may be called aesthetic (Amoore 2013: 129-54; Riles 2001: 185n4) to the extent 
that it is expressed in acts of evaluation of form of clues and their associations (that is, 
the “look” of the company). To discern what is dodgy and what is not, one needs “an eye 
for certain things,” as Mike once put it to me. Information, he said, is “out there”, but one 
must know how to “see” what it shows; by extension, one also must know what to look 
for.  
 
***  
Bernard was very clear about this. When he joined Mike to work on the Azerbaijan 
investigation, he “started going through corporate records […], going through all the 
SOCAR subsidiaries […] and looking for the same pattern.” Just what kind of pattern that 
would be, he could not know, but his experience informed what elements the pattern could 
have. The pattern he did find, was one of numerous connections between Anar Aliyev and 
SOCAR’s joint ventures and contract-holding companies: “we identified that there 
seemed to be a pattern of this one guy sitting behind all these businesses, all these deals 
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with the State Oil Company…” Once it was established, looking for further connections 
became a matter of finding elements that could fit the pattern. A patterned arrangement 
gave (new) meaning48 to elements constituting it, thereby confirming uncertain inferences 
(Engelke 2008: S17), and redirecting the speculative orientation of inferences towards the 
possible replication of connections in a predictable patterned way. The search for a 
pattern, like suspicion that leads it, is central to the process of investigation, and once 
again illustrates how the expertise required for it can be characterised as “aesthetic”—in 
other words, as having to do with the “pattern which connects” (Bateson 1979: 8). 
Describing their investigations, Mike and Bernard often relied on tropes that connoted 
collection and assembling of elements into a whole, as if the role of the investigator were 
to put elements of a jigsaw puzzle together. They did not use this particular analogy, but 
their colleague from another organisation, Corruption Watch UK, did. To assemble a 
puzzle, one has to iteratively fit available elements to see whether they could connect into 
a recognisable pattern/image which is given prior to, and independently of, one’s attempts 
to assemble it. Similarly to a puzzle, once a whole is made, it becomes a ‘picture’, a 
representation of something else than itself. Describing one investigation that he had been 
involved in earlier, Mike said:  
                                                 
48 Or, if we were to follow Gregory Bateson’s (1987) definition of meaning, we could say that the pattern 
of information is the meaning. 
Figure 2.4. The diagram of Anar Aliyev’s company network. Source: Global Witness 
2013: 16-7. Courtesy of Global Witness. 
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We listed company names, which ones were listed in the UK. And I put one name 
[into a corporate registry search engine], and then I get another hit, and then I get 
another hit, so we got ten companies registered in the UK, and you’re like wow, 
that’s interesting. And then you do a company search and out of these ten, six are 
registered in the same address. And then I got, Wow, now the scheme is starting 
to reveal itself, and that’s very satisfying. But in the beginning it wouldn’t 
necessarily be so, you’d know something vague about money laundering 
[happening in one of the companies]… Something’s looking suspicious… But 
now, if these six companies are registered at the same address, or directed by the 
same people, then it’s likely that they are used by the same people… 
 
Suspicion that Mike mentions here contains a germ of a causal hypothesis: the regularity 
of the pattern’s element appears to have originated from the same cause. Apprehending a 
pattern of relationships as a “scheme”, he interprets it as a plausible consequence of 
someone’s action that had purposefully brought about this arrangement of corporate 
structures, because the very ordered character of the pattern indexes its artificial origin. 
Likewise, Bernard's comment about “one person sitting behind all the companies” implies 
a connection of multiple visible elements at the front stage, to an invisible controlling and 
coordinating agency at the backstage. In this logic, making the scheme visible is the 
necessary first step to revealing those who use and profit from it.49 The investigators’ 
judgement about things looking “interesting” and “suspicious” is not only aesthetic, but 
also moral, because they attribute the abnormality they find in company structures to 
someone's deliberate attempt to arrange corporate ownership in a particular way. 
 
The jigsaw puzzle analogy also suggests that the image assembled in a particular case 
always represents the same object, independently of who puts it together, or how. It also 
implies that there is only one way in which the pieces fit together. While Mike and 
Bernard would agree that the investigation invariably uncovers objective facts, I would 
suggest that this is where the analogy stops. Describing the investigation as a process of 
assembling disparate clues that point to objective facts, we should not negate the 
constructive agency of the investigator who makes a whole of pieces that could have been 
assembled differently. For example, looking for and analysing corporate records in the 
                                                 
49 The scheme, however, can only be made visible forensically: relating connections to one another, the 
investigator assembles a patterned whole that was previously accessible to him only through clues and 
traces. In Azerbaijan Anonymous, this relational whole is made visible by the diagram of connections 
between Anar Aliyev and his companies. 
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Azerbaijan investigation, Bernard began to chart a diagram of suspected and confirmed 
connections between companies, whether or not he knew who owned them.50 This draft 
chart, Bernard explained, helped him record and make sense of the data.51 There was “too 
much information”, “too many things to keep track of,” he said, and making a diagram 
rendered this information visible to the investigator himself52. Abstracting information 
about companies and their relationships from the documents, and making it visible in a 
single visual field, allowed the investigators to see a pattern in it.  
 
Before finalising the report, Bernard edited the provisional chart that he had been using. 
He removed many suspiciously looking, ‘dodgy’ companies that did not link to Aliyev or 
SOCAR; some of the companies that he could not find evidence of direct links with 
Alieyv, and so on. Unresolved traces and unconfirmed connections were removed not to 
confound the reader of the report. If pattern was first revealed by summating all the 
connections, now it was made visible through their subtraction. The key addition was the 
box with the name of Anar Aliyev himself, to which all the connections now appeared to 
be leading. The resulting diagram was a product of intentional construction, rather than a 
direct imprint of investigative procedures of piecing things together. This elucidates the 
labour of selection and association that the investigators put into making things visible: 
information per se, dispersed through publicly accessible corporate registries, did not 
create transparency, and making something intelligible and meaningful—transparent—
required work. Through this selective construction, the diagram and the investigation 
gained their focus on the figure of Anar Aliyev as the man “behind” a vast network of 
companies. Mike said that  
What is very interesting, is that in the course of investigation the figure of Anar 
Aliyev […] became much more prominent. […] Once you have something like 
that [— evidence that his companies are striking many deals with SOCAR], which 
                                                 
50 Showing me a draft version of the diagram on his iPhone, Bernard said: "I genuinely had a picture of 
basically this diagram blue-taped to the board behind my desk… I was doing it on my own mind-mapping 
thingy [software application] and updating it and using it as I went, and printing it out every week or two." 
51 Writing about the development of genealogical method in XX-century British anthropology, Mary 
Bouquet (1993: 36) remarks that “[g]enealogical plotting became more than simply a way of gathering 
materials; it became closely identified with the presentation, or even the translation of other ways of life 
[…].” Likewise, Bernard’s diagram is an instrument of both processing and presenting information. 
52 In the report, there is another register of connections: an annex lists most of Anar Aliyev’s companies, 
describing their ownership structure and supporting evidence step by step. While representing the results 
of the same investigation, unlike the diagram, the annex singles out the chains of ownership and emphasises 
their complexity. I asked Bernard how he worked on it, and whether the annex came before the diagram. 
“The annex to this—that I wrote after the fact!”—he said. “I had it all in my head and my notebooks—as I 
went through, I was taking notes.” 
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is a fantastic story in terms of headlines, you know—An unknown man has 50 
separate deals with SOCAR, that kind of starts to dominate the story a little bit, 
and maybe another deal that you’ve looked at, which is interesting but doesn’t 
feature Anar Aliyev, drops away a little bit. So, there’s certainly the selecting of 
information. 
 
The direction in which the investigation proceeded by following up relationships and 
transactions—from SOCAR to contract-holders and joint ventures, to owners of these 
companies, to Anar Aliyev—was reversed in the diagram once Aliyev became its 
ordering centre and focal point. 
 
Concluding remarks 
What do the investigators make of their suggestion that Anar Aliyev is “behind” a large 
network of companies dealing with SOCAR? The answer, as I have already hinted, is in 
Bernard and Mike’s dietrological53 (Knight 2000) framing of the problem. Arguing that 
Aliyev somehow stands behind the companies, they suggest that like some puppet master, 
he controls and directs them, despite their apparently separate legal personality; and that 
precisely because of the separate legal personality of corporate entities, he can hide 
behind the “veil” of corporate form, avoiding accountability for what he does through and 
with these companies.54 Such ascriptions of agency allow Global Witness to define who, 
and what, can be held accountable and responsible for corrupt or otherwise “suspicious” 
actions. By means of the corporate network diagram, the investigators redescribed 
companies that at first seemed disconnected, as enmeshed in and subsumed by networked 
relations of ownership and control focusing on one person. 
 
Whereas this particular report stops short of claiming that Anar Aliyev should be held 
responsible for his involvement with SOCAR (remember, no wrongdoing was proven), 
such calls to account are typical in Global Witness’ reports. In this chapter, I have focused 
                                                 
53 In his discussion of conspiracy theories in contemporary American popular culture, Peter Knight coins 
the term to refer to causal theories that assume real agency hidden behind its visible and seemingly 
unconnected effects. The term comes from Italian dietro, meaning “behind”. See contributions to Marcus 
(1999) and West and Sanders (2003) for comparable ethnographic accounts of conspiratorial reasoning. 
54 At the same time, the report leaves open the question of how, and why, Aliyev became such a prominent 
player in the Azerbaijani oil industry. Mike and Bernard’s sources in the country were convinced that 
Aliyev was somehow connected to the President of Azerbaijan. While the investigators did not have any 
evidence to corroborate this claim, they equally refused to give up on their suspicion that Aliyev was not 
the ultimate beneficiary of the companies that he legally owned.  
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on informational practices and expert procedures that make possible such attributions of 
agency and responsibility in the first place. The wider relevance of this account of 
investigative expertise is that practices I have described, are typical not only to Global 
Witness’ investigators, but also to many journalists and due diligence researchers in the 
UK and abroad. Offshore corporate services, and various illicit and immoral practices that 
they allow to proliferate, have become better known to the public thanks to scandals such 
as Luxembourg Leaks and Panama Papers, which have generated much political 
controversy. This chapter makes a small step towards understanding the expert practices 
and routine procedures of collection and interpretation of information, on which forensic 
analysis of offshore finance depends. 
 
I have sought to demonstrate the uncertain, speculative and prospectively-oriented 
character of investigative work. I have argued that it relies on learnt aesthetic sensitivities 
which are illustrated by the work that suspicion and search for pattern do in the 
investigators’ quest for knowledge (Grasseni 2009). Aesthetic here does not refer to the 
appreciation of beauty—rather, as Annelise Riles (2001) points out, it has to do with 
attention to form. As I have shown, aesthetic sensitivity, manifested in suspicion and 
search for patterns, guides the investigators in their attempt to make and prove 
connections between companies and infer potential new connection from them. In so far 
as these connections come to link many corporate entities into an ordered pattern, they 
warrant an inference about social causation. 
 
Thus, I have argued that Mike and Bernard's search for a pattern of relationships that 
could explain why so many of SOCAR's joint ventures and partner companies were “non-
transparent”, is a search for a causal explanation. For Mike and Bernard, there could only 
be one admissible cause of the pattern: intentional human agency. Aliyev’s involvement 
with SOCAR as it is presented in the report, is “revealed” and confirmed by the patterned 
replication of his connections to SOCAR (through his part-ownership of the joint venture 
companies). At the same time, however, the pattern is not given in the information, but 
has to be constructed through interpretation of clues. The construction is quite literal—it 
takes form of meticulous charting. Like any act of interpretation and representation, 
diagramming is selective and partial, which is not to suggest any mishandling of evidence 
by the investigators, but instead to emphasise their creative agency in choosing the frame 
of representation of the corporate network that instantly draws attention to that which the 
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results of investigation eventually came to demonstrate: Anar Aliyev's central role in a 
network of deals with SOCAR.  
 
In this manner, once the investigators identify Aliyev as the person behind the network, 
their anticipatory activity of connecting relations in search of pattern, gives way to a 
retrospective stripping back of patterned connections, which better reveals Aliyev’s 
position in them. In here, there is a temporal shift: from a forward-looking search for 
knowledge, led by a sense of suspicion, to a backward-looking work of demonstrating the 
agency and responsibility of the person behind the pattern. 
 
By reconstructing one investigation, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that 
transparency is not a given, and a mere publication of information—despite the 
assumptions built into policies such as the EITI—does not guarantee visibility. Rather, 
transparency is in the eye of the beholder. It depends on one’s ability to make inferences 
from available information. To make these inferences, I have argued, the investigators 
need to have a sense of what a ‘normal’, ‘unsuspicious’ business transaction or 
relationship looks like, and it is in the expression of these expectations of normality, that 
we see how the investigations and campaigns that they inform, are driven by moral visions 
of a socio-political order without corruption. 
 
My final observation here concerns the extent to which Mike and Bernard’s investigation 
depended on public information that was already publicly available. Both investigators 
told me that the availability of this information did not make Aliyev’s corporate network 
transparent. Rather, as I have suggested in this chapter, making it transparent entails 
rendering them visible within a single frame of a diagram or a report. This frame is a 
construct of a specific kind: it aggregates connections and persons (corporate and human) 
so that they can be seen from a single encompassing perspective, which allows to see the 
complexity of interconnections among the companies as a simple index of Aliyev’s 
(unexplained, hence suspicious) connection to SOCAR.55 What generates the 
investigators’ suspicion, then, is exactly the fact that information about these companies 
is so vastly distributed—as if hidden—across a number of corporate registries in different 
countries.  
 
                                                 
55 I am grateful to Tom Yarrow for nudging me to think in this direction.  
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In the case I have discussed, this construct is a result of forensic (re-)construction that 
makes use of already existing infrastructures of corporate disclosures. This brings me 
back to the broader question with which I began the chapter: namely, what is the 
relationship between the ways in which the investigators come to know corruption, and 
the recommendations they make about measures to fight it?  
 
Mike and Bernard told me that in a typical investigation, there would be a mix of different 
sources on which the investigator relies for information: some of it s/he would receive 
from informants, some, from the press; the rest could be found in corporate registries. My 
interviews with other investigators in NGOs and the private sector, confirm this. 
Azerbaijan Anonymous was, perhaps, unusual because most of the forensic work was 
documentary; however, it certainly reflected how follow-the-money techniques work in 
other contexts. Crucially to my point, the clues that Mike and Bernard obtained from 
financial documents, had been results of systematic policies of corporate reporting in 
place in various jurisdictions. This information had been generated through routine 
practices of disclosure that make up infrastructures of corporate governance. It could be 
argued that the opacity of Aliyev’s corporate network is a result of exploitation of 
differences between reporting regimes in different countries. But it is also true that Mike 
and Bernard’s investigation wouldn’t have been possible—at least in the form that it 
happened—without these informational infrastructures.  
 
My description of the Azerbaijan Anonymous investigation suggests that there is a 
connection between the question the investigators ask (is there corruption in SOCAR’s 
deals?), how they go about answering it (investigation of business deals using public 
records), and the implications they draw from their answer (no corruption can be proven, 
but extensive disclosures are necessary). It points to the recursive relation between Global 
Witness investigators’ attempts to identify corruption and attribute responsibility for it, 
and their advocacy for more transparency. In other words, in so far as the investigators’ 
moral project of fighting corruption begins with the problem of knowing it, the remedy 
they advocate for is first and foremost a remedy to the problems of investigating 
corruption. This further suggests that we should understand investigations and 
campaigning as professional practices in their own right—with their forms of specialist 
knowledge, and ethical orientations. In this light, recommendations of more transparency 
that Global Witness routinely make in their reports, should be seen as informed by the 
internal logic of investigative practice, rather than only by the nature of the problem that 
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campaigners seek to tackle. In the next chapters, I take this insight further, as I turn to the 
history of the EITI and its origins in Global Witness’ reports.  
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Chapter Three  
Where it all started: Global Witness and the origins of the 
EITI 
 
[I]f the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens 
to history, he finds that there is “something altogether different” behind 
things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no 
essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from 
alien forms. Examining the history of reason, he learns that that it was born 
in an altogether “reasonable” fashion—from chance; devotion to truth and 
the precision of scientific method arose from the passions of scholars, their 
reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, and their spirit 
of competition—the personal conflict that slowly forged the weapons of 
reason.  
 
Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1984: 78) 
 
What would a genealogist make of the emergence and development of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative? S/he could ask, as Andrew Barry (2011) did, how the 
notion of extractives’ transparency gained its currency among campaigners and civil 
servants in London at the turn of the XXI century. Or, understanding that in order to 
become policy this notion would have to pass through a complex chain of institutional 
translation (Latour 1996), s/he could try to trace this chain. Alternatively, skeptical that 
one line of descent could be unambiguously traced, our genealogist could instead inquire 
into contingencies of discourse and practice, conflicts, aspirations, agendas and ethical 
commitments of those who “fabricated” the ideas and institutions through which the EITI 
came to be.  
 
Eddie Rich, with whose speech to an audience of UK EITI supporters in London I opened 
this thesis, is not a genealogist. “Here is where it all started!”—Eddie declared, referring 
both to Global Witness, who had proposed the idea of an extractives transparency policy, 
and the UK government, whose officials had developed it. In 2002, when the EITI was 
announced, the building in 1 Victoria Street where Eddie was giving his speech, belonged 
to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the grand-parent of the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills. Its officials, as I learned reading the department’s 
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archived correspondence and ministerial briefings, played a significant role in shaping 
the Global Witness’s proposal into a policy design that became the EITI—not the least 
by tying to block the policy altogether. Such details were not part of Eddie’s story of the 
EITI’s success, just as they are absent from the policy’s official history.56 In Eddie’s 
narrative, the history of the EITI was one of straightforward development: an idea was 
proposed, then made into a policy, then gradually updated to reflect new challenges.57  
 
As a long-term observer and participant of the EITI, Eddie Rich would have known that 
the history of the Initiative was more complex than its official representations. Trouillot 
(1995) reminds us that all historical narratives, in so far as they are socially and culturally 
constructed, are products of relations of power enmeshing their authors, and as such, 
express certain claims to authority. The official account of the EITI’s institutional origins 
claims an organisational and political coherence for the Initiative, hiding rifts and 
alliances that have been constitutive of the policy.  
 
My aim in this chapter is to develop a basis for a “historicised anthropology” (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 1992) of the EITI. Building on my ethnographic reading of archival 
documents about the campaigns and negotiations that (in a rather contingent way) led to 
the announcement of the EITI in 2002, I want to ask two questions of the policy’s early 
history: First, how did the idea of a state policy on transparency of extractives emerge? 
Second, why was it formulated in the way that it was? Addressing these questions, this 
chapter provides an account of the conceptual and social work that went into constructing 
the EITI in its early form in 1998-2002.58 This offers a starting point for unpicking the 
sense of the historical necessity inherent in the EITI’s official narratives.  
 
Describing the contingencies of theory and practice underpinning the formulation and 
reception of a proposal for a policy on extractives’ transparency in the UK, this chapter 
                                                 
56 See The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (Accessed 20 February 2017), available from 
https://eiti.org/history. 
57 This view is reminiscent of the notion of a policy cycle—the consequential development of a policy from 
problems to identification of instruments to address the problems, to solutions, and new challenges—which 
I was taught first as a student in politics, and later as a trainee civil servant on fieldwork. 
58 This will help us understand (in Chapter Four) how the Initiative developed from the initial suggestions 
to something resembling what it is now; and how the voluntary, participatory design of the policy was 
proposed as a response to particular problems of interdepartmental diplomacy in the Whitehall. Such 
historical account is necessary to understand the context and shape of the ethnographic problems dealt with 
in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. 
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traces two intertwined trajectories of the proposal’s development: one intellectual, the 
other political.59  
 
Following the intellectual trajectory means investigating how a policy of corporate 
disclosures addressing a lack of governmental accountability could become conceivable 
at all. I thus analyse a number of investigative reports (and their sources) published by 
Global Witness between 1999 and 2002, in order to understand how the campaigners 
problematised government corruption in developing countries as a matter of economic 
and social development, how this problematisation led them to attribute responsibility for 
remedying the situation to international petroleum corporations, and how transparency 
was framed as the mode of intervention. Underpinning this trajectory, I argue, was a series 
of conceptual shifts between objects and scales of concern, which transformed a proposal 
for solutions to peculiar problems of Angolan development, into an abstract model and a 
vehicle for a policy that Global Witness proposed to UK government officials. I identify 
possible intellectual influences that contributed to these shifts, and thereby make a 
corrective contribution to critical literature that has similarly sought to trace the ‘rise’ of 
the extractives’ transparency agenda. I will return to these issues below.  
 
I have suggested in Chapter Two that investigative reports (such as the ones this chapter 
focuses on) are instruments of campaigners’ political interventions. This chapter explores 
how such interventions take place by tracing the political trajectory of the above 
mentioned policy proposal. It seeks to understand the ideas and conceptual shifts, to 
which I alluded above, as artefacts of situated practice of campaigning. This paves the 
way to understanding campaigning and bureaucratic practices of policy-making as 
constitutive and performative of what Michel Foucault, in his Archaeology of Knowledge, 
calls “political knowledge”. Speculating about what an archaeology of such knowledge 
might look like, he suggests:  
Instead of analysing this knowledge – which is always possible – in the direction 
of the episteme that it can give rise to, one would analyse it in the direction of 
behaviour, struggles, conflicts, decisions, and tactics. One would thus reveal a 
body of political knowledge that is not some kind of secondary theorizing about 
practice, nor the application of theory. Since it is regularly formed by a discursive 
practice that is deployed among other practices and is articulated upon them, it is 
                                                 
59 The separation is artificial, but I employ it for heuristic purposes. 
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not an expression that more or less adequately ‘reflects’ a number of ‘objective 
data’ or real practices. It is inscribed, from the outset, in the field of different 
practices in which it finds its specificity, its functions, and its network of 
dependences. (Foucault 1972: 214)  
 
Following up on this suggestion, this chapter describes how, and to what ends, 
campaigners, and then government officials, elaborated and deployed ‘transparency’ as a 
legitimate concern of development intervention. Scholars who have sought to explain the 
emergence and rise of the discourse and policies on extractives’ transparency in various 
contexts (Barry 2013; Watts 2004; Weszkalnys 2011, 2013), tend to explicate them by 
referring the growing prominence of the so-called resource curse theory in economics and 
politics in early 2000s. The resource curse thesis (on which more later in the chapter) 
postulates an inverse correlation between natural resource abundance and economic 
growth, political stability, good governance and corruption (Firger 2010; Ross 1999). 
However, while linking the extractives’ transparency ‘agenda’ to the empirical and 
theoretical accounts of the resource curse, these scholars often leave the precise nature of 
the relationship between these accounts and the EITI, or later policies on extractives’ 
transparency in different countries, unexplained (although see Weszkalnys 2011). 
 
In contrast, I argue that concerns and theories about transparency in extractive industries 
that developed within the political practice of British campaigners and officials in 1999-
2002, had a distinct origin from the resource curse theory, although eventually they 
became influenced by it. Global Witness’ propositions about transparency were a 
response to specific problems of corruption in Angola, and only later were they developed 
into an abstract model of economic and political relations (that the resource curse thesis 
was). This move appears to have been under-theorised. While it had been influenced by 
campaigners’ reading of economic analyses of scholars who later became established 
proponents of the resource curse thesis, it responded to rationales that were internal to the 
logic of Global Witness’ political practice. I therefore suggest that government officials 
in the UK accepted and developed upon the Global Witness’ policy proposal because of 
various organisational and political concerns within the British government, to which the 
abstract, flexible model underpinning the proposal, could be variously made to “fit”. The 
resource curse theory came later. 
 
*** 
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The anthropological convention compels us to explain the emergence of the EITI—first 
as Global Witness’ proposal for a policy, then as a tentative policy design—in relation to 
its context. But what was this context? The answer will depend on what the policy 
intervention proposed by Global Witness meant to those formulating and negotiating it. 
Was it a development policy? A transparency, anti-corruption, or corporate social 
responsibility initiative? Or, perhaps, a tool of conflict prevention in ‘fragile’ resource-
rich states? Maybe all of this at once? As I have sought to demonstrate, the extractives’ 
transparency proposal (from the EITI emerged later) was some of these things—and it 
was different things to different people—in several combinations at different moments of 
its early “social life”. The notion of transparency remained at its core at all times, but it 
was precisely because of the ambivalence and flexibility of this notion, that campaigners 
and UK officials could inscribe Global Witness’ policy proposal into various explicit and 
implicit frames of reference. They summoned up concepts and concerns about foreign 
policy, international aid, anti-corruption, CSR, democratic accountability and economic 
liberalisation, in order to explain and legitimate the new policy idea about extractives, 
and I refer to these ideas throughout this chapter to provide context to the changing notion 
of extractives’ transparency.  
 
But what interests me, is precisely campaigners’ and officials’ own acts of inscription and 
articulation which make ‘context’ an ethnographic problem (Dilley 1999). Instead of 
multiplying explanatory contexts, I posit only one kind of context, analytically speaking: 
that of social action and relations among the people and institutions involved in 
negotiating the EITI. Explicit references that campaigners, corporate representatives and 
civil servants made to ideas of good governance, security, anti-corruption, New Labour’s 
foreign policy etc., and which were often expressed in terms of making the policy 
proposal “fit” a particular frame or “language”, were part of the “symbolic play” of 
persuasion (Carrithers 2008: 162, also 2005a,b) internal to the negotiation of the policy 
proposal that later became EITI. Campaigners and officials’ own attempts to 
contextualise this proposal, direct my attention to how it gained social reality and support, 
and was shaped by different people’s interpretations.  
 
My account begins in 1999, with Global Witness’ report on Angola, usually cited as the 
beginning of their extractives’ transparency campaign, and indeed of the EITI. It proceeds 
in three parts. First, I describe the manner in which the authors of the report framed 
extractives’ corruption in Angola as a problem, international corporations operating there 
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as responsible subjects, and their transparency disclosures as a solution. Second, I analyse 
how, having met resistance to their proposals, the campaigners abstracted this problem-
agent-solution triad out of the particular context of Angola into which they urged 
intervention, and made it into a model of a structural condition of all resource-rich 
developing economies that could be addressed with a single policy. Third, I turn to how 
the policy idea proposed by Global Witness as a result of these conceptual shifts, was 
received by officials of the UK Department for International Development (DfID). I draw 
attention to how campaigners and civil servants contextualised the proposal in relation to 
existing policy frameworks and pragmatic exigencies of bureaucratic management. I 
conclude with some reflections about what these conceptual shifts and contextualising 
moves could teach us about the social life of policy ideas.  
Global Witness’ report on Angola 
At the end of 1999, Global Witness, then still a very small organisation, published an 
investigative report with a self-explanatory title: “A Crude Awakening: The Role of Oil 
and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets”. The Crude 
Awakening argued that corporate payments for oil extracted in Angola to the country’s 
government, as well as speculative oil-backed loans, financed the government’s arm 
purchases, which fuelled the civil war. It also denounced the embezzlement of oil 
revenues and lack of governmental accountability that caused it, and suggested that a 
greater transparency of the government’s resource revenues could be a remedy to 
corruption. 
 
Global Witness was founded in 1995 by three investigative journalists, Patric Alley, 
Charmian Gooch and Simon Taylor, who had earlier worked on reporting environmental 
crime, and discovered that, although natural resource exploitation, corruption and conflict 
appeared connected, no-one investigate this link. They decided to establish a new NGO 
that would focus on this nexus.60 After initial work on illegal timber trade financing 
conflict in Cambodia, Global Witness began investigating how UNITA rebels in Angola 
used revenues from diamond trade to finance their activities (Global Witness 1998). This 
then led them to question how the Angolan government financed its war effort from oil 
                                                 
60 Nicholas Shaxson (2008: Chapter 11) describes how the organisation started from a self-financed 
undercover trip of the three founders to Cambodia in January 1995, during which they posed as prospective 
buyers of timber. The report that resulted from their initial investigation linked environmental destruction 
to war, and stranded the usual divisions of “issues” on which NGOs campaigned. The link between resource 
exploitation, corruption and war, would become the organisation’s niche. 
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revenues and loans. When the Crude Awakening was published, it was not the first report 
by a Western NGO to bring up this matter and mention lack of transparency of the 
government finance (e.g. Human Rights Watch 1999). Nor was the investigative 
knowledge underpinning Global Witness’ report new: Nicholas Shaxson (2008), who was 
a natural resource reporter covering Angola at the time, argues that it was his reporting in 
specialised press and directly to Global Witness, that led to the NGO’s publication. But 
Global Witness seem to have been the first among campaigning organisations to directly 
attribute responsibility for the conflict and alleged misuse of oil revenues to Angolan 
politicians, and turn transparency from a problem of economic knowledge, into a problem 
of political accountability. They wrote:  
A significant portion of Angola’s oil derived wealth is being subverted for 
personal gain and to support the aspirations of elite individuals, at the centre of 
power around the Presidency. The war is generating vast profits for top level 
generals within the Angolan armed forces (FAA), as well as for international arms 
dealers, not to mention enormous suffering for the Angolan people. Rather than 
contributing to Angola’s development, Angola’s oil revenue is directly 
contributing to further decline. Considerable effort has been made by the 
government to stifle all opposition and the press has been effectively muzzled. 
There is no accountability of government. (Global Witness 1999: 2) 
 
Beginning with a table of shocking development indicators, the report argued that poverty 
in Angola was a direct result of corruption, and corruption was only possible as long as 
the government were not held to account, by the citizens, for how they spent money 
received from the natural resource endowment. It provided a number of illustrations of 
how the Angolan president and his cronies corrupted structures of power to appropriate 
oil revenues and use them to purchase weapons and maintain luxury residences. The 
Crude Awakening reverberated in Angola61 and the oil industry more broadly, mainly for 
its identification of the mechanisms of embezzlement, and a sensational attribution of 
personal responsibility for corruption to the president. But there was another conceptual 
innovation in the report that concerned international corporations’ role in perpetuating 
the status quo.  
 
                                                 
61 Shaxson (2008: 212) quotes Arvind Genevan, a division director at the Human Rights Watch 
(Washington), as saying that “Crude Awakening created a firestorm in Angola. […] The government went 
nuts, drawing more attention to it. They denounced and obfuscated; it was a very Soviet response.” 
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Arguing that oil, as any national resource, belonged to the people—the real sovereign of 
Angola—the report stated that it was the people, too, who had to hold their rulers 
accountable. But as long as there was no publicly available information about government 
oil revenues, and civil society and political opposition were being suppressed, 
accountability was impossible. Drawing on the International Monetary Fund’s 
endorsement of the principle of market transparency, the campaigners then said that “full 
transparency” (that is, the publication of detailed accounting information) of international 
oil companies’ payments to the Angolan government would dispel secrecy around the 
state finance, and would allow citizens to hold their politicians accountable. In the face 
of plunder and unaccountability, facilitated by financial secrecy, international oil 
companies had to recognise and renounce on their complicity therein. Global Witness 
stated that given that companies such as BP-Amoco were paying “vast sums (the future 
development potential of Angola) into a black hole [they] must accept that they are 
playing with the politics and lives of Angola’s people.” (1999: 2) 
Transparency as corporate responsibility  
Global Witness’ critique was neither anti-corporate, nor informed by an anti-capitalist 
sentiment. The campaigners’ rhetoric differed significantly from that of other civil society 
groups working on issues of corporate responsibility and justice. In Shaxson’s view, it 
was this “unpoliticised” attitude of Global Witness that contributed to their success with 
future supporters among governments, international organisations and donors. Charmian 
Gooch in her turn recalled that “[t]he regular NGO strategy wasn’t going to work […] 
We went to the U.S. and spoke to the NGOs on oil […] some saw the oil companies as 
imperialist bastards, others tried to negotiate with them, then got dragged into endless 
negotiations that led nowhere.” (Shaxson 2008: 212)  
 
The ‘irregular’ strategy that Gooch and others opted for instead, was to position Global 
Witness’ criticism of corporate practices as an extension of the corporations’ own rhetoric 
of organisational virtue—the discourse of the corporate social responsibility (CSR). The 
campaigners sought to demonstrate that if companies were to be coherent and credible as 
virtuous subjects, then the principle of the CSR had to apply consistently across different 
domains of their activity. Thus, in one of the sections of the Crude Awakening, 
campaigners asked whether the virtuous commitments and performances of oil 
corporations such as BP-Amoco, through which they sought to establish themselves as 
ethical, responsible and transparent (Global Witness 1999: 9), could ever be truthful 
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without the corporations’ embrace of “full transparency”. With an unavoidable irony, the 
report points out that despite BP-Amoco’s “honourable objectives” to be a “force for 
good” in Angola, the failure of the government to promote democracy, accountability and 
transparency, posed a serious challenge both to BP-Amoco’s objectives of being an 
ethical corporation, and to their reputation more generally. In support of their argument, 
Global Witness referred to study of corporate social responsibility (CSR) risks in the 
country that BP-Amoco commissioned in 1997, which described the company’s social 
responsibilities in a similarly broad way. Instead of questioning the company’s CSR 
rhetoric, campaigners took it at face value and challenged BP-Amoco’s readiness to do 
the same:  
Global Witness recommends that BP-Amoco alliance sets a “benchmark for 
corporate transparency and accountability” by publishing their full set of 
Angolan accounts, both in Angola and internationally – not just the consolidated, 
audited, year-end accounts available in the annual reports. (1999: 9, emphasis in 
original) 
 
This “challenge” is an interesting example of how Global Witness pragmatically relied 
on available discursive and normative means in order to define and legitimate their 
demands. In doing so, campaigners implicitly portrayed companies as potential agents of 
international development—a role that by the early 2000s, most extractive industry 
corporations themselves claimed they embraced without restraint (Rajak 2011: 10-1). As 
Dinah Rajak persuasively demonstrates in her ethnography of a mining corporation in 
South Africa, at the end of 1990s and in early 2000s, companies in extractive industries 
were especially active in redefining themselves as actors of a new kind of responsible 
capitalism. As I will show in the following sections, this view of capitalism was in line 
with a new paradigm of international development espoused by the New Labour 
government in the UK, which sough to “make globalisation work for the poor” through 
the forces of the private sector.62 Whether or not Global Witness deliberately played into 
this emerging governmental and corporate discourse in the UK (on which more later in 
this chapter), their report insisted that oil corporations could transform relations between 
Angolan citizens and the state in the way that the state itself was incapable of. Typically 
to contemporary uses of the CSR principles to re-describe extractive industries as a new 
agent of development, this move “elevated big business as the path to development where 
                                                 
62 This paradigm itself built on the move from government- to market-led development, enshrined in the 
policies of the IMF and the World Bank (Marquette 2003). 
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states characterised […] by chronic incapacity or corrupt rapacity, have failed.” (Rajak 
2011: 11)  
 
In March 2002, Global Witness published a follow-up report on Angola that summarised 
the NGO’s work on the country to date, and gave some new recommendations. One of 
the elements that this new report, entitled All the President’s Men (Global Witness 2002) 
took from the Crude Awakening, was the emphasis on CSR. Where in Crude Awakening 
the reference to CSR appeared somewhat marginal, and the challenge to BP-Amoco was 
almost incidental to the complex structure of the narrative, the new report placed 
corporate responsibility at the centre of how it argued for a new policy intervention 
addressing corruption in Angola.  
 
Campaigners sought to redefine the principle of corporate responsibility itself so that it 
included corporate disclosures of payments to governments. Referencing the EU 
Commission’s definition of CSR as “the concept that an enterprise is accountable for its 
impacts on all relevant stakeholders” (quoted in Global Witness 2002: 45), the report 
deemed that the notion of extractive companies’ “stakeholders” should be extended to 
include all the citizens of a country where resource extraction took place, since it was on 
their behalf that the state owned and managed the resources. Conversely,  
[b]y not publishing what they pay, every non-transparent oil company operating 
in Angola is in violation of the real principles of CSR as civil society and the 
general population are being deliberately excluded from the dialogue over the 
governance of their resources in Angola. Thus, Global Witness argues that the 
definition of corporate responsibility must be bound up with the operation of 
transparent and accountable business practices. (ibid.)  
 
Global Witness’ redefinition of CSR put corporate disclosures at the centre of what it 
meant to be a ‘responsible’ company. This redefinition was pragmatic: the campaigners 
must have recognised that they stood no chance of influencing the Angolan government 
directly, whereas most petroleum companies operating in Angola, were either based in 
London, or traded on the London Stock Exchange, and were sensitive to public pressure. 
Implicit in these arguments was a rather consistent, if inherently unverifiable, set of 
assumptions about politics. If normally structures of institutional accountability included 
the government and its electorate communicating through channels of political 
representation, Global Witness attempted to redefine this relationship by making oil 
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companies part of it. If the state did not represent its citizens, and did not represent itself 
to citizens through the publication of information, then the corporations could—indeed, 
had to—do what the state did not: represent the state by making visible what they paid, 
so that citizens could exercise their democratic rights. This information, the argument 
went, could then allow citizens to exercise democratic pressure. In this view, shared by 
many anti-corruption campaigners and other supporters of transparency in today’s 
Britain, information is enabling and transformative of civic action and democratic 
politics.63  
 
This consequentialist understanding of transparency has persisted in Global Witness’ 
reports and justifications for policies of the UK government until today, largely 
unassociated to the discourse of corporate social responsibility. But in 1999-2002, the 
NGOs’ references to the principles of CSR were instrumental in legitimating their calls 
for new corporate disclosures. The CSR movement was increasingly gaining support at 
the time, and All the President’s Men identified no fewer than five different institutional 
fora devoted to CSR—from the Global Reporting Initiative to the UN Global Compact—
that in one or another way listed transparency among their supported principles.64 
However, it is difficult to judge just how effective this framing of transparency in terms 
of corporate responsibility was—certainly, Global Witness’ reports did not lead many 
corporations operating in Angola to embrace the kind of disclosures that the NGO were 
advocating for. There were reasons for companies’ resistance, which I will discuss in 
what follows.  
 
For now, I want to note that once the UK government officials took on the idea of a policy 
proposed by Global Witness, still hesitating whether to frame it as a matter of foreign 
policy, or corporate governance, CSR, or development intervention (more on this later), 
the NGO dropped references to principles and frameworks of corporate social 
responsibility,65 while retaining the general idea that corporations should be responsible 
for transparency. This attribution of responsibility, which the notion of corporate social 
responsibility allowed Global Witness to express, remained for a long time a focus of 
                                                 
63 One could agree with the merits of this line of reasoning, but still question how readily it applies, in virtue 
of the assumptions it makes about political processes, to countries like Angola, or, in fact, even the UK. 
64 Scholars studying adoption and diffusion of “international norms”, call such positioning of an emerging 
norm in relation to already existing ones, “grafting” (Price 1998). Alexandra Gillies (2010) explores the 
“grafting” argument in elation to extractive industries transparency agenda. 
65 Several major report that Global Witness published in 2002 and later do not mention CSR at all. 
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debate and contestation between the NGO and its allies, and extractive corporations and 
government officials who sought to respond to their campaigns. 
Corporate reactions to the campaign 
In their 1999 report, Global Witness called on corporations operating in Angola to 
voluntarily adopt a policy of “full transparency”. Little came out of these calls. In 2000, 
the British minister for Africa at the Foreign Office called a meeting between the 
representatives of the NGO and oil companies operating in Angola to facilitate a dialogue 
between them. With hardly any company sending a representative, the meeting did not 
yield any results (Shaxson 2008: Chapter 11). Then, at the beginning of 2001, Global 
Witness wrote to executives of major petroleum corporations to gauge their views on 
payments’ disclosures, asking if they wanted to be “part of the problem” of government 
corruption in Angola, or the solution to it. Few companies reacted. But BP-Amoco—the 
target of Global Witness’ earlier challenge and the self-described champion of 
transparency whose representative had attended the meeting at the Foreign Office—
responded to the letter, promising they would publish detailed information about its 
operations and payments to the government in Angola.66  
 
The company carried out its promise in 2001. The government’s reaction was hostile. In 
a letter67 to BP-Amoco, copied to all other oil companies operating in the country, Manuel 
Vicente, the President of Administrative Council of Sonangol, the state oil company of 
Angola, repudiated BP-Amoco for succumbing to the pressure  
by organised groups [Global Witness] that use available means in an orchestrated 
campaign against some Angolan institutions by calling for ‘pseudo-transparency’ 
of legitimate government actions. As the national authority that awards 
concessions, Sonangol is fully aware that its economic link with your company 
should not be mixed with other relationships that seriously violate existing 
contracts in order to attract credibility. (Global Witness 2002: 41-2)  
 
Vicente, whom Global Witness had accused of corruption, threatened to end BP-Amoco’s 
licence to operate in Angola, unless they cease any further disclosures and abide by the 
                                                 
66 They stated that information about payments to the government from individual blocks would be 
aggregated in order not to contravene confidentiality agreements with Sonangol, which was one of the 
conditions of the companies’ production contract. The breach of the agreement would lead to the 
termination of the contract itself. 
67 See Global Witness 2002: 41-2. 
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confidentiality clause in their contract. Sonangol’s letter warned other companies off 
following BP-Amoco’s tracks and getting involved in domestic politics of revenue 
distribution by publishing payments’ data. If the companies had been cautious with even 
responding to Global Witness’ calls for transparency earlier, now they had more reasons 
to do so.68 
 
These responses resisted Global Witness’ framing of oil corporations as political subjects 
responsible directly to Angolan citizens. They implied that political interventions—which 
publication of revenue information inevitably were, despite Global Witness’ attempts to 
express them in the idioms of CSR—, had not to be mixed with business. Many critical 
NGOs would have much to say of these responses. Global Witness, however, 
pragmatically persevered with their arguments: “‘Transparent’69 companies are not 
telling governments what to spend their money on, they are merely letting to know the 
real owners of resources—the citizens for whom the state holds those resources in trust—
what they are paying.”70 The NGO collected corporate responses to their earlier letter in 
the 2002 report. But the report itself was already making a departure from the 
campaigners’ earlier insistence on voluntary corporate disclosures. It also introduced a 
conceptual possibility of a general policy on transparency that would not be specifically 
targeting companies operating in Angola. I will now explain these shifts and their 
significance.  
From voluntary disclosures to government regulations 
Already in November 2001, in a submission made to the European Commission’s public 
consultation about CSR, Global Witness suggested that voluntary social responsibility 
disclosures would never be successful. Companies had to be obligated to publish certain 
kinds of non-financial information,71 campaigners suggested. These suggestions were still 
                                                 
68 One stated: “we are an oil company. We are not political. We have nothing to hide about what we are 
doing in Angola.” (TotalFinaElf, quoted in Global Witness 2002: 42). Similarly, the CEO of another, said 
that his company was sensitive to the “local needs” in Angola and observed the confidentiality agreement 
with Sonangol because disclosures could be seen as a form of influence on domestic politics, and therefore 
not a “proper role” for private companies. See an interview with Lee Raymond ExxonMobil, in "A Dinosaur 
Still Hunting for Growth." The Financial Times (London), 12 March 2002, 16. 
69 Note the quotation marks, indicative of the novelty of the phrasing. 
70 Simon Taylor. “Corporate Secrecy Oils the Wheels of Poverty”. Press release of 20 June 2002. Global 
Witness. (Accessed 28 February 2017), available from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20050509201025/http://pwyp.gn.apc.org/english/media/mediapage.shtml?x=
54923.  
71 With time (in 2014) such rules would be introduced in the EU through the EU Directive on non-financial 
reporting (Directive 2014/95/EU). 
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made alongside a recommendation for voluntary disclosures to companies, but it was 
clear that such disclosures could put companies in conflict with the Angolan government, 
unless they were mandated legally by another government. In All the President’s Men 
(published in March 2002), the campaigners wrote: “This issue [of corporate disclosures] 
cannot be addressed ‘voluntarily’. BP’s experience with Sonangol shows that, even if an 
oil company wants to be transparent, it may be threatened with having its concessions 
terminated and re-assigned to less scrupulous competitors.” (ibid: 60) Whereas the Crude 
Awakening appealed to companies, international financial institutions and a broadly 
defined international community, the new report added another addressee: the “national 
governments”. From then on, and until today, the main target of their campaigning would 
be governments of countries where large international corporations were registered and 
traded on stock markets. 
 
The campaigners’ goal was to have these governments introduce a mandatory set of 
regulations that would apply to all extractive companies registered or traded on stock 
exchanges in the same jurisdiction, and which by their statutory nature override any 
confidentiality arrangements between companies and their “host governments” (such as 
that between Sonangol and BP-Amoco). Planning to campaign across the G8 countries, 
where most of transnational extractive corporations operating in Angola and elsewhere 
were based, the authors of the report identified the existing system of stock market 
transparency as the institutional framework for such rules:  
 
there is an obvious necessity for a parallel regulatory approach to address the 
failure of voluntary initiative on transparency and to set minimum standards of 
financial disclosure amongst multinational companies for all their countries of 
operation. Global Witness believes that the major national securities regulators 
have both the power and the right to effect immediate change to companies’ 
reporting and disclosure standards to this end. (ibid: 60) 
 
In particular, the report said that national governments should: 
 • Ensure that their national oil companies adopt full transparency criteria 
on overseas operations. […] 
 • Insist that financial regulators of international stock exchanges should 
legally oblige companies filing reports with them to disclose payments to all 
national governments in consolidated and subsidiary accounts.  
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 • Insist that their export financing agencies practice full transparency as 
a condition for setting up credit agreements, and that full transparency of funding 
partners and recipients becomes a pre-requisite for funding. (Global Witness 
2002: 1) 
 
Each of these recommendations pointed to different modalities of regulating transparency. 
Similarly to the references to the CSR discourse, this ambivalence about what had to be 
done reflected the campaigners’ pragmatic openness to different policy options: if 
companies couldn’t be forced to adopt payments’ disclosures directly, then perhaps this 
could be done through stock market, or export credit regulations—whatever government 
officials, whom the campaigners approached simultaneously with publication of the 
report, preferred. I will comment more on this later. Now, let me turn to other conceptual 
shifts that allowed Global Witness to broaden the focus of their campaign. 
Towards an abstract model 
This campaign began as an attempt to address conflict and corruption in Angola through 
the proxy of transnational oil companies’ financial disclosures. This, as I have shown, 
highlighted the difficulty of persuading these companies to make the disclosures, 
particularly after the BP-Amoco case highlighted the business risks of transparency in 
Angola. In the Crude Awakening (1999), Global Witness only timidly suggested that their 
recommendations stemming from the research applied to countries “similar” to Angola. 
The report did not specify which countries these were, but it implied that the nexus of 
resource wealth and conflict was an affliction of a general type. This nexus, after all, was 
what the founders of Global Witness had chosen to focus on from the outset. But the 
interventions that this and earlier reports proposed, were focused on the role of particular 
resources in particular conflicts. The solutions offered apply to specific cases only.  
 
But in All the President’s Men, the relationship between the report’s object and its policy 
recommendations changed: its main recommendations concerned all major international 
oil companies, not only those operating in Angola. The country itself became a mere a 
case study—a particular instance of a more general problem. For Global Witness it was 
“obvious that the techniques of state looting detailed [in the report] are readily exportable 
to wherever the predatory nature of international oil and financial businesses interact with 
weak civil society and unaccountable neo-authoritarian governments.” (Global Witness 
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2002: 59) The problem that they identified in Angola, therefore, was but an instantiation 
of more general forces that could also be found elsewhere:  
The charge of industry complicity [in governments’ looting of resource revenues] 
extends to all other countries – such as Azerbaijan, Chad, Cambodia, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Sudan, Nigeria to 
name but a few – where natural resources provides a significant source of state 
income, where corruption associated with state income is of concern, and where 
such companies are not fully transparent about their payments. (ibid: 60)  
 
The problem of corruption-revenue-development nexus, previously a particular political-
economic, historic condition of Angola, was now liberated from the contingent causality 
of the country’s socio-historical context, becoming an overarching deterministic model, 
a general causal mechanism that could be abstracted and scaled up. And so was the 
condition of oil industry’s “complicity” in perpetuating this nexus—a claim now 
dependent not on what companies’ did in Angola, but on how they dealt with payments 
transparency. The nexus in question became a result of specific, yet general conditions, 
that could be identified empirically and analytically in a range of countries, which could 
be targeted through policy instruments recommended by Global Witness. These policy 
instruments, moreover, focused on companies, not governments. The idea of extractive 
companies’ transparency—a result of campaigners’ attempts to address particular 
conditions in Angola—was now being turned into a mobile model that, on the one hand, 
was meant to address general structural conditions of resource-led development, and on 
the other, prescribed generic modes of corporate disclosures for this purpose. “The IMF, 
World Bank, and International Finance Corporation […]—said the report, —“should 
develop and institutionalise a model of transparency and revenue management that could 
be exported into different national situations.” (ibid: 60)72  
 
This model73 built on a set of implicit assumptions about the role of public information 
in politics, taking information as an enabling condition of citizens’ democratic control of 
the government. If citizens have information about oil revenues of the government, it 
implied, they can make it responsible for the use of these revenues. Importantly, the report 
                                                 
72 It can be argued that the subsequent advocacy of Global Witness focused on exporting this model to 
different countries and international organisations with an intent of incorporating it into regulations on 
corporate disclosures. 
73 The clarity of the model is an effect of my reconstruction. The measures proposed by the NGO call forth 
a set of rather consistent assumption, but they remain implicit in the text of the report. 
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suggested that corporations’ publication of information about payments could activate a 
democratic potential of the public that otherwise would be unrealised.74  
 
The model curiously reminds of the knowledge-power thesis familiar to many 
anthropologists, whereby state’s official knowledge about X makes X susceptible to 
control in the way that, for example, statistics or land measurements allow the state to 
“see”, or construct, subjects of its rule (Scott 1998). There is, however, a crucial 
difference: payments/revenue transparency is not about seeing like a state—if anything, 
it is about seeing the state itself, allowing citizens to control state revenues made visible 
through disclosures. The state is thus defined by the flow of information about it which. 
In Mark Fenster’s words (2015: 152), the disclosure of this information is expected to 
“banish public ignorance, magically transform public discourse, and allow the true public 
to appear and triumph.”75 Needless to say, all this assumes one kind of public and one 
kind of relationship of accountability between the public and the state. 
 
What is striking about Global Witness’ recommendations is that the flow of this 
information must come, like the flow of payments to governments, from companies. Such 
view of democracy—curiously reminiscent of Karl Deutch’s (1963) theorisation of 
political systems as cybernetic systems—expresses a dissatisfaction with the separation 
of the state and the citizenry, or the “public” (Fenster 2010); yet, it is exactly on this 
separation that it comes to depend, for citizens/public are the collective agent that needs 
to be brought into a controlling relationship with the state by means of transparency 
disclosures.  
 
The corporations are an important part of this model because it is from them, rather than 
unaccountable and unreliable governments (which Global Witness stood no chance of 
persuading about transparency), that the flow of information representing the flow of 
money to the state coffers, must come. Curiously, while the existence of a public is a 
                                                 
74 This was, in a way, a refashioning of the principal-agent problem in political science, where information 
asymmetry between citizens (principal) and their government (agent) leads to a lack of agent’s 
responsibility to the principal. For an overview, see Eisenhardt 1989. 
75 This idea of transparency as a tool of discipline and public accountability, has a long history that goes 
back at least to Jeremy Bentham’s political philosophy. I lack the expertise—nor is it the task of this thesis—
to adequately cover this history, and therefore send the reader to the existing accounts of how the principle 
of transparency developed historically in the context of Western democracies (Schudson 2015; Hood 2006), 
management (Mehrpouya 2011) and in relation to science and politics of representation (Levitt 2009). A 
different genealogical line connects the reactivation of the contemporary interest in transparency with the 
“audit explosion” of the 1990s (Power 1996) 
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precondition of accountability,76 Global Witness suggest that accountability is a result of 
public debate engendered by disclosures; they also suggest that disclosures can then 
strengthen this debate. From here, it is just one step to using extractives’ transparency as 
a tool of democratisation.77  
 
What I have described here, of course, can be apprehended from Global Witness’ 
campaigning materials only analytically, leaving open the question about whether the 
campaigners were being guided by a coherent conceptual scheme of the kind exposed 
above, or by some more vague and fuzzy ideas about the role of knowledge or information 
in public life,78 from which “transparency”, as a principle, derived its value. 
The intellectual context  
As I have suggested, the model of extractives’ transparency at which Global Witness 
arrived in their 2002 report, was a result of several conceptual shifts. These shifts 
responded to the contingencies of NGOs’ campaigning, such as the BP-Amoco case 
which played a role in pushing the campaigners to change the focus on their 
recommendations. But there were also other—intellectual—influences. They are difficult 
to trace with certainty. 
 
I would like to suggest that one possible influence could have come from comparative 
political science, albeit in a round-about way. In October 2001, Oxfam America79 
published a report entitled Extractive Sectors and the Poor (Ross 2001). Written by a 
political scientist and a proponent of the resource curse thesis Michael Ross, the report 
                                                 
76 Another synonym for the public is “civil society”, which somewhat shifts the centre of gravity away from 
“citizens” of a country, and towards organised groups like Global Witness itself. To my knowledge, the 
NGO leaves this slippage unreflected upon in the reports discussed here, and their other work. Civil society 
is taken to represent the citizenry, but it is not clear for the benefit of which civil society the disclosures are 
to be made. Unnoticed goes the fact that there are different connections and forms of civil society in 
different socio-cultural contexts (Hann 1997) and within the Western liberal tradition (Taylor 1990). 
77 This line of argumentation transpired later in Global Witness and their allies’ work. 
78 We find more explicit theorisation of the political and economic effects (and mechanisms) of 
transparency in statements and policy papers produced by economists and political scientists in academia 
and organisations like the World Bank and the IMF at the same time as Global Witness worked on their 
Angolan campaign (for example, the Oxford Amnesty Lecture “On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public 
Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life” given by the Senior Vice President and Chief 
Economist of the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz [1999]). 
79 Oxfam America and Global Witness had a donor-recipient relationship in 1999-2000; and a two of other 
national organisations of Oxfam (particularly, the British and the Dutch) gave funds to Global Witness in 
2000-2001 (see Global Witness Limited. 2001. Report & Financial Statements, Companies House, 30 
November 2001). There is no evidence of whether or not the grants received had been given to finance the 
resource transparency campaign. 
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sought to explain why extractive industries and resource dependence harmed the poor. 
Ross identified different mechanisms related to the character and inequality of resource-
led economic growth, vulnerability to economic shocks, unaccountability of governments 
and propensity to civil wars, which it suggested could be addressed through greater 
transparency80 and control of resource revenues. These conclusions were backed by a 
comparative econometric analysis of data from a number of resource-dependent states. 
Global Witness campaigners were familiar with this report and referred to it, writing that 
it “identifies a clear statistical relationship between states with dependency on primary 
extractive industries and unaccountable state institutions that are linked to poverty.” 
(Global Witness 2002: 60) This, in effect, was an indirect description of the mechanisms 
of the resource curse.81 Ross, who had by then published articles about the relationship 
between resource dependency and democracy (e.g. Ross 1999), wrote in the report that 
“Oil and mineral dependent states tend to suffer from unusually high rates of: corruption; 
authoritarian government; government ineffectiveness; military spending; Civil war.” 
(Ross 2001: 4) Global Witness campaigners were also familiar with the work of the 
Oxford political scientist Paul Collier, who, serving at the time as the director of the 
Development Research Group at the World Bank, argued in one paper that primary 
commodity exports were “the largest single influence on the risk of conflict” (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2000: 26). Familiarity with these arguments, comparative by their nature and 
focused on diagnosing a set of causes across economies and explaining development 
outcomes in countries through the same causal mechanism, must have contributed to the 
conceptual shift in Global Witness’ approach.  
 
Academics such as Ross, Karl and Collier went further than Global Witness’ own detailed 
descriptions of patterns of state looting among the Angolan elites, because they were 
interested in postulating a generalisable political economic theory of development and 
conflict, in which oil and revenues derived from it, were the deterministic force behind 
ill governance, poverty and the lack of development. Global Witness, in contrast, were 
more interested in the possible transformative effect of corporate disclosures on 
accountability and development. While the resource curse thesis and Global Witness’ 
                                                 
80 Oxfam America’s report was probably first to recommend “Full disclosure of all financial transactions 
between extractive firms and host governments” (Ross 2001: 1) in a truly generalised sense. 
81 The argument must have been already familiar to Global Witness campaigners from the work of a 
political economist Terry Lynn Karl (1997), who had written about the “paradox of plenty”—a situation in 
which windfall revenues from petroleum failed to result in socio-economic development because of 
inefficient government policies. Global Witness referenced Karl in A Crude Awakening. 
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model (which was about to be turned into a policy) did share many of the same 
assumptions and recommendations, they had a different pragmatic orientation (one was a 
scholarly theory, the other, an artefact of political knowledge used in campaigning), and 
had developed as responses to different kinds of concerns, even if there was no hard 
separation between the two. (Michael Ross' authorship of the Oxfam America report was 
a case in point.)  
 
It is worth jumping ahead to mention that in 2002, a team at the World Bank directed by 
Paul Collier and Ian Bannon started a research project on the governance of natural 
resources that sought to investigate the link between resource extraction and conflict, 
touching on poor governance (Bannon and Collier 2003). The project aimed to formulate 
policy models that would disrupt the perceived causal relationship between resource 
revenues and conflict; a number of practical papers were commissioned from various 
contributors, including the proponents of the resource curse thesis such as Michael Ross 
and Philippe Le Billon, as well as the Director of Global Witness Simon Taylor and the 
NGO’s campaigner Gavin Hayman. As I will argue in the next chapter, this project 
(although not necessarily the papers mentioned above and collected in Bannon and Collier 
2003), and possibly Paul Collier personally, had a major influence on civil servants at the 
Cabinet Office preparing a draft script of the EITI in June-July 2002.  
 
However, the idea of an extractives' transparency policy came to these officials not from 
the proponents of the resource curse thesis, but from Global Witness. In the following 
section I describe how this happened. 
Campaigners approach the government 
In late February 2002, about a fortnight before the publication of All the President’s Men, 
a campaigner from Global Witness whom I will call Alex Grommet82, wrote to a senior 
civil servant at the UK government’s Department for International Development, 
requesting a meeting to discuss the NGO’s upcoming report.83 Grommet said that Global 
Witness and a group of allied British organisations including CAFOD, Save the Children 
                                                 
82 During the following decade that he spent at Global Witness, Grommet rose in the ranks, becoming the 
Director of Campaigns and eventually the Executive Director of the NGO. At the time of my fieldwork, he 
left Global Witness to become the Executive Director of a World Bank-initiated transparency organisation. 
83 Email of 19 February 2002, File n. 174604, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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and Transparency International UK,84 wanted to talk about a proposal for an extractives’ 
transparency proposal. 
 
This proposal, he wrote, could be implemented through changes to stock exchange listing 
rules in countries of the G8. Linking the proposal to the context of government policy, 
Grommet argued that resource payments transparency was especially important for 
African countries, and that because of this, the issue therefore was relevant for the G8 
Africa Action Plan,85 as well as for PM Blair’s call to “clamp down on companies that 
fuel wars in Africa through their exploitation of valuable natural resources”86. Commodity 
revenues, the email said, were a destabilising influence in developing economies, leading 
to corruption and undermining the rule of law. This was a key challenge to development 
in Africa, and transparency of government resource revenues could help tackling it. But 
to have international companies disclose their payments, it was necessary to have the 
support of G8 or OECD. Could DfID and the UK government introduce such a policy 
and promote it across all the G8 countries? Grommet hoped he could discuss this in detail 
at the meeting.  
 
The DfID official agreed to the meeting, which took place several weeks later (on 14 
March). It was attended by civil servants from different teams at DfID, the head of the 
International Investment Policy Directorate of the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), and representatives of various NGOs: Global Witness, Oxfam and Transparency 
International UK sent their campaigners. Merits and problems of the proposal were 
discussed, and DfID officials promised to consider it further and seek views on it from 
                                                 
84 Support from Oxfam, Save the Children and a number of religion-based international development 
charities such as CAFOD, whose remit had never extended to anti-corruption, good governance or CSR, 
indicates that these organisations were exploring new ways of approaching poverty reduction. It also 
suggests that Global Witness’ argument that good management of resource revenues could bring long-
awaited development appealed to them (Gillies 2010: 110). 
85 It was under preparation, and would be formally adopted on 27 June 2002 at the Kananskis, Canada 
Summit of the G8. 
86 Andrew Parker. “Blair Calls for Clampdown on Companies That Exploit Africa.” The Financial 
Times (London), 7 February 2002, 4. 
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other government departments87. The representative from DTI who was at the meeting, 
subsequently described DfID officials as supportive of campaigners’ ideas.88  
 
Global Witness’ approach was timed well. Tony Blair’s speeches to the Labour Party 
Conference on 2 October 2001, and at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library on 7 
April 2002,89 had expressed a new political vision of Britain’s involvement in Africa. 
Having earlier described the state of Africa as a “scar on the conscience of the world”90 
that could only be healed collectively, in his address at the Bush Presidential Library, 
Blair described a form of development assistance that sought to remake the very 
functioning of political institutions: 
To bring hope to Africa we have constructed the idea of a partnership between the 
developed world and Africa. Not the old "aid" in a passive donor-recipient relationship. 
But a partnership in which, in return for African countries applying rules of good 
governance, anti-corruption, proper legal and commercial systems; we offer assistance 
for good governance, action on education and health, access to markets, help with conflict 
resolution which blights so much of the continent.91 
 
Blair’s vision was one of an increasingly globalised, interconnected world, in which New 
Labour’s commitment to social justice extended beyond domestic policy preoccupations 
to form the basis of Britain’s foreign policy, and where what was good for the poor, was 
                                                 
87 The ensuing correspondence among DTI officials portrays Global Witness as a group eagerly 
campaigning on all fronts, seeking (and often failing) to secure contacts with whoever they thought could 
listen to their recommendations. For example, they appear to have approached European Commission 
officials with the same recommendations about transparency. They had spoken to UK civil servants at DTI 
working on a major review of the UK company law, and implementing policy on the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention. Global Witness were also interested in obtaining a contact in the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA)—the UK financial services regulator—so as to discuss their campaign directly. This corroborates 
my earlier suggestion about the pragmatism of their campaigning. 
88 Email of 14 March 2002, File n. 174604, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive 
89 DTI officials, corresponding about extractives’ transparency proposal in late May, used this speech as a 
reference point for their descriptions of the NGOs’ proposal. 
90 Tony Blair. “Speech to the Labour Party Conference,” Brighton, 2 October 2001. British Political Speech. 
(Accessed 28 February 2017), available from http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-
archive.htm?speech=186.  
91 Blair, Tony. “Speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library,” Crawford, 2002. British Political 
Speech. (Accessed 29 May 2016), available from http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-
archive.htm?speech=281. 
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also good for Britain92 (Abrahamsen 2005: 61-63).93 But it also had to be good for 
international trade, because trade and development went together. “What the poor world 
needs is not less globalisation but more” stated Blair,94 echoing DfID’s new approach to 
development assistance, summed up in the title of the department’s white paper: “Making 
Globalisation Work for the Poor” (DfID 2000).  
 
Conceptual framework of DfID’s research resonated with Global Witness’ arguments. 
Contemporary DfID’s publications on governance and fiscal management shared the 
campaigners’ assumption that “more” transparency improved political accountability, 
which in its turn, reduced corruption.95 DfID’s support for anti-corruption was partly 
driven by economic considerations, also espoused by major IFIs at the time (Marquette 
2003; Tanzi 1998), that investment negatively correlated with high levels of corruption 
and complexity of bureaucratic procedures. One research paper published by DfID stated 
that public budget transparency “promotes certainty and confidence over budget plans 
and reduces the opportunity for corruption”, while provision of information to the public 
“[e]nables civil society to challenge the government to improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of expenditure.” (all quotes DfID 2001: 26) Reforms of public expenditure 
management, the paper noted could be induced through DfID’s support to civil society, if 
they were not supported directly by country’s government. 
 
Finally, Global Witness’ proposal “fit well”—to use a phase civil servants used 
themselves—with New Labour’s emphasis on responsible capitalism and a new role for 
corporations in international development. It also chimed with what Richard Manning 
(2007: 554-5), describing the New Labour’s international development policy, calls “a 
                                                 
92 Extractives’ transparency fit this new conceptual tenet, although perhaps not in a way that the 
campaigners had intended. When at the end of July 2002 Tony Blair met with a number of corporate 
executives, including those of BP and Shell, the CEO of BP Lord Browne spoke of the need to provide 
positive examples of sustainable globalisation. Browne presented a paper suggesting that globalisation is 
“synonymous with progress.” Lord Browne made a case that companies needed to re-build trust in the 
corporate sector, and transparency of payments to governments would demonstrate companies’ 
contribution to state budgets, illustrating positive aspects of globalisation and allowing citizens to hold 
governments to account. Tony Blair agreed. (Interview with a former civil servant from DTI, 15 July 2015.) 
93 Such a vision—and Blair’s interest in the notion of “globalisation”—could be at least partially attributed 
to the intellectual influence of the sociologist Anthony Giddens who advised the Prime Minister (Giddens 
2007). 
94 Blair, Tony. “Speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library.” Crawford, 2002. British Political 
Speech. (Accessed 29 May 2016), available from http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-
archive.htm?speech=281. 
95 It’s worth noting that the arguments for transparency in these papers are often circular: corruption is both 
a result and a cause of institutional weakness; civil society—both a result and a cause of civic debate. 
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strong feature of the UK’s approach under successive Labour Secretaries of State”—
namely, “the attempt to influence the international system. Whether in the World Bank, 
the UN system, the EU or the OECD, DFID and its Secretary of State worked to 
encourage other actors to join it to make changes in accordance with its development 
philosophy.”  
“Fitting” the proposal 
Archived correspondence suggests that some time after the meeting with the NGOs, DfID 
officials proposed the campaigners’ policy idea to their colleagues in the Cabinet Office, 
and it was discussed at length between Cabinet Office, DfID and DTI. The dynamics of 
these discussions (which happened during May 2002) is the subject of the next chapter. 
Having described above the political and policy context in which the proposal was 
received, here I would like to turn briefly to how officials, and campaigners who lobbied 
them, linked the proposal to various frames of reference in order to make sense of it and 
pragmatically inscribe it in different policy agendas.  
 
Aware of the fact that government officials were discussing their policy idea, Global 
Witness and other NGOs stepped up their collective attempts to influence the officials. In 
mid-May (13 May 2002) the billionaire financier and philanthropist George Soros, whose 
Foundation had supported Global Witness earlier,96 and who had decided to lend his 
personal backing to the NGOs’ cause, wrote a letter to PM Blair to “alert [him] to a 
proposal being put forth by the London-Based NGO Global Witness and supported by a 
host of other groups including Oxfam, Save the Children, and Christian Aid, among 
others.”97 Describing the proposal in a way already familiar from Global Witness’ 
publications, Soros suggested that “the UK take the lead on this issue during the G8 
Summit in June [2002]. It could form a central part of the G8 response to the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).”98 (quoted in Sudetic 2011: 68)  
                                                 
96 Soros’ Open Society Initiative (later Foundation) supported Global Witness financially since 2000. See 
Sudetic (2011: 65-92). 
97 On 20 May 2002—still awaiting a reply from the PM—Soros wrote to Blair again, noting that the NGOs 
now had a “critical mass in support of getting publicly traded oil and resource companies to disclose their 
payments for resources on a country-by-country basis.” Soros said he and the NGOs he supported, “would 
like to launch a public appeal prior to the G8 meeting in Canada.” The philanthropist asked if Tony Blair 
would like to act as a convenor—“It would give the Appeal the momentum it needs.”—but there is no 
evidence to suggest the Prime Minister accepted the invitation. (See File n. 575894, EITI folder, BIS Matrix 
Archive). On 13 June, however, the appeal was launched when Soros and the NGOs launched a formal 
coalition under a catchy name “Publish What You Pay” 
98 Soros attached a policy statement by the NGOs, which included a suggested draft G8 communique 
proposing the establishment of a G8 working group that would elaborate on the NGOs’ call to implement 
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A seemingly minor suggestion, Soros’ was in fact an attempt to position the campaign 
proposal not only substantively (that is, in relation to its aims and desired effects on 
political accountability and development in Africa, as NGOs had done so far), but so to 
speak procedurally, as something internal to the logic of implementation of the UK 
foreign policy. In other words, Soros was suggesting not only that the proposal could be 
advanced at the upcoming G8 meeting, but that it itself could be used as an instrument of 
to certain policy agendas—e.g. as a “central part of the G8 response” to NEPAD. 
 
Soros’ letter was followed on 31 May by one from Travis Clarkson99 (a pseudonym), a 
Director General of one of the NGOs acting in a “transparency coalition” with Global 
Witness. Clarkson’s letter was dedicated to making a substantive case for supporting the 
extractives’ transparency proposal, but ended with a pragmatic urge to action. The NGOs, 
he wrote, “hoped” that the UK Government would “take a lead” on promoting revenue 
transparency at the upcoming G8 summit and the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development. Clarkson described the proposal as a “tool” for achieving various goals 
which happened to be formal indicators of government development policies (e.g. 
fighting corruption, reducing poverty and preventing conflict). Revenue transparency, 
Clarkson suggested, could even bring the UK closer to fulfilling its obligations under the 
UN Millennium Development Goals. Finally, the policy proposal would also “help put 
into practice” the “far-sighted initiatives” proposed in the Treasury’s report Tackling 
Poverty: a Global New Deal.100  
 
                                                 
legislation and enforcement regimes on extractives’ payments “and production sharing agreements with 
governments and companies of countries where they operate, as well as “Technical assistance to 
governments of resource-rich countries in order to facilitate development of “socially responsible petroleum 
revenue management regimes, consultative mechanisms with civil society, and transparency of government 
petroleum and mineral revenues”. (Letter of 13 May 2002, File n. 575894, EITI folder, BIS Matrix 
Archive.) It seems that the NGOs’ suggestions kept changing ever so slightly, while always remaining 
centred on the mandatory disclosures. This suggests that their lobbying demands kept changing. 
99 Letter of 31 May 2002, File n. 576080, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. Clarkson wrote on behalf of the 
directors of CAFOD, Friends of the Earth, Global Witness, Oxfam, Save the Children and Tearfund. 
100 The letter also contained an earlier campaign “one-pager” signed by 11 NGOs, which explained the 
proposal in details, further highlighting the pragmatic stance taken by Clarkson: “Fiscal transparency should 
also form a central component in the ‘good governance’ agendas of international development agencies and 
may help to lessen the scope for conflict and serve as a conflict prevention ‘tool’ against privatised resource 
wars.” In this respect, the revenue transparency proposal could be read both as a development and a security 
intervention—both rationales united through the idea of political and market stability brought about by 
availability of information to citizens and investors. 
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Similarly to Global Witness’ references to the CSR discourse, Clarkson linked the 
payments’ transparency proposal to already established policies and international 
development commitments. But this was not just a discursive legitimation: like Soros’ 
letter, Clarkson's “contextualising moves” (Dilley 1999) constructed the proposal as a 
potential vehicle for realising concrete policies. David Mosse, following Latour (1996), 
calls this the “contextualisation” of a project or policy: the “interpretive work of experts 
who discern meaning from events by connecting them to policy ideas and texts” (Mosse 
2005: 157). Contextualising the NGOs’ policy proposal in relation to various institutional 
frames of action, Clarkson and Soros made it meaningful for ministers and officials in 
terms of categories of government action.  
 
This approach spoke to officials’ own way of contextualising the proposal. As the archival 
materials suggest, civil servants debating the proposal thought that it could addressing a 
number of development problems with a single formal mechanism. And because these 
problems had already been inscribed in various formal plans for development 
intervention, but had not yet been addressed, this in turn gave a reason for implementing 
the proposal.  
 
The official response to George Soros described the proposal in a way that vindicated 
campaigners’ contextualising efforts. The letter, prepared by a senior civil servant at DTI, 
but written in the name of the Prime Minister, stressed that the government was already 
working, in various institutional arenas, on a range of initiatives to improve fiscal 
transparency in developing countries. Global Witness’ proposal, it suggested, was 
“interesting” and “fit quite well with other initiatives”101 (meaning OECD Guidelines on 
Multi-National Enterprise, the UN Global Compact, different CSR reporting schemes, 
and so on).  
 
If Soros and Clarkson sought to contextualise the proposal in relation to practical and 
political imperatives that it could help realise, officials involved in subsequent 
negotiations of the proposal explicitly fitted it to relevant policy statements and 
commitments in a way that at once reproduced and stabilised them (Neumann 2013: 79-
80), and positioned the proposal in an instrumental relation to them. For example, when 
after the G8 Summit in July 2002 they presented a draft paper delineating the extractives’ 
                                                 
101 Draft letter of 30 May 2002, File n. 424002, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive 
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transparency proposal for the upcoming World Summit for Sustainable Development 
(WSSD), the paper stated that the UK had “used the G8 Summit in Kananskis as an 
opportunity to place the issue of transparency of payments on the international agenda.”102 
The objective, it said, had been to recognise “the need for greater accountability and 
transparency in relation to resource extraction, and to commit to exploring ways of 
achieving this.” As a proof, it referred to the G8 Africa Action Plan adopted at the 
Summit.103 Reading these documents now, it is impossible to verify whether officials 
negotiating the Plan indeed had had an intention to make the revenues transparency 
proposal a part of the plan, or it was merely read into the plan retrospectively. It is 
impossible to verify the WSSD paper’s statement that the “The UK objective for the 
Summit was for the G8 to recognise the need for greater accountability and transparency 
in relation to resource extraction, and to commit to exploring ways to achieve this.”104 
But what matters for my argument, is the very fact that officials preparing the WSSD 
paper, contextualised the extractives’ transparency proposal as something stemming out 
of the G8 Plan, and realising the Plan’s imperatives. As one official from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office put it in a letter to his Whitehall colleagues, the work on the 
extractives’ transparency proposal—for whose progression the G8 commitments 
“provided the basis”105—had to be squared with “the desire to set action in the context of 
the G8 Kananaskis language.”106 
 
This instrumental attitude to the negotiation of the text (“language”)107 of the proposal 
suggests that officials, similarly to campaigners, also sought to inscribe the proposal in 
existing discursive and institutional frameworks. An agreeable policy proposal had to 
“fit” other policies. Making it fit, was a painstaking work of cross-referencing (or 
                                                 
102 Discussion paper, early July 2002, File n. 323107, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. Quotation 
paraphrased. 
103 G8 Africa Action Plan, Kananaskis Summit Communiqué, 27 June 2002: paras 1.5, 2.6. 
104 Discussion paper, early July 2002, File n. 323107, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. Quotation 
paraphrased. However, there is evidence that Government officials provided briefings to the UK G8 Sherpa 
(that is, high-level representative and negotiator) on the revenue transparency proposal in the context to G8 
preparations. 
105 Discussion paper, early July 2002, File n. 323107, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
106 Email of 12 July 2002, File n. 323107, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
107 Anthropologists studying international organisations and law have written much about the negotiation 
of “language” of documents, and the way in which form, rather than meaning, takes precedence in this 
process (Riles 2000; 2005; Merry 2006; Müller 2013). They point to the fact that the form that enables the 
“fit” is made, rather than given, and that the process of making it is highly political. The next chapter will 
discuss in more detail how the form of the extractives’ transparency proposal was negotiated within the UK 
government. 
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contextualising) the proposal and the speculative stories about its potential future effects, 
with official policy statements, international agreements, and policy programmes of the 
UK government. I will build on this idea in the next chapter, as I discuss how the proposal 
was made to fit a complex landscape of departmental interests and hierarchies, in which 
it was adapted in order not to disrupt policy agendas of different departments whose areas 
of responsibility it connected. Now, however, let me summarise the arguments of this 
chapter.  
Concluding remarks  
In this chapter, I have sought to investigate “where it all started” for the EITI. Taking the 
official narratives of the EITI’s history as a starting point, I have described how the idea 
of a policy on corporate disclosures of payments to governments became possible, how it 
changed, and how it arrived on the tables of DfID officials in Spring 2002.  
 
The description of the shifts and transformations of the idea of extractives’ transparency 
that I have offered here, challenges EITI’s official history. We have seen, for example, 
that contrary to Rich and Moberg’s (2015) claims that the EITI was a response to some 
pre-given, natural “governance gap”—i.e. an incapacity of governments to deal with 
extractives’ corruption—, corruption in extractives had to be first legitimated as an object 
of intervention. In fact, I have demonstrated that both the object of the intervention, and 
its tools, had to be constructed and contextualised in relation to widely recognised and 
acceptable discourses of corporate responsibility and international development. 
 
Once we start paying attention to how campaigners devised the payments’ transparency 
model, we notice that it developed as a form of situated political knowledge that was 
deployed in attempts to persuade powerful actors about the importance of extractives’ 
transparency. I have described how campaigners skilfully contextualised their proposal 
within already established frames of reference and official action, and how the way they 
did so resembled officials’ own attempts to situate the proposal in relation to official 
policy goals and commitment.  
 
But whereas the campaigners developed the idea of extractives’ transparency and a model 
for a policy of disclosures in the context of political practice of campaigning, the practices 
and relations in which the proposal found “its specificity, its functions, and its networks 
of dependencies” (Foucault 2002: 214) once it began its social life within the UK 
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government, were very different from the NGO campaign. I would speculate that part of 
Global Witness’ and their allies’ success in persuading DfID officials to accept their 
proposal, was in articulating possible ways in which the proposal could “fit” 
policymakers’ agendas.  
 
Tracing the origins of the EITI in the Global Witness’ campaign on Angola, this chapter 
has demonstrated that Global Witness is not only an organisation that influences policy, 
but also a site where this policy is made (Tate 2015). I have examined how the 
particularities of Global Witness’ campaign shaped the proposal, and in doing so, have 
offered an exposition of the processes by which the idea of transparency gained 
“significance in relation to the politics and economy of oil” (Barry 2013: 61). 
 
Asking why transparency has gained such currency in this context, Andrew Barry 
suggests that “economic analyses of the so-called ‘resource curse’ have provided [the idea 
of transparency] with an influential justification.” (Barry 2013: 64, references omitted) 
The justification he has in mind, is conceptual: following Weszkalnys (2011), Barry 
suggests that this justification is internal to economists’ arguments about the positive 
impact of transparency and accountability on the management of natural resources and 
economic growth. Contributions to Collier and Bannon’s (2003) project offer a good 
example of such arguments. 
 
Barry, however, does not demonstrate neither how the idea of transparency gained 
traction, nor how exactly the resource curse thesis has been used to legitimate it. My 
analysis of the Global Witness’ campaign has sought to address both problems. It is true 
that the work of the proponents of the resource curse thesis became a prominent reference 
in official narratives of extractive transparency policies and campaigns in the UK and 
elsewhere. However, this is not to suggest that these policies and campaigns had emerged 
from the resource curse scholarship. British civil servants whom Global Witness lobbied 
for a revenue transparency policy, started using the term “resource curse” (always in 
quotation marks) only in 2003,108 when the institutional arrangements for the EITI had 
been set up, and much after Global Witness first formulated the idea of an extractives’ 
transparency policy. At least in the UK, the resource curse scholarship was not the primary 
                                                 
108 After they had been exposed to ideas of Collier and other World Bank researchers.  
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source of arguments and conceptual schemata that informed these policies at the outset. 
Nor were they what gave the idea of extractives’ transparency its legitimacy.  
 
I have suggested that the campaigners first developed and justified their idea of 
extractives’ transparency in relation to the discourse of corporate social responsibility. It 
then gained currency among policy-makers in the UK because of the pragmatic 
exigencies of the government’s development policy, rather than through research-based 
intellectual discussions (as implied by the idea that the resource curse theory 
legitimated/influenced policy). The fact that (as I will demonstrate in the next chapter) 
World Bank were supporting the idea that UK civil servants had chosen to implement, 
gave further legitimacy to civil servants’ work, but it was not the source of the policy’s 
idea. The acceptance of the proposal within the government became possible, in part, 
because of how Global Witness had constructed it as an abstract model divorced from a 
particular context of intervention, and therefore open to contextualisation in different 
policy agendas.  
 
Let me return to the moment when Global Witness’ proposal was accepted for 
consideration. I would like to note again that PM Blair’s views on corporate responsibility 
and international development, as well as DfID’s policy and research on governance, 
explain why DfID officials would be sympathetic to Global Witness’ proposal for 
increased transparency of extractives. But I would like to entertain the possibility that 
they might have accepted the proposal for other reasons—reasons having to do with the 
everyday flow of governmental work. My discussion of how these officials contextualised 
the proposal as a possible instrument of already existing policy agendas, makes room for 
this interpretation.  
 
This is where the next chapter in the history of the EITI begins.  
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Chapter Four 
A ‘social’ policy: drafting a blueprint for collaboration 
 
How did Global Witness’ proposal of a regulation for extractives’ transparency become 
policy? With this question in mind, in this chapter I will describe the path of their proposal 
through different parts of the British government and multi-lateral international 
negotiations. I will seek to explain how and why it changed on its way to becoming the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.  
 
To track these changes, I analyse policy texts and correspondence that accompanied UK 
government officials’ negotiations of the EITI. I read these documents109 as “scoreboards 
of relations of influence in an organisation” (Mosse 2005: 39). They demonstrate a 
multiplicity of competing and overlapping policy rationales at work in the negotiation of 
the EITI. I talk of negotiation because as a policy proposal, the EITI touched upon 
responsibilities and agendas of several government departments at the same time, and in 
order for the policy to be realised, it had to be supported (or at least not opposed) by all 
of them. Government departments and other institutions (such as the World Bank) that 
participated in this negotiation, differed in specialisation, remit and political influence. 
Their support hinged on the policy proposal’s coherence with their respective institutional 
imperatives. As a result, the policy design had to accommodate a multiplicity of interests, 
while remaining practically implementable. This became progressively difficult as the 
work on the proposal moved from discussions of its general principles, to elaboration of 
technical detail of corporate/government reporting. Exploring how the policy was 
negotiated, brings to light the work of assembling the “networks of validation and 
support” (Latour 1996; Mosse 2005)—the alliances and coalitions of institutional actors 
backing and reproducing the discourse of policy.  
 
The few existing accounts of the history of the EITI either overlook this social dimension 
of its development, or reduce it to schematic representations of one-sided interventions 
by Global Witness or the UK government (e.g. Rich and Moberg 2015; van Oranje and 
Parham 2009). In contrast, I demonstrate how the creation of the EITI was a collective 
endeavour, in which disagreements among British officials representing different 
government departments played a decisive role. The EITI was a ‘social’ policy from the 
                                                 
109 I accessed them in the internal archive of BIS. See the methodology section of the Introduction for a 
description of the materials. 
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very beginning. This chapter describes and analyses how this social dimension of policy-
making shaped the drafting of the policy, bringing about numerous transformations in its 
design, and eventually leading the drafters to make collaboration the mechanism of EITI’s 
governance. 
 
This chapter begins where Chapter Three ended: as you will recall, Global Witness and 
their allies met with officials from the Department for International Development in 
March 2002, asking them to consider the proposal for a mandatory extractives’ 
transparency policy. DfID functionaries, apparently sympathetic to the idea, promised 
they would talk to colleagues from other government departments.  
 
Around the same time, bureaucrats from the Cabinet Office—the department responsible 
for coordinating all other departments and supporting the ministerial cabinet—were 
making preparations for a major UN conference, the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development (WSSD), scheduled for August-September 2002 in Johannesburg. A group 
of civil servants within Cabinet Office’s subdivision called Performance and Innovation 
Unit (PIU), had been asked to prepare a list of proposals that the UK delegation would 
promote at the Summit. Archived government correspondence shows that in early May 
PIU officials (the “WSSD team”) submitted to the Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott 
a paper delineating several policy initiatives for the WSSD. A number of suggestions in 
it concerned extractive industries110; two of them focused on transparency of extractives’ 
payments to governments.  
 
Preparing the paper, PIU officials had consulted the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO), the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), and DfID. 
And it must have been from the latter that they borrowed the ideas of policies on 
extractives’ transparency, because (at least) one of these ideas was a word-by-word copy 
of what Global Witness campaigners had suggested to DfID officials in March:111 a new 
(obligatory) rule for all extractive companies traded on stock exchanges in G8 countries 
to disclose what they paid for extraction to governments around the world.112 
 
                                                 
110 Email of 25 April 2002, File n. 126823, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
111 The other proposal in the paper was for a transparency conditionality clause that would be attached to 
International Financial Corporation’s loans. It is not clear what was its origin. 
112 Email of 3 May 2002, File n. 174613, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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In Chapter Three, I explored how and why Global Witness formulated this proposal 
within the political and intellectual context of their campaign on Angola. Here, I describe 
the striking transformation of the EITI from a proposal for mandatory rules on corporate 
disclosures; to a multi-lateral, voluntary partnership between governments and extractive 
corporations, where both parties had to report their payments and revenues. This was a 
transformation from a policy originally meant for implementation in the UK and other 
G8 countries, to one in which no G8 country took part when it was launched, and which 
the UK government itself chose not to implement. Why did these changes happen? How 
did the collaborative set-up of the EITI, as it exists today, emerge? Finally, what can this 
teach us about the relationality of policy and government bureaucracy?  
 
I argue that these changes were a result of negotiations and compromises among the 
various institutional actors whose support was required, at different moments in time, to 
bring the EITI into existence. Importantly, not all of them were part of the UK 
government: policy negotiation is a complicated diplomatic process (Goodsell 2005), but 
this diplomacy is as much domestic, as it is foreign, and as I hope it will become clear, 
distinguishing between the sites and scales of this diplomacy in advance does not help 
our understanding of it. I describe how, between April 2002 and June 2003, Global 
Witness’ original proposal became transformed into a policy design that differed in almost 
every respect from what had been intended. I trace this transformation by following the 
proposal’s path as it was negotiated among the different departments of the UK 
government; then, between the government and various international actors; and finally 
within a consultative group of stakeholders that included many government 
representatives. Building on Mosse’ suggestion that “the discourse of policy acts 
internally and has internal effects” and that “development policy ideas are important less 
for what they say than for who they bring together” (2005: 15, original emphasis), I argue 
that PIU and DfID officials’ attempts to recruit wide support (both within the UK 
government and without it) for the nascent EITI was the main driving force behind the 
transformations of the policy design.  
 
Understanding these transformations is important for two reasons. First, it was between 
April 2002 and June 2003, that the main structural elements that characterise today’s EITI 
came into existence. One of these elements was the idea that there should be a single set 
of principles governing corporate and government disclosures—the idea that was 
eventually realised in the EITI Standard which during my fieldwork structured the 
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implementation of the UK EITI in many ways. Another one, was the idea that the EITI 
should be implemented through the mediation of a multi-stakeholder group, the 
collaborative forum of collective governance whose social complexities and effects I trace 
in Chapters Five to Seven of this thesis. 
 
Second, the transformations that I describe in this chapter not only resulted in the EITI, 
but in a roundabout way, incited Global Witness and Publish What You Pay, who were 
dissatisfied with how their original proposal had been changed, to keep campaigning for 
a policy on mandatory extractives’ disclosures. Almost a decade later, they succeeded. 
This led to a situation wherein during my fieldwork the UK Department for Business, 
Innovations and Skills was implementing two policies on transparency of extractive 
industries—one of them the UK EITI, the other, the EU rules on extractives’ mandatory 
disclosures. The multiple conceptual and social overlaps between these policies generated 
considerable friction and led to a conflict between corporate and NGO stakeholders of 
the UK EITI. In a sense, the seeds of this conflict had been sown in 2002-3, when UK 
government officials conducted the negotiations that changed Global Witness’ proposal 
into a policy design that could be supported in its particular political and institutional 
context.  
 
Following the ‘social life’ (Appadurai, Kopytoff 1986) of Global Witness’ proposal in the 
UK government between April 2002 and June 2003, I pay close attention to three 
moments of its institutional development in this period. I begin by discussing (1) the 
debates between PIU officials and representatives of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) about articulating the extractives’ reporting proposal with regards to 
national legislation and domestic policy interests of DTI. I then describe the (2) 
negotiations about the policy design between the UK government officials and potential 
international partners. The chapter ends with my description of (3) the debates about 
whether to implement the negotiated EITI in the UK.  
 
These three moments do not exhaust the complicated history of the EITI. For one, the 
EITI changed a lot since 2003. However, it was in this initial period that its main building 
blocks were laid. Reconstructing how this happened provides important insights into the 
sociality and politics of policy-making, uncertainties surrounding it, and the complex 
traffic of political and intellectual influences that come to shape the institutional design 
of the EITI. 
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From mandatory to voluntary reporting  
When officials from the Performance and Innovation Unit113 finished the draft paper 
setting out proposals for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, they circulated 
it for comment among “relevant departments”—mostly those whose staff had contributed 
to the paper. Emails with comments were returned. But in another part of the government, 
the paper sent ripples of dissatisfaction.  
 
Drafting and sending the paper, PIU officials had neither consulted their counterparts at 
the Department of Trade and Industry, nor directly approached them for comment on the 
proposed policies, even though DTI was responsible for corporate accounting, reporting 
and social responsibility, and therefore had a “departmental interest” in the extractives’ 
transparency proposals. So, when someone within another government department 
forwarded PIU’s draft paper to a senior official at DTI114 (saying that “you too should 
have this”), the official115 complained to his colleagues: “in spite of the claim that this has 
been sent to relevant departments for comment, it doesn’t seem to include DTI”. Was it 
worth making a fuss, he asked, given how little chance there was that the extractives’ 
transparency proposal would be implemented?116  
 
Not agreeing the draft paper in advance with relevant civil servants at DTI was a political 
mistake: the unwritten rules of the civil service dictated that policy proposals and texts 
should be sounded out with all departments that have jurisdiction over the areas that these 
proposals touched upon (Rhodes 2011: Chapter 8; for a comparative point, see Neumann 
2013: Chapter 3). Seeking to rectify the mistake, they re-circulated an updated draft, now 
including DTI officials.  
                                                 
113 The Unit was created in the Cabinet Office in 1998, and existed until later in 2002, when it became part 
of the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. It was a key centre of cross-departmental coordination and advice to 
the Prime Minister (Page 2003: 657). Half of its staff were on secondment from other government 
departments, and half, from academia, business organisations and NGOs (Public Administration Select 
Committee 2007: 8-9) and this diversity was reflected in the variety of projects PIU, and later PMSU, were 
assigned. See Rhodes 2011: 22-5 for politics surrounding PIU and Tony Blair’s re-shaping of the Cabinet 
Office. 
114 Email of 25 April 2002, File n. 126823, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
115 As late as the end of June 2002, another DTI official wrote to his colleague (I paraphrase): “Personally 
I find it irritating that PIU had been internally running with this idea for some time but only recently 
revealed it to others in the Whitehall.” Email of 24 June 2002, File n. 275131, EITI folder, BIS Matrix 
Archive. 
116 Email of 25 April 2002, File n. 126823, EITI Folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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A collectively agreed response from the DTI was promptly submitted to PIU; but among 
themselves, DTI civil servants complained: “PIU’s paper looks okay on a first read; our 
main concern will be in the area of extractive industries”,117 wrote one official, adding 
that the extractives’ transparency proposals were “fraught with difficulties”.118 His 
colleagues were sceptical whether the proposed policy on mandatory disclosures would 
work at all, either because they thought transparency a bad cure for corruption, or because 
they doubted the proposal’s political appeal. One DTI functionary, however, noted to his 
colleagues that their scepticism was not shared in the Cabinet Office: “The PIU were 
more optimistic than us about any solution on bringing transparency to extractives being 
effective. There seem to be examples of where greater transparency has helped in 
developing countries.”119 
 
The DTI officials’ scepticism was not a matter of private opinions. Rather, it reflected the 
way in which the proposal sat uneasily with the departmental policy agendas. The civil 
servants were keen to know the details: how would the proposal be implemented, and 
how would that affect companies that it aimed to regulate? These questions led them to 
ask whether this new kind of corporate regulation could affect DTI’s “relationships” with 
stakeholders. The proposal’s stated objectives were one thing; how it articulated with 
DTI’s departmental priorities and responsibilities, was another. All this the civil servants 
knew without having to consult their ministers. They also knew what approach to 
corporate regulation was right for DTI, and if they were to accept the proposal, it had to 
cohere with this approach.  
 
In order to discuss the pre-circulated WSSD paper with representatives of different 
departments, the WSSD team at the Performance and Innovation Unit called an officials’ 
meeting on 2 May 2002. Two DTI bureaucrats attended. De-briefing their colleagues after 
the meeting, they wrote about having voiced their “strong reservations” about the 
difficulties of the extractives’ transparency proposal. The main difficulty was the 
“burden” that any mandatory disclosures regime would impose on extractive companies. 
This, they reasoned, would also provoke resistance from the financial markets regulator 
                                                 
117 Here and further on, quotes are paraphrased. 
118 Email thread of 1 May 2002, File n. 174609, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
119 ibid. 
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(by then an entity separate from the government). They were alarmed that a proposal 
which they saw as grounded in the context of a particular country’s problems (Angola) 
and a particular set of industries (oil, gas a mining) could develop into something much 
larger, covering all G8-listed companies (they indeed talked of all companies, not just the 
extractives) with a blanket requirement to disclose payments to an undefined set of 
national governments. And then, there was the political problem of simply accepting the 
Global Witness’ proposal on corporate reporting, which could potentially set a precedent 
for a new way of working with NGOs.120 Finally, even if the proposal was accepted in 
principle in the UK and on other G8 countries, it was technically difficult to legislate for, 
they said121. All these practical and political complications meant, as one DTI official 
remarked in early May, that it was unclear how the proposal would evolve and how likely 
it was to “develop legs”.122 But after the meeting, this likelihood increased, when PIU 
officials sent the WSSD paper with the proposal to Deputy Prime Minister Prescott,123 
who approved of it. Soon after that, the proposal received the backing of PM Blair 
himself.  
 
The mandatory disclosures proposal, if realised, would have to be implemented in the UK 
by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), a body formally independent from the 
Government. On 20 May officials from PIU, DTI and the Treasury met with FSA 
representatives to discuss the proposal.124 Having no evidence about the content or 
outcomes of their meeting, we can make an inference from the fact that shortly after it, 
PIU officials abandoned the idea of implementing the proposed extractives’ transparency 
regulations through stock exchange rules. As an alternative, they suggested incorporating 
the proposal into the new Company Act (the main statute on practices of corporate 
governance and reporting) on which DTI mandarins were working.  
 
DTI mounted an even stronger opposition: as the department responsible for company 
law, and at the time conducting a public consultation about reviewing it, they had been 
long opposed to using company law as a vehicle for forms of reporting unrelated to the 
                                                 
120 See an email thread of 3 May 2002, File n. 174613, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
121 Email of 21 May 2002, File n. 174617, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
122 Email of 1 May 2002, File n. 174609, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
123 Briefing note of 24 May 2002, File n. 127740, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
124 Email of 22 May 2002, File n. 174619, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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main aim of corporate regulation—informing markets of the company’s health.125 One 
DTI official mused that if PIU had their way, it would damage DTI’s relationship with its 
business stakeholders.126 So would the resulting “regulatory burden on industry”. DTI 
officials also thought that mandatory reporting would adversely affect the 
competitiveness of UK (and G8) companies vis-a-vis their unregulated rivals. These civil 
servants acknowledged that the reasons to introduce new transparency requirements for 
extractives were legitimate. However, they opposed the idea that these requirements be 
mandatory, and couldn’t but see ever more negative consequences of PIU’s proposal.127  
 
Arguing against the proposal, DTI officials judged it as “excessive”, “non-essential”, 
“burdensome” regulation. This went to the heart of how the relationship between the state 
and the private sector was reformatted under the New Labour government. In this context, 
DTI’s core function was to regulate British corporations in a way that was conducive to 
overall economic growth (Taylor 2007). Understandably, officials involved in the work 
on the extractives’ disclosures proposal, did not see how exactly the proposed disclosures 
would lead to economic growth in the UK. In contrast, DfID and PIU supported the 
proposal because of their own objectives—respectively, promoting international 
development through the private sector, and delivering WSSD options that would fit 
political requests from PM Blair and his entourage. As a result, discussions of the 
proposal among these different parts of government rehearsed their division of labour, 
contrasting policy priorities and ideas of government intervention.  
 
Despite DTI’s opposition, PIU officials were not discouraged, perhaps, as one DTI 
bureaucrat remarked, because they were confident of the proposal’s political backing, 
which overrode any disagreements at the level of the civil service. Worried that their 
arguments were not being heard, a senior DTI official wrote to his Secretary of State128 
Patricia Hewitt to express concerns about the extractives’ proposal. He urged the minister 
to officially write to DPM Prescott and other ministers who supported the proposal, and 
caution them against the implementation of mandatory regulations without public 
consultations and considering undesirable outcomes of the policy. As was common, he 
                                                 
125 Email of 3 May 2002, File n. 174613, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
126 PIU officials suggested that some oil corporations supported the kind of transparency regulation that 
was being proposed, but were able to cite only BP-Amoco and Shell as examples, and DTI civil servants 
were not persuaded. (Briefing note of 24 May 2002, File n. 127740, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive.) 
127 Briefing note of 24 May 2002, File n. 127740, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
128 That is, the chief minister of DTI. 
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prepared a draft letter for Hewitt, which supported the extractives’ proposal’s broad aims, 
but suggested that ministers at FCO, DfID and DTI should look for alternative ways of 
promoting transparency.129 The draft insisted that it was “essential” that DTI officials 
were involved in “any further work” on the extractives’ proposal. Hewitt signed and sent 
the letter without any major changes. 
 
Political support of the secretary of state—the ultimate recourse in inter-departmental 
disputes of civil servants—, tipped the balance of the discussion in favour of DTI. The 
PIU officials were forced to take seriously the DTI’s opposition to a mandatory regime 
of disclosures. The shift in PIU’s position is not mentioned explicitly in interdepartmental 
correspondence, which makes it perhaps all the more visible. By early June 2002, the PIU 
officials began to speak of a “strong preference”130 of the government for a voluntary 
reporting regime, and never failed to mention in new iterations of the WSSD paper that 
such reporting should not put burden on companies.131 Satisfied with this change, DTI 
officials stopped resisting the proposal, although they did not seem to become less 
sceptical of it.  
 
This transformation of the proposal, which later would have major consequences for how 
the EITI would work, was not a consequence of DTI officials trying to change the 
intended outcomes of the planned policy. Rather, it resulted from negotiations between 
officials representing departments with different policy imperatives. The object of these 
negotiations was not so much the proposal itself, as the minimal conditions of DTI’s 
support of it. The proposal therefore had to be amended to accommodate interests of the 
dissenting officials (Mosse 2005: Ch2) that concerned  the proposal’s regulatory form 
and possible unintended consequences in Britain, rather than its stated objective of 
achieving transparency abroad. Even if the proposal “fit” various policy discourses in 
circulation in the government (see Chapter Three), it also had to be “fitted” to policy 
agendas of different government departments, and DTI officials were not shy of enrolling 
their Secretary of State to remind PIU about it.  
 
                                                 
129 Briefing note of 24 May 2002, File n. 127740, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
130 Proposing a “voluntary scheme” for reporting, PIU still suggested a “legislative stick as back up” (the 
preferred option was to amend stock exchange listing rules through the FSA). 
131 Email of 29 May 2002, File n. 174631, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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It had taken Global Witness two and a half years between 1999 and 2002 to move from 
advocating for voluntary disclosures, to arguing that mandatory regulations were 
necessary (see Chapter Three). British government officials needed only a month of 
meetings, emails, and one ministerial letter, to reverse that shift. But as they also 
recognised, the voluntary reporting proposal had a difficulty of its own: it required that 
G8 governments persuade companies to participate in a non-mandatory reporting 
scheme.132 How would that be possible, if negotiating support even within the UK 
government had proven difficult? Official wrote that in order for the proposal to be 
implemented, or even presented at the WSSD at all, there first needed to be an 
international support for it—from both companies and governments.  
 
I now turn to what I called the second moment in the development of the EITI—the 
negotiation of policy design with potential supporters from outside the UK government.  
From “voluntary scheme” to “partnership” 
Patricia Hewitt’s letter to DPM Prescott was probably a strong influence on PIU officials’ 
decision to drop the idea of a mandatory reporting scheme. However, it was not from 
Hewitt that they heard about the voluntary reporting option. Correspondence form late 
May and June-July 2002 reveals another—and a more distant—influence.  
 
At the end of May 2002, PIU officials were working on a briefing about the WSSD 
proposals for UK diplomats attending a G8 summit in Canada at the end of June. The UK 
delegates’ task was to sound out these proposals with other countries’ delegations. Since 
the extractives’ proposal concerned all G8 countries, PIU needed an early approval of 
their foreign counterparts to continue the preparations to the WSSD. While working on 
the briefing (which PIU agreed with DTI, FCO and DfID), the head of the WSSD team 
at PIU spoke with a representative of the World Bank. The Bank, said the representative, 
was “lobbying to get the issue of resource revenue management on the agenda of the 
upcoming meetings of the G8 and NEPAD [New Economic Partnership for African 
Development]”.133 PIU officials took this as a sign of the Bank’s potential support for 
their initiative on extractives. It turned out that the Bank official was involved in a new 
research project about the management of resource revenues, directed by Paul Collier134 
                                                 
132 Email of 29 May 2002, File n. 174631, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
133 Email of 29 May 2002, File n. 174629, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
134 An economist at Oxford, Collier served as the Director of Development Research Group at the Bank. 
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(we have encountered him in Chapter Three). Collier was an influential supporter of the 
resource curse thesis and researched links between resource-dependence, conflict and 
poor governance.135 The work he directed at the Bank included the Governance of Natural 
Resources Project, which also addressed the theme of resources and conflict, working 
“toward practical approaches and policies that could be adopted by the international 
community.” (Bannon 2003: ix)  
 
Having learned about PIU’s WSSD proposal on extractives, the Bank official suggested 
a “model for voluntary disclosures” of corporate payments.136 I have not found any 
archival evidence as to what this model was exactly, but one clarification comes from 
later cross-Whitehall correspondence. In early July, PIU officials circulated a discussion 
paper with a schedule of work in the run-up to the WSSD. One of the sections was devoted 
to Collier’s project. Functionaries from PIU and DfID had met with Collier in person (in 
June), and he invited them to comment on and contribute to his project. The World Bank 
project reportedly137 had several research streams, one of which sought to “address the 
extent to which poor governance of natural resources is a general and global problem, and 
systematically identify in which situations and for what commodities it is a problem.” 
Another explored “possible actions for both corporate and government reporting.”138 The 
project was largely exploratory, and PIU officials wrote that its scope was still quite 
broad: target commodities ranged from oil and gas to coltan to timber and illegal drugs. 
This suggests that its primary focus was not on transparency of resource revenues, but on 
their effects on political stability.139 This would be consistent with Collier’s own research 
interests. But the Banks’ project also had a policy component, and PIU officials focused 
on that. One memo circulated within the government stated that “The World Bank has 
been lobbying on this, including transparency of payments, at the G8 and it has high-level 
                                                 
135 For example, in March 2002, Collier published a World Bank working paper with Anke Hoefller, entitled 
“Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, in which they tested different models explaining the causes of civil 
war around the globe. The paper built on their earlier research into economic causes of civil war (Collier 
and Hoeffler 1998). Among other things, it explored different sources of funding for rebels, stating that: 
“That primary commodity dependence increases the risk of conflict is consistent with the evident role which 
primary commodities play as sources of rebel finance. Primary commodity dependence is also associated 
with poor governance and increased exposure to economic shocks, either of which could increase conflict 
risk.” (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 34, reference omitted) 
136 Email of 29 May 2002, File n. 174629, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
137 PIU’s description of it in their paper is reminiscent of their ideas about their proposal, and it is not clear 
whether Collier’s project was indeed similar, or the similarity was a result of officials’ redescription. 
138 Email of 29 May 2002, File n. 174629, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
139 Research papers commissioned as part of the project, and gathered in Bannon and Collier 2003, confirm 
that transparency of payments for resource extraction was just one of the project’s concerns. 
 110 
support from within the bank. The project intends to provide strong evidence to support 
policy development and implementation on the issue.”140 And the WSSD discussion 
paper noted: 
The Bank is developing a partnership initiative on the governance of natural 
resources. The objective is to formulate a global action plan to improve the 
transparency of revenues generated by natural resources and reduce rents from the 
illegal trade in commodities with a strong link to conflict. The Bank’s ideas for 
what the action plan would be, are still not highly developed. It is looking for 
credible proposals for legislation and action that could be taken forward at the 
multilateral level. Initial thinking on possible actions includes measures to 
increase the levels of scrutiny within developing countries and ways to reform 
voluntary and mandatory forms of corporate reporting.141 
 
This description suggests that when speaking of a voluntary disclosures scheme, the Bank 
official had in mind a voluntary multi-lateral partnership—an institutional form, rather 
than a concrete idea of what exactly the partnership would do. But this seemed enough 
for the PIU officials, who wrote to their government colleagues that the Bank’s project 
and their own proposal had similar objectives and schedule. They saw “an excellent 
opportunity to link the two strands together”. The discussion paper conveys some of their 
enthusiasm: after the initial disagreements across the Whitehall that caused uncertainty 
about the shape of the policy proposal, PIU officials seemed to have found in the World 
Bank an influential partner and supporter.  
 
The officials wrote: “The World Bank is keen for the UK to be a partner in its initiative, 
and for the UK to work to encourage other countries and companies to join it. We have 
agreed that it would be desirable to announce the initiative in the context of WSSD, if 
there is sufficient progress to bring in the relevant partners.”142 The Bank, they claimed,143 
had committed USD 400,000 to support this initiative, but the detailed mechanics of the 
partnership was as yet unclear. The paper spelt out the partnership’s desirable 
                                                 
140 Note of 10 July 2002, File n. 206049, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
141 Discussion paper, early July 2002, File n. 322853, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
142 ibid. 
143 There is no evidence to independently verify the claims in the WSSD paper I refer to. World Bank seems 
not to have published any materials that would indicate such an early support of what later became EITI—
possibly because its own policy of involvement in the matters of extractives’ industries was under review 
then (Gillies 2011). 
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composition: the Bank, the IMF, “at least 2 G8 countries”, “2 African countries and 2-3 
oil companies from the G8 operating in Africa”. This would be announced and registered 
as a “Type II” partnership144 during the World Summit on Sustainable Development. PIU 
suggested a work plan that called on DfID to propose how this initiative would work 
inside partner countries, and on FCO to do the diplomatic work of recruiting support 
among potential participants. FCO also had to prepare the ground for a formal launch of 
the partnership at the 2003 G8 summit in France by negotiating with their French 
counterparts.145 DTI, in their turn, had to negotiate support of the future partnership with 
major oil companies. 
 
A briefing on WSSD plans, prepared by PIU officials in mid-July, noted that “the proposal 
needs to be supported by a broad international coalition. Without this support, any 
measures to promote transparency – voluntary or mandatory – will fail.”146 This statement 
illustrates an important shift in the conceptual architecture of the extractives’ transparency 
proposal. As long as the plan was for the proposal to be implemented as a national policy 
in the UK (through stock exchange rules or corporate law), the support of DTI and other 
departments was indispensable. Now, the proposal refashioned as a voluntary multi-
lateral partnership, broad international support for, and participation in it, became an 
explicit goal of the policy and a measure of its success. More on this in the following 
section of this chapter.  
 
For now, it suffices to say that already at this early stage, the work of securing the support 
progressed rather quickly: by 15 July, Norway had already indicated their future 
participation. Not much later the DTI Secretary of State Patricia Hewitt wrote to her US 
counterpart that the USA should support the British extractives’ transparency initiative.147 
In August, Cabinet Office sent the draft WSSD proposal to their opposite numbers in the 
                                                 
144 Type II partnership is a form of voluntary public-private-civil cooperation of stakeholders first 
developed by the UN for the WSSD. It was devised to facilitate the implementation of sustainable 
development policies alongside traditional inter-governmental cooperation, and it is likely that UK 
officials’ need to find an internationally recognised institutional form led them to exploring the adopting a 
Type II model. On the history Type II partnerships, see contributions to Benner, Streck and Witte 2003. 
145 An FCO civil servant responded: “We cannot assume that we will succeed in getting this issue on the 
agenda of the G8 summit in 2003—we first need to work to persuade other G8 countries, in particular 
France, the hosts.” Email of 12 July 2002, File n. 323107, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
146 Paper of 15 July 2002, File n. 325358, EITI files, BIS Matrix Archive. 
147 Letter of 2 August 2002, File n. 480594, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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German government, who agreed with it, and warned against “even considering” 
mandatory disclosures.148  
 
By late July, there were further changes. Although the officials working on the WSSD 
proposals were keen to launch the extractives’ transparency partnership together with the 
World Bank, the Prime Minister appeared less keen on it. An advisor to Tony Blair wrote 
to the WSSD team (now embedded in the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, a successor to 
PIU) and other relevant departments to express PM’s request that all preparations to 
WSSD be made in close cooperation with France—possibly because of the importance 
of diplomatic cooperation with the French as hosts of the next G8 summit.149  
 
This meant, wrote the head of the WSSD team to officials in DfID, DTI and FCO, that 
“our discussions with the World Bank and others regarding the partnership on governance 
of natural resources be put on hold while we explore the scope for an initiative with 
France.”150 Since the UK government’s plan was to eventually incorporate the WSSD 
transparency proposal into the framework of G8 statements, it made sense to enrol French 
support for the initiative from its outset. The cooperation with the World Bank was 
shelved. But by then, Collier and his staff had already changed the British extractives’ 
proposal, and their influence proved to last: Cabinet Office would not be reverting to their 
earlier plans for extractives’ reporting. “The Prime Minister is strongly in favour of a 
multilateral approach”, wrote Blair’s advisor.151  
 
So far we have seen how Global Witness’ initial idea of a mandatory transparency policy 
became transformed into a voluntary reporting scheme as a result of DTI officials’ 
opposition to it. Now, the World Bank’s influence meant that that this scheme would take 
shape of a partnership of both companies and governments. As opposed to the original 
intention—that companies should disclose their payments to governments precisely 
because governments (or the Angolan government) could not do so—, now companies 
would report what they paid to governments, and governments would report what they 
received. It is unclear from the archival documents why exactly the equal and 
simultaneous participation of companies and governments was deemed necessary. But 
                                                 
148 Note of 20 August 2002, File n. 326214, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
149 Which meant that the French government had much influence over the agenda of the summit. 
150 Email of 24 July 2002, File n. 325363, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
151 ibid. 
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some large oil companies, consulted by the UK officials, supported this arrangement—
the conflict between BP-Amoco and the Angolan government had demonstrated the 
importance of government’s agreement to corporate disclosures. Another element of this 
new design was a complementary system of monitoring of disclosures (“perhaps through 
a World Bank report to the annual G8 Summit”152) through which a third party would 
audit corporate and governmental disclosures. This was still only a speculative design, 
and it would have to be discussed and agreed on with potential participants. Yet, when 
the partnership materialised in 2003, it was this design that provided the basis for its 
institutional architecture. 
 
Finally, there was another conceptual shift, which had to do with the relation between the 
institutional form of the proposed initiative, and the arenas in which its contents would 
be negotiated. Let’s return to May 2002, when DTI officials opposed PIU’s proposal of 
mandatory disclosure rules. Their opposition hinged on the perceived implications of 
these rules for companies and DTI’s relationships with them. But, as we have seen, neither 
in their discussions with DTI officials, nor in those with Collier’s team at the World Bank, 
did the Cabinet Office functionaries propose what these rules would be exactly. But if 
they had originally suggested to the DTI that it would be the rules of disclosure that would 
be obligatory for companies, now it was the organisational form—the partnership—that 
was voluntary, not the rules that would be the content of the form. 
 
At the end of July, this form still remained void, so to say: the concrete reporting 
arrangements were unclear. Writing to her Secretary of State, a DTI official involved in 
the work on the extractives’ proposal, said: “At the moment, the situation is very fluid 
and unclear; there is a number of often conflicting initiatives. The picture should become 
clearer after the WSSD.”153 In mid-August 2002, an Assistant Private Secretary from the 
Treasury wrote to PM Blair’s Principal Private Secretary154 that Chancellor Brown155 was 
                                                 
152 Paper of 15 July 2002, File n. 325358, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
153 Note of 1 August 2002, File n. 234645, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
154 In the British civil service, a Principal Private Secretary is the civil servant who runs a Cabinet minister’s 
(in this case, the Prime Minister’s) private office. An Assistant Private Secretary is a civil servant one grade 
below PPS. In this case, the PPS to the Prime Minister was the main representative of the UK government 
to the G8 negotiations (the so-called “Sherpa”). He was therefore the person who would be negotiating 
throughout 2002-3 with his French counterparts about the agenda of the upcoming summit, including the 
extractives’ proposal. 
155 Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer—the chief minister of the Treasury. Brown was long-term 
political rival of Tony Blair and eventually succeeded him as a Prime Minister in 2007. 
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“keen” to see that options for reporting were “going beyond a voluntary approach”, and 
that a possibility of mandatory reporting was kept open.156 The letter expressed 
Chancellor’s reservations that a “purely voluntary initiative” might not result in the 
desired degree of transparency. Whereas the institutional design—the form—of the 
partnership had been more or less decided upon, the reporting rules that participant 
governments and companies would have to follow, and even the rules of participation 
itself, were still up for negotiation.  
 
This move ultimately hollowed out the WSSD proposal of the remnants of the idea that 
Global Witness and their allies had proposed some five months earlier. It had one crucial 
implication, which I will discuss in the rest of the chapter. Namely, the shift of the 
proposal’s design from a mandatory reporting scheme to a voluntary partnership, meant 
more than just a shift from binding to non-binding rules of disclosure. Rather, it implied 
a change in who was setting the rules. With a mandatory scheme, it would be national 
governments (a fact that gave weight to DTI’s opposition); now, however, the arena of 
the partnership itself would be the forum for the negotiation of reporting rules. As I will 
demonstrate, this locked together the negotiation of support for and participation in the 
partnership, with the negotiation of its rules, leading to a situation where greater 
participation could only be achieved by reducing the degree of transparency demanded 
of the participants. Through the Autumn of 2002 and the first half of 2003, participants 
to the newly established partnership—representatives of governments, corporations, 
investment funds, international financial institutions, and NGOs—debated the 
partnership's rules of governance and reporting. It is this period—the third moment of the 
development of the EITI—that I discuss in the two following sections. 
The emergence of the multi-stakeholder structure 
In early September 2002, a press release from the Prime Minister’s Office announced the 
launch of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.157 The WSSD extractives’ 
proposal finally obtained an official name and existence—but hardly anything else. A 
newly created unit at the Department for International Development took over the work 
                                                 
156 Letter of 16 August, File n. 274811, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
157 The Initiative was meant to be launched at the WSSD, and there are varying accounts of why it was not. 
I will not go into the detail here (for that, see van Oranje and Parham 2009: 43; Rich and Moberg 2015: 
21). Most accounts of the EITI’s history name the WSSD in Johannesburg as the beginning of the EITI—
partly because that is how the UK government presented it. My point here is that instead of focusing on 
single official events, we can better understand the emergence of the EITI, or indeed any policy, if we grasp 
its social life within the government bureaucracy. 
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on the policy from the Cabinet Office.158 Much of the work was done by DfID officials 
themselves, but they continued to involve a “core Whitehall group” of representatives 
from other departments. DTI were still involved, albeit mostly as observers of the process; 
FCO officials contributed diplomatic assistance. The character of the work changed, too. 
DfID functionaries now had to get the initiative off the ground by enrolling support from 
participant countries and companies. They had to negotiate and agree with them the 
EITI’s rules and procedures. As one member of the DfID team described it to his DTI 
colleagues, this work would move on three tracks: those already “in coalition”159 would 
meet to discuss what they could agree on; these discussions would be informed by a 
“technical track, drawing largely on Collier et al’s work” at the World Bank; and new 
governments and companies would be drawn into the coalition through an “influencing 
track”. This way, the EITI would be “taken forward to the 2003 G8 Summit [in Evian, 
France] and beyond”.160 
 
The fate of EITI now depending on support of other governments, DfID officials spent 
the November-December 2002 on a diplomatic tour. They visited France, the US, and 
Canada, and prepared briefings for the UK delegates (the Sherpa and his Sous-Sherpas) 
involved in preparatory negotiations for the 2003 G8 Summit.  
 
Meeting notes and correspondence from this period demonstrate these officials’ attempts 
to persuade their foreign counterparts that the EITI was worth including into the G8 
agenda.161 These records show their shrewd political manoeuvring and attempts to link 
the EITI to already established institutions and policy discourses, similarly to how the 
Global Witness and PWYP campaigners had done. DfID officials met with 
representatives of different departments of the French government, and noted that among 
the French there was no agreement whether it would be better to include the EITI into the 
                                                 
158 Possibly because the Cabinet Office, and PIU/PM’s Strategy Unit in particular, had the role of 
kickstarting policy initiatives that were then transferred to government departments that developed them 
further (see Page 2003). 
159 Meaning other governments, companies and NGOs with whom government representatives had had 
contact so far. 
160 Email of 4 October 2002, File n. 347024, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
161 The G8 would lend the nascent Initiative political legitimacy and weight, making it easier to recruit 
participants. 
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G8 agenda on Africa, or into the one on Corporate Social Responsibility.162 In contrast, 
the US government “saw EITI as fitting with their G8 aims on transparency and 
accountability.” Regardless of how EITI featured in the G8 statements, there was an 
agreement among foreign officials whom DfID consulted that it had to “fit”, and refer to, 
“wider international initiatives to promote transparency and good governance”.163 
 
On their return to London, DfID officials wrote long reports, circulating them to the 
members of the “core Whitehall team”. Their accounts noted intra-governmental 
differences of opinion, political power, and expertise among the bureaucrats they visited 
in Paris, Washington, and Ottawa. The reports identified who within these countries’ 
governments would be the most suitable person to keep in contact with about the EITI. 
On these visits, the British bureaucrats also met with representatives of extractive 
companies and industry groups—e.g., senior officials of the French TotalFinaElf and the 
mining association of Canada—whose support for the EITI could help persuading their 
governments about joining the Initiative. These points demonstrate that despite the 
broadening of the scope of actors involved in discussions about EITI (as compared to 
cross-Whitehall negotiations in May-June 2002), the underlying dynamics of these 
discussions remained similar, focusing on the problem of aligning EITI rules and 
institutional forms under negotiation, with a multiplicity of interests and agendas. This 
civil service diplomacy, not involving career diplomats or official governmental 
representation, and exploratory in its nature, does not seem that different from what the 
PIU team had done in May 2002 when gathering cross-Whitehall support for their WSSD 
paper. Now, however, DfID officials were navigating a much more complex institutional 
arena; interests they had to take into account multiplied.  
 
These foreign visits were only partially driven by the aim of getting the EITI on the G8 
agenda. More importantly, DfID officials sought to encourage their counterparts to 
participate in discussions about the organisation and rules of the EITI partnership. Such 
discussions could not be left to G8 meetings alone. In a briefing to a British delegate to 
the G8 Sherpa meeting in Ottawa on 8-9 December 2002, DfID officials instructed him 
to persuade his foreign counterparts to send delegates to a planned workshop in London: 
                                                 
162 “It would be important to allow the French to take ownership of EITI”, commented the UK Ambassador 
in Paris, adding that “Getting Canada [the 2002 G8 president] on board would create a sense of handover 
of the G8 work [on EITI]”. Note of 18 November 2002, File n. 441520, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
163 Telegram, mid-February 2003, File n. 615728, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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“all G8 members have expressed interest in EITI. Some want more clarity on the measures 
proposed before giving their support. We could suggest options for these measures, but 
we really want them to support the principles of the initiative and get involved in shaping 
it.”164 
 
To prepare to these international discussions, the DfID EITI team decided to convene a 
“stakeholder group” (to which they otherwise referred to as a “working group”) that 
would meet regularly in London and include representatives of other Whitehall 
departments, UK-based companies, institutional investors and asset managers, and NGOs 
who had indicated their support of the EITI. The group met for the first time at the end of 
November 2002, with two items on the agenda: “Bringing in other stakeholders—who, 
how, and when?”; and “Exploring options towards a solution”—i.e. rules of disclosure. 
A set of “underlying principles” of the EITI was agreed. First prepared by the DfID team, 
these principles consisted of a number of general commitments to transparency and 
constructive cooperation, and did not contain any concrete obligations to report 
payments’ information. Their vagueness was intentional: a meeting note by a DfID 
official states that the EITI team intended to “use the principles to buy-in the widest 
possible support from all stakeholders.”165 The loftier the principles were, the easier they 
could accommodate the different interests of the stakeholders. In Mosse’s view, such 
ambiguity of policy discourse, “facilitates and helps maintain consensus, and conceals 
ideological differences, setting limits to the struggles over meaning” (2005: 36).  
 
But if “strategic ambiguity” is a common feature of policy formulations (Tate 2015: 5), 
the differences among the numerous participants of the EITI negotiations could also test 
the limits of the capacity of vague formulations to “marshal the fullest range of 
institutional allies” (ibid.). DfID officials understood this. As they were making 
preparations to an international EITI workshop planned for February 2003, one civil 
servant wrote: “We need to keep a balance of invitees in favour of ‘supportive partners’, 
in order not to allow the potentially hostile, but ‘need to get on board’ parties to stifle the 
initiative”.166 These comments demonstrate that DfID officials recognised that their 
chosen form of negotiations—the multi-stakeholder group—could lead the discussion 
                                                 
164 Briefing note, early December 2002, File n. 474415, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. My emphasis. 
165 Note of 26 November 2002, File n. 474385, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
166 Note of 16 December 2002, File n. 499181, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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about the EITI in an unpredictable directions, and made it necessary to pre-select 
“supportive partners”. 
 
Numerous foreign visitors were invited to the workshop, which DfID planned to use to 
mobilise support from governments and companies. In order to “give focus” to this 
workshop, the group agreed to design a draft “protocol or compact” that would delineate 
the structure of the EITI, and give options for a reporting mechanism. (DfID 2003b) The 
group discussed a number of mandatory and voluntary options, some of which the DfID 
team had borrowed from a draft paper prepared by Paul Collier’s team on the Governance 
of Natural Resources project at the World Bank. Meeting records demonstrate that the 
participants’ judgments about the reporting options they discussed were inseparable from 
their evaluation of how likely these options were to receive support from different 
governments and corporations.167 Some of these options had already been considered—
and rejected—among the Whitehall officials earlier. But as a senior member of the DfID 
EITI team wrote in a memo, “the process of having the stakeholder group arrive at the 
different approaches and debate their strength and weaknesses was important”. The 
process was important because of the performative dimension of the multi-stakeholder 
negotiation. The group had been set up in the first place to attract potential supporters of 
the EITI with the prospect of making the policy from scratch. And now, in the words of 
the same official, “If the UK is to propel this initiative, we need to be seen to allow all 
stakeholders to discuss all options, and not close them off early”.168 
 
Eventually, the stakeholder group agreed that a voluntary approach was “necessary in the 
short term to build momentum and get key actors” to join the EITI. (The NGOs in the 
group, among them Global Witness, insisted on not excluding mandatory reporting rules, 
which they claimed were the only way to make the payments meaningfully transparent. 
Curiously, some oil companies seemed to support them.)  
 
                                                 
167 On the company side, the reporting options included a new voluntary code, changes to international 
accounting standards, changes to stock exchange listing rules, reports to an independent third party, and 
changes to production sharing agreements. On the government side, they included a new voluntary code, 
amendments to OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, a UN convention, and transparency 
conditionality written into loan agreements with the World Bank and IMF. 
168 Briefing note of 2 December 2002, File n. 471311, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. Emphasis added. 
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The international EITI workshop took place in London on 11-12 February 2003.169 It was 
organised according to the same multi-stakeholder principle, and its participants agreed 
that future meetings should keep to this participatory model of governing discussions 
about EITI. A discussion paper for the meeting stated that “The Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative aims to bring together all the relevant actors in the extractive 
sector”.170 The focus of the workshop was as much on the substantive content of the 
Initiative—disclosure rules, templates for reporting, mechanisms of data collection—, as 
on the organisation of the EITI itself, namely, who could participate in it and how. DfID 
presented the “voluntary compact” (to be signed by governments and companies) that 
they had drafted together with the UK stakeholder group.171 The compact described 
participation as an explicit aim of the initiative, on par with promoting transparency in 
extractive industries. 
 
Its proposed arrangements created a complicated situation of interrelated scales: the 
compact itself was a document that would be agreed multilaterally and have an 
international status; it would be implemented within countries, but reporting information 
would go to an organisation outside of the country; there would be associate signatories 
of the compact—international NGOs, institutional investors etc.—, who would oversee 
national reporting, but not take participation in the in-country process. Finally, workshop 
participants recognised that they needed to guarantee that when implemented in different 
countries, the compact would lead to comparable processes of payment/revenue 
                                                 
169 It was attended by some 70 people (mostly officials, not politicians) who according to a DfID telegram, 
represented: “the G8, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Botswana, CAR, China, DRC, Ghana, Indonesia, 
Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Norway, Venezuela and Yemen; main private oil, gas and mineral companies; 
state owned companies in Azerbaijan, Angola, Algeria, Nigeria; industry bodies; IFIs; UNDP; OECD; and 
NGOs.” Telegram, mid-February 2003, File n. 615728, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
170 DfID. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Discussion Paper for International 
Stakeholders Meeting 11-12 February 2003. (Accessed 10 February 2017), available from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/frame/20030812004849/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/fi
les/eiti_paper.pdf.  
171 The compact, if adopted, would require, as a “pragmatic first step”, that signatory governments disclosed 
the payments they received from extractive companies operating on their territory; and signatory 
companies, disclosed what they paid to these governments. To oversee the compact’s implementation by 
signatory parties, the multi-stakeholder structure of the workshop would be replicated as a multi-lateral 
governance mechanism, in particular via the participation of actors such as pro-transparency NGOs, 
investors and international financial institutions, interested in the disclosures. For this purpose, a category 
of “associate signatory” was proposed. By mid-2000s, this arrangement would be reorganised into the EITI 
Board. Reporting of payments/revenues information would be done through reporting templates, and 
participants of the workshop agreed that there should be an independent party collecting the templates. 
Most participants considered the World Bank or the IMF suitable for the role, although it was noted that 
further clarification would be needed. Although the voluntary compact was eventually rejected (see below), 
in one or another way, all these elements eventually became incorporated into the EITI. 
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reporting. They also saw that, if implemented, such a set-up would result in institutional 
tensions if responsibilities of different parties were not clearly defined. A post-workshop 
report published by DfID stated: 
There was considerable discussion about the need for an international standard 
with international monitoring, in addition to country-by-country application of the 
compact. It was agreed that the template should be internationally recognisable, 
setting minimal reporting requirements, but that appropriate flexibility should be 
practiced in country […] to reflect country-specific circumstances.”172 
 
Possibly as a partial solution to these tensions, it was suggested that there also be an in-
country mechanism of governing the process of disclosures. The multi-stakeholder 
structure—which characterised the workshop itself, and whose perpetuation was 
recognised as one of the aims of the gathering—was proposed as a model for this 
mechanism:  
In contrast to the international collation of data, it was felt that the review and 
publication of data should happen at a national level. Although it was difficult to 
mandate centrally what form this should take, the model of a multi-stakeholder 
group, comprising government representatives, company representatives and 
NGOs seemed appropriate and had been proven to work in other similar 
situations.173 
 
I have not found records that would elucidate how exactly the participants arrived at this 
suggestion. But I think it is significant that the proposed organisation of governance of 
the EITI, replicated the collaborative form that structured discussions of these 
proposals.174 In other words, the proposed procedure replicated the multi-stakeholder 
arrangement of the group in which the proposal was being discussed. It is important to 
remember here that DfID had chosen to organise the discussions about the EITI in this 
                                                 
172 DfID. Report of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) workshop, 11-12 February 
2003, para. 24. (Accessed 15 February 2017), available from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/frame/20030812004849/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/fi
les/eiti_workshop_report_feb03.pdf  
173 DfID. Report of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) workshop, 11-12 February 
2003, para. 26. (Accessed 15 February 2017), available from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/frame/20030812004849/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/fi
les/eiti_workshop_report_feb03.pdf  
174 The stakeholder group convened by DfID continued to function even after the February workshop and 
the June 2003 international conference where the agreements reached at the workshop were officially 
formalised. 
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collaborative, multi-stakeholder form, because they sought to recruit support for the EITI 
partnership by making the potential partners shape the rules of their own participation. 
Finally—and going one step back—this was only an option because of the earlier decision 
to organise the proposed policy as a multi-lateral partnership, rather than as any other 
kind of a voluntary scheme. This was how the early form of what later became the central 
organising form of the EITI—the collaborative, tripartite multi-stakeholder group—
became enshrined in the policy.  
 
The question of the collaborative form of the EITI is important, because in the next three 
chapters I will deal in great detail with how the social structures of the policy whose 
emergence we have traced here, played out when the UK eventually decided to implement 
the EITI in 2013. But before I turn to this, there is one last thing to be explained: namely, 
why did the British government not sign up to the EITI already in 2003, despite initial 
plans to do so, and all the while encouraging others to take part in it? 
A sudden change in direction 
After the EITI workshop in February demonstrated a broad support for the voluntary 
compact among potential stakeholders, the DfID EITI team began to work on a more 
detailed, technically and legally precise set of documents defining the Initiative. An 
international ministerial-level EITI conference was scheduled for June. Writing to Tony 
Blair and her Cabinet colleagues, Clare Short, the DfID Secretary of State, said that the 
conference’s purpose would be to “keep the political momentum and offer an opportunity 
for supporters to sign up to the EITI voluntary compact”.175 In view of diplomatic 
considerations, Short proposed that “[t]o set the example for others, the UK would need 
to be a founding signatory of the voluntary compact.”176 Responses from other Cabinet 
ministers were positive.177 Stressing that the UK’s participation in the EITI would 
encourage other countries to participate, these responses did not mention at all whether 
greater transparency of the extractives was needed in Britain. Domestic effects of the EITI 
were not a concern for them.  
 
                                                 
175 Letter of 21 February 2003, File n. 886155, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
176 Letter of 21 February 2003, File n. 886155, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
177 E.g. Letter of 21 March 2003, File n. 886190; Letter of 19 March 2003, File n. 886232, EITI folder, BIS 
Matrix Archive. 
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DTI functionaries involved in the “core” group of Whitehall officials working on the 
EITI, also agreed that UK’s participation in the initiative of its own making was 
symbolically important. However, just as ten month earlier, they were still sceptical about 
the potential implications that the EITI could have for British oil, gas and mining 
companies. Explaining the Initiative to her departmental colleagues in mid-March 2003, 
one DTI official from the core group noted that there were two aspects to implementing 
EITI in the UK. One was the government disclosures— “preferably with as little extra 
work as possible”; the other, that the government “would be expected to encourage UK 
companies to sign up.” She noted that, given that their government had initiated the EITI, 
it would be difficult to “get away” with “anything less than that”. Echoing the DTI 
opposition to the mandatory reporting proposals in May 2002, she stressed that she would 
advise her minister and DfID colleagues against “any element of compulsion”178 in 
corporate reporting or participation. 
 
An “element of compulsion”, however, was about to be reintroduced. This time around, 
the suggestion came not from another government department, but from the working 
group of UK stakeholders convened by DfID. Collective agreement of stakeholders made 
it more difficult to oppose; and as we will see now, this element of compulsion was a 
practically inevitable consequence of how the EITI had been conceptualised as a 
voluntary partnership.  
 
As noted already, the voluntary compact, agreed in principle at the February EITI 
workshop, described a two-tier structure of the policy. Participation in the EITI was 
organised at an international179 level: to take part in disclosures, companies and 
governments joined the compact. But disclosures themselves were supposed to take place 
at the country level (i.e., only the payments made/revenues received within that country 
would be reported). And whereas it was clear from the compact that participant 
governments would report their own resource revenues, it was not obvious at all from the 
compact what information would have to be reported by companies. At the time, only a 
few major corporations supported the EITI (BP, Shell, AngloAmerican, Rio Tinto). They 
would also be the first to benefit, as it was broadly recognised, from the reputation of 
being transparent. But any given country received revenues from many more—often 
                                                 
178 Email of 14 March 2003, File n. 1026482, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
179 The term is imprecise, but I use it for the lack of a better one. It is meant to capture a scale implied by 
the participation of governments and transnational corporations in the framework of the compact. 
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small, local—extractive companies that neither had international presence, nor would 
benefit much from the proposed disclosures. If these companies were to report what they 
paid to a government, they would first have to sign the international EITI compact, for 
which they had little incentive as long as it stayed voluntary. And if they did not sign the 
compact, then it would be impossible to compare corporate payments for extraction with 
government receipts, within the unit of a country. This comparison was the compact’s 
main mechanism of detecting corruption (a difference between payments and receipts was 
expected to indicate embezzlement or underpayment).180 Transparency could only be 
meaningfully achieved with full corporate participation in the EITI process within a given 
country. And this was difficult as long as participation was structured around signing the 
international compact, rather than some national-level mechanism.  
 
These considerations (which are indirectly indicated in the cross-Whitehall 
correspondence I have seen,181 and which otherwise can be reconstructed from the 
conceptual structure of the compact) must have informed DfID’s discussions with 
stakeholders about the mechanisms of disclosures. In March, when a new iteration of the 
compact was being drafted, the problem of getting more extractive companies involved 
in country-level EITI implementation came up as a technical question of “language”. The 
head of the DfID EITI team wrote to her DTI counterpart about the need to “devise an 
appropriate phrasing for the compact to ensure that it is not difficult for the UK or other 
countries to sign it”. Specifically, she wrote, her team had discussed “the language around 
host [signatory] countries permitting/encouraging/requiring companies in their territory 
to sign”182. She wanted to know if DTI officials and their legal advisors would have any 
difficulties with either form of phrasing. 
 
The DTI addressee of this letter—an official in the Corporate Law and Investigations 
(CLI) directorate who had been involved in the EITI work since May 2002—went on to 
consult her departmental lawyers. She also wrote to civil servants in other parts of her 
department, who were responsible for supporting and regulating oil, gas and mining 
                                                 
180 See DfID. Report of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) workshop, 11-12 February 
2003, paras 11-2. (Accessed 15 February 2017), available from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/frame/20030812004849/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/fi
les/eiti_workshop_report_feb03.pdf  
181 E.g. mentions of issues of participation in DTI emails. See the email thread of 14 March - 2 April 2003, 
File n. 1026519, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
182 Email of 14 March 2003, File n. 1026482, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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industries. The ensuing correspondence within the DTI was partly about establishing who 
within the department’s many directorates had the authority to opine about the EITI’s 
implications; and, partly, on actually formulating a common departmental opinion in a 
dialogue between the knowledgeable CLI official, and many others who knew little about 
the EITI. If the UK signed up to EITI, they reasoned, it would not just be the large 
extractive companies who would be permitted or encouraged or requested to report, but 
also the smaller ones operating in the country. “Do you mean that all UK owned mining 
companies would have to fill out the templates regardless of whether or not they have 
signed up to the initiative? This would be a mammoth amount of work”—wrote an official 
from the Mining Directorate. The CLI bureaucrat objected: as she understood it, only 
those companies who actually signed up to the voluntary compact would have to report. 
She did not “want to see the compact go any further than a government commitment to 
encouraging companies to sign up.”183 Nevertheless, she argued, DTI officials had to 
prepare for anything: “What if ministers decided that they wanted to introduce an element 
of compulsion? […] What if there was a pressure from bigger companies on smaller ones 
to sign up? We need to be aware at least of the impact on smaller companies if we need 
to make an argument that they be kept out of EITI”. The mining directorate official 
seconded her: “I assume that filling in the template will be burdensome and time-
consuming, especially for small and medium enterprises.”184  
 
The CLI official wrote that she had made the point “very strongly to DfID that I could 
not advise the Secretary of State to support anything more than an encouragement for 
companies to sign up to EITI.”185 Still, at the end of March the stakeholder group 
convened186 by DfID collectively decided to “revert to other HMG departments to check 
the feasibility of ‘Requesting all companies operating in the country to provide 
information’.” Our CLI official was not at the meeting, and later wrote to her colleagues 
in the department explaining that if the UK signed up to the compact, it would have to 
“request” all extractive companies in the country to report what they paid to the 
government. “While better than ‘require’”, she said, it was “not much better”. She had no 
                                                 
183 Emails of 19 March 2003, File n. 1026519, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
184 ibid. 
185 Email of 20 March 2003, File n. 1026519, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
186 Before the meeting, the DfID EITI team had revised a draft of the EITI voluntary compact, which as of 
17 March included a line about signatory governments’ commitment to “request all companies operating 
in [their] territory to provide the data described in the Company Template and make it available to the 
auditor”. See EITI Voluntary Compact, 17 March 2003, File n. 886108, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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power over the wording: agreed by the stakeholder group—not only government 
officials187—, it was supported by corporate representatives.188 Yet, in her opinion, “many 
companies would take a ‘request’ coming from the government as a requirement.”189 This 
was relevant in the UK, where a ‘request’ to report could have “huge implication” for 
small and medium enterprises neither involved, nor interested, in the EITI. Other officials 
from the DTI agreed that an “encouragement” was preferable.  
 
This correspondence demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing between voluntary and 
obligatory reporting when it was “requested” by the government. On 8 April, the CLI 
official wrote to the head of the DfID EITI team to “reiterate the importance of keeping 
the Initiative strictly on a voluntary basis.” The “DTI policy view”, she said, put 
importance on a voluntary character of the initiative; and if the word “request” was kept 
in the compact, the UK government would have to undertake a Regulatory Impact 
Assessment to evaluate the business costs of the regulation, since it would not be “purely 
voluntary”. The official concluded: “The way the compact is drafted, it would potentially 
mean a burden on companies that are not involved in the problem that the EITI is trying 
to solve.”190  
 
The archival materials I have consulted lack a record of how the DfID EITI team reacted 
to DTI’s renewed opposition to the policy. But DTI’s disagreement with the “reporting 
burden” implied by the proposed change in the wording of the compact, was not the only 
difficulty that DfID officials were dealing with. There were disagreements with 
representatives of the US government and companies, fears that Britain would be the only 
signatory of the compact, and concerns among other G8 governments about the purpose 
                                                 
187 All quotations from an email of 2 April 2003, File n. 1026519, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
188 This was an echo of UK officials’ earlier conversations with corporate representatives in the UK and 
France, in which companies (Shell, BP and TotalFinaElf) had reportedly expressed a preference for a 
mandatory disclosures scheme. Within the stakeholder group, the issue seemed most pressing for BP—
possibly, because of the earlier difficulties that the company had experienced after the publication of their 
Angolan reports under Global Witness’ pressure. The CLI official noted that the likely reason for this 
phrasing was that: “In countries with opaque extractive sectors, government contracts prevent companies 
from disclosing payments information unless they are required to do so for some other reason.” This 
suggestion, of course, missed the point that companies in a particular country would not report without 
government’s participation anyway. 
189 Email of 2 April 2003, File n. 1026519, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
190 Email of 8 April, File n. 1026498, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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of their participation in an initiative focused on anti-corruption in the extractives 
industries (after all, wasn’t grand corruption the ill of the developing world?).191 
 
In mid-April 2003, the head of the DfID EITI team revealed the extent of these 
difficulties, when she circulated an assessment of the “way forward for EITI”. There was 
a “slight change of plan”, she wrote with an understatement: changes were significant 
indeed. Specifically, she wrote, “the US have drawn some lines in the sand, IMF are 
concerned about overcommitting themselves, and it has proved difficult to get a voluntary 
compact that could work equally well of the UK and Angola.”192 She summarised these 
changes as follows:  
- we have shifted from a single global compact to in-country compacts; 
- we have shifted from a focus on all types of countries piloting this, to focus on 
developing countries with significant dependence on extractives; 
- the June EITI conference will agree a Statement of Principles and Agreed 
Actions, rather than signing a global compact.193 
 
For the DTI “core group” official, this was a “collapse” of the voluntary compact idea as 
such. Whatever the reason for it, it was a “very welcome development”, given that DTI 
had expressed a preference for a non-binding, voluntary approach from the very 
beginning.194 Now, the UK would not be implementing the EITI at all. Thus, the EITI 
transformed from a partnership for which suitable and demonstrative enough partners had 
to be found; into a set of general principles, which later became a mobile policy model 
that the EITI is today.  
 
The change of plan meant that rules of disclosure now would be negotiated within 
implementing countries. “Actual disclosure will be pursued on a country by country basis, 
in cases where there is a problem with a lack of transparency, through discussions between 
individual governments, companies and other stakeholders, with parties agreeing what 
each will disclose. The idea now is to start EITI as a pilot scheme in one or two willing 
                                                 
191 Core group NGO paper on the future of the EITI, September 2004, File n. 2436670MIN1-00519577, 
EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
192 Email of 15 April, File n. 924755, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
193 Email of 23 April 2003, File n. 1026505, EITI folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
194 Email of 25 April 2003, File n. 1026505, EITI Folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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countries.”195 This eliminated the tensions of scales of participation and reporting, 
mentioned earlier. But at the same time, it meant that rules and mechanisms of disclosure 
would be developed within countries by their multi-stakeholder group on a case-by-case 
basis. The UK, not implementing the EITI itself, would instead focus on “testing out” the 
initiative in the signatory countries. In the concluding remarks that follow, I revisit and 
elaborate this and other points of the chapter.  
Concluding remarks  
In this chapter I have described the transformation of Global Witness’ proposal for a 
government-implemented mandatory policy of corporate reporting, into a voluntary 
partnership of companies and governments, organised around a multi-stakeholder process 
of negotiation of the reporting rules. I have traced this transformation through various 
social arenas within and without the UK government. I have argued that the conceptual 
changes that the proposal underwent on path to becoming the EITI, had to do with how it 
was negotiated within the various institutional contexts that it traversed. The speculative 
conceptual architecture of the proposal itself was a key moving factor in the creation of 
new social fora (e.g. the stakeholder group convened by DfID) where it was debated.  
 
I have described three moments in the development of the institutional design of the EITI 
between April 2002 and May 2003. The first moment concerned the transformation of the 
design from a mandatory reporting policy, to a voluntary one as a result of internal 
governmental disagreements. I have described just how central to the making of the EITI 
were the processes of coordination and negotiation within the UK government. The 
speculative design of the proposal had to be in accords with agendas of various 
government departments. Yet, these agendas were not always in agreement themselves, 
and the policy proposal had different meaning and implications for officials positioned 
differently within the government. The negotiations that began with a failure of PIU to 
consult with DTI officials, evolved as a gradual incorporation of DTI’s preferences and 
domestic policy imperatives into the project design. The design of the policy as it emerged 
in early Summer 2002, reflected, in its main elements, the key moments of these 
negotiations, in particular the compromise that PIU officials made about the modality of 
policy implementation (mandatory/voluntary) in order to prevent it from being derailed 
by DTI opposition.  
                                                 
195 Email of 12 June 2003, File n. 1306236, EITI Folder, BIS Matrix Archive. 
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I have argued that the negotiation of the policy design at this stage was about making it 
incorporate, replicate and perhaps reinforce policy interests of different departments 
(rather than contradict them). In order to gain support within the government, the design 
of the proposal had to accommodate interpretive and political differences among the 
negotiating officials. My material supports Mosse’s (2004, 2005) argument that policy 
designs ‘work’ to enrol support from various actors. Conversely, Neumann (2012) 
demonstrates in his ethnography of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs how the 
writing of official documents within the ministry is a collective endeavour that integrates 
different arguments, policy agendas, and social relationship in a self-conscious 
performance of institutional unity. My ethnography demonstrates that the design of the 
EITI was a result of a similar process within the UK government. 
 
I have thus demonstrated that texts, or at least policy texts inscribed in official documents 
that mediate government work, both reflect and structure social relations. Describing the 
second moment of the EITI’s development, I have shown how even provisional policy 
designs have conceptual and social effects of their own within the arenas where they are 
negotiated. This second moment had to do with a transformation of the EITI’s provisional 
design into a voluntary multi-lateral partnership of companies and governments as a result 
of the World Bank’s influence.  
 
The transformation made a broad support for the policy an explicit condition of its 
possibility, and in fact elevated government and corporate participation in it to the status 
of the policy aim. Primary discussions about the policy proposal shifted from within the 
Whitehall, to a participatory multi-stakeholder arena set up to both enrol the support for 
the partnership, and to negotiate its rules. I have sought to demonstrate how meetings and 
workshops with actual and potential supporters and participants of the EITI, gradually 
gave substance to the idea that the EITI should be organised according to a model of a 
partnership between companies and governments. We have seen now how the meetings 
and workshops themselves “brought together”, for the purpose of collective consultations, 
discussions, and eventually, decision-making (e.g. the collective agreement of the EITI 
Principles and Voluntary Compact), representatives not only of companies and 
governments, but also the World Bank and anti-corruption NGOs, including Global 
Witness.  
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I have suggested that these meetings and workshops provided not only a platform for 
discussions about the EITI and its rules, but themselves became a model of how the EITI 
should be governed: an informal mechanism of recruiting support and securing 
participation in the policy, became a mechanism of governing it. The place of the 
collective governance in the organisation of the EITI as we know it today, was a result of 
an interplay between the conceptualisation of the policy as a partnership, and forms of 
social coordination and organisation that this conception entailed within the context of 
British government’s relations with other G8 countries, large oil companies, international 
financial institutions and anti-corruption NGOs. In other words, collaboration became 
central to the EITI because of the social logic of policy negotiation, rather than some 
external need to make up for the incapacity of any one government to deal with 
extractives’ corruption, as Rich and Moberg (2015) suggest, writing of a “governance 
gap” that collaboration is supposed to address. If anything, the “gap” to which 
collaboration responded, had to do with the fact that the British government could not 
successfully launch a policy like the EITI on its own because of the international 
dimensions of the extractives’ reporting. 
 
Because the Initiative could only go forward if all partners agreed about the reporting 
rules and rules of participation, the rules themselves had to accommodate multiple 
interests. I have demonstrated how DfID officials attempts to involve maximum 
participation and support from among governments and companies, effectively put in 
contradiction the two goals of the EITI (achieving transparency of payments and 
revenues, and securing participation in the Initiative). This was because the more parties 
got involved in discussions about the rules of reporting, the less they could agree on, and 
the less willing they were to accept more stringent reporting options. We can see this in 
the preference for voluntary reporting among the participants in DfID’s workshops; in the 
difficulty to agree a voluntary compact that would work equally well for all participants; 
and in the fact that disagreements and concerns among UK and other governments’ 
representatives eventually led to a down-sizing of the EITI and a further shift of 
discussions about the rules to multi-stakeholder groups that would be established in each 
implementing countries. Contrary to the official narratives of the EITI and the theory of 
collective governance proposed by Rich and Moberg (2015), instead of facilitating greater 
transparency, multi-stakeholder collaboration undermined it. 
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The final, third, moment of the EITI’s development that I described, concerned renewed 
opposition within the DTI to a particular way in which a small textual change to the 
voluntary compact could reframe the relations between governments and companies that 
it stipulated. I have described discussions within DTI about it, and pointed to how they 
could have influenced DfID’s decision to change the direction of the EITI, making it an 
initiative for resource-rich developing countries only. This was when the EITI finally 
became the tool of regulatory export that it stayed for many years, during which the 
British government supported it abroad—a tool of international intervention that had very 
much been shaped by the parochial concerns of the British civil service. 
 
It was only in 2013 that the government finally decided to implement the EITI in Britain, 
and in the following chapters I will describe how this happened, and how it led to new 
paradoxes and contradictions. Between 2003 and 2013, many things changed in the 
organisation of the policy. The Statement of Principles and Agreed Actions gradually 
gave way to an increasingly formalised code of rules that were the same for all 
participating countries, and which eventually became enshrined in the EITI Standard.196 
NGOs became formally recognised as a stakeholder group—the Civil Society—, and 
rules about independent audit by a third party were introduced. In 2006, the tension 
between the international and national dimensions of the EITI was resolved with the 
creation of the EITI International Secretariat and a multi-stakeholder Board. But many of 
these institutional arrangements germinated already during the discussions described in 
this chapter. Most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, the collaborative form 
of the EITI remained the same.  
 
The next chapter turns to the paradoxes of EITI implementation in the UK in 2013-15, 
tracing the interplay of the institutional structures of the EITI, with diplomatic concerns 
of both the UK government, and Global Witness and their partners in the Publish What 
You Pay Coalition. As will become clear in the next chapters, the structures of the EITI 
that emerged 2002-3, shaped the policy’s implementation in Britain a decade later, 
exposing once again the importance of organisational coordination and navigation of 
social relationships in the complex world of policymaking. 
  
                                                 
196 During the second EITI conference, EITI Principles developed and adopted in 2003, were supplemented 
by EITI Criteria which set common “rules of the game” in a manner reminiscent of the original Voluntary 
Compact. These rules were gradually transformed into more comprehensive EITI Requirements (in 2009 
and 2011). The Requirements, in their turn, were superseded by the 2013 and 2016 EITI Standards. 
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Chapter Five 
An example for others: national policy as a tool of global 
campaigning  
 
In the previous two chapters, I have traced the development of the EITI model of 
collective governance in the early 2000s. In this and the next two chapters, I describe 
what happened when this model was put into practice in 2013-15. This chapter analyses 
how government officials and NGO campaigners performed the making of a national 
policy, the UK EITI, towards international arenas. The chapter contributes to the 
dissertation’s overall aim of understanding the changing social world of policy-making, 
and the effects of collective governance on it, by examining how the implementation of 
the EITI model in Britain was paradoxically informed by the government’s and the 
NGOs’ attempts to promote it abroad. Central to this was the government’s rhetoric of 
international leadership (discussed in the next section). 
 
The chapter explores what I see as the paradox of the UK EITI, namely, that as a policy 
on transparency of domestic extractive industries, it was implemented for diplomatic 
reasons which had little to do with transparency in the UK; and it was supported in this 
capacity by international NGOs keen to instrumentalise the government’s rhetoric about 
the UK EITI, in order to influence policy-making in other countries. When I began to 
research the UK EITI in late 2014, Elizabeth, Aimée and Stewart, the staff of the UK 
EITI Secretariat, occasionally talked about this discrepancy between the government’s 
diplomatic reasons for implementing the EITI, and the Initiative’s official aims of 
improving transparency and accountability of domestic extractive industries. But if the 
officials were keen to point out the contradictions of their policy, these did not present 
themselves as practical problems. The work of the Secretariat was focused on 
“delivering” the policy—getting it off the ground, making it work, and getting the 
stakeholders to agree—rather than on the more abstract questions of what the policy was 
for, or what it was aiming to achieve. International leadership, and the manner in which 
it only uneasily articulated with the UK EITI’s domestic goals, receded into the 
background of the officials’ day-to-day work.  
 
I was therefore surprised to discover, when I first attended a UK EITI meeting, that the 
rhetoric of international leadership was alive and well. Unexpectedly, however, it was 
predominantly the NGO campaigners, rather than government officials, who talked about 
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the need to make the UK a “good leader” of extractives transparency. And they not only 
talked about it, but actively sought to introduce new, more stringent, transparency rules 
into the UK EITI. Justifying their agenda with claims about public interest and 
accountability, these campaigners admitted in private that there was little if any public 
interest in the UK EITI in Britain, and that they themselves were not interested in making 
the British extractives more transparent.  
 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that their interests lay elsewhere, and will explore what they 
were, and how they played out within the formal organisation of the EITI, shaping the 
UK EITI. These interests were elsewhere quite literally: the campaigners participated in 
the UK EITI in order to make it into a model example of transparency policy, to which 
they could point in other EITI-implementing countries. Corporate representatives resisted 
this agenda, and on the whole managed to have the upper hand. However unsuccessful, 
however, the campaigners’ attempts to turn the UK EITI into an exemplary model of EITI 
implementation reveal more general truths about collective governance and policy-
making.  
 
They demonstrate that despite the official emphasis on collaboration, disputes and 
divergent attempts to shape the policy according to one’s interests were equally important 
modalities of collective governance. The paradox of the UK EITI also unsettles 
conventional ideas about autonomous and independent ‘domestic’ policy-making (Peck 
and Theodore 2015: 3). It also demonstrates the manner in which the supposedly global 
and mobile policy models are implicated in situated social arrangements of policy 
implementation (Burawoy 2001; Tsing 2005). At the same time, this paradox offers an 
opportunity to rethink the scale of policy not as an analytical given, but as an ethnographic 
artefact (Yarrow 2011: 108-18). 
 
The material I discuss in this chapter shows that a national policy can be produced and 
animated by aspirations of transnational campaigning. These aspirations do not situate 
the ‘national’ within the ‘global’ in a manner of vertical encompassment (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2002: 996). Rather, the national and the global are different—and contingently 
related—ways of scaling the policy, which become emphasised in competing attempts of 
different stakeholders to perform the UK EITI to different audiences. As a result of these, 
the global reach of the UK EITI, as a model example of transparency, can be understood 
as implicated and encompassed within its national arrangements. The scale of the policy 
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is relationally made and constructed (Carr and Lempert 2016), and my ethnography 
demonstrates that for the NGO campaigners, scaling is a form of political intervention in 
its own right. 
 
I suggest that the campaigners’ attempts to turn the UK EITI into an arena and a tool of 
political intervention elsewhere, were possible not despite the formal organisation of the 
policy, but because of it. Besides the government’s rhetoric of international leadership, 
of particular importance here was the tension between the abstract EITI model and its 
concrete implementation in the UK. It opened up an opportunity for the NGO 
representatives to pursue their goals in ways that did not immediately appear as situated 
within a ‘national’ or ‘global’ arena, and therefore allowed them to hold in view multiple 
levels of action at once (Cook 2016: 155-6; Riles 1998). This insight will be crucial to 
my analysis of the sociality and limits of collaboration in Chapter Six.  
 
To explore these issues, in what follows, I first discuss the government’s rhetoric of 
international leadership, and why the NGO campaigners claimed that they had “no 
interest” in the UK EITI, yet continued to be actively involved in this. I will then turn to 
one case of their involvement, the negotiation of the scope of the policy in early 2014. 
Reconstructing from internal documents the campaigners’ proposal to introduce new 
forms of transparency through the UK EITI, I explore how they justified it by 
appropriating the government’s rhetoric of international leadership. I then explain why 
claims to leadership and exemplarity made sense in the organisational context of the EITI. 
And to explore why new forms of transparency mattered to the campaigners, I relate them, 
on the one hand, to the institutional organisation of the EITI, and on the other, to the 
NGOs’ campaigning practices more broadly.  
 
In the final part of the chapter, I build on the preceding analysis in order to discuss the 
politics of collective governance in the context of the UK EITI. Returning to the paradox 
of the UK EITI, I explain the concrete social and cultural arrangements through which a 
supposedly domestic policy could become a vehicle for transnational interests. To 
conclude, I reflect on the implications of the UK EITI’s paradox for our understanding of 
scale in policymaking. 
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The rhetoric of international leadership 
In spring 2013, the British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that his coalition 
government would implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in the UK 
as a part of the government’s transparency agenda for its 2013 presidency of the G8. 
Together with two other flagship policies on transparency on this agenda,197 the UK EITI 
meant to demonstrate the British leadership in the sector, and raise “global standards of 
transparency”. Some six months later, the BIS Committee of the House of Commons 
launched a comprehensive inquiry into the state of extractive industries in Britain. 
Knowledgeable of the government’s transparency agenda, the parliamentarians asked 
Jenny Willott MP, a junior BIS minister responsible for the UK EITI, to appear before 
the Committee. Parliamentarians inquired: Why did the UK sign up to the EITI? Why did 
it take the government so long? Some were sympathetic to the government’s transparency 
plans, others were sceptical that transparency could ever deliver on its promise of good 
governance. Willott responded: 
I think when it was originally set up it was intended to be for resource-rich developing 
countries for their companies to sign up to. The UK has, as you said, felt very strongly 
that it is an important area and has been really pushing it over the years. The 
Government came to the conclusion that we would be much more effective by taking 
a lead and signing up to it and that would help us to be able to encourage other 
countries to sign up, which is why we have now decided to sign up. Developed 
countries are now increasingly signing up to show that it is truly a global standard and 
that it is appropriate and possible for all countries to sign up to it.198 
 
The exchange above gives a hint of Willott’s answers: the government had signed up to 
the Initiative in order to set an example for other countries; the reasons were diplomatic. 
By and large, the Committee members were content with the explanation, and only 
scolded the government for not setting an example for other countries earlier.199 In 
                                                 
197 The transposition of the European extractives’ mandatory reporting rules, and a policy on transparency 
of beneficial owners of British companies. 
198 House of Commons, Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, Oral evidence: Extractive Industries 
Sector inquiry, HC 832-v., 2014, Q 411. 
199 The record of the session suggests that neither the Committee members, nor minister Willott herself, 
knew of the government’s plans to join the EITI already in 2003 (see Chapter Four). If they did, they would 
also know that already then the potential British participation in the EITI was described in moral terms of 
leadership and exemplarity. In 2013, as in 2003, the rhetoric of moral consistency, uprightness, and honesty, 
inherent in the narrative of “international leadership” of the extractives’ transparency agenda, framed the 
government’s official explanations about joining the UK EITI. 
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parallel with Willott’s appearance before the Committee, Elizabeth Pierce and her team 
at the UK EITI Secretariat at BIS, submitted a paper explaining to the Committee the 
government’s official position: 
The UK signed up to EITI to show leadership on extractives and to encourage 
other countries to follow suit. We are responding to concerns that potential EITI 
countries are deterred from joining the initiative due to the perception that EITI is 
designed for poor and corrupt countries. [By implementing EITI in the UK,] The 
Government aims to send a clear message that EITI is a global standard for both 
developed as well as developing countries. … The UK getting our own house in 
order will encourage others, including emerging economies, to sign up. As more 
countries join the EITI, overall global standards of transparency are raised200. 
 
The rhetoric of leadership, infused with normative aspirations and assumptions about the 
effectiveness of the UK’s exemplarity, indirectly pointed to the diplomatic considerations 
that motivated the government’s decision to implement the policy. Ever since the formal 
launch of the Initiative in 2003, the government had promoted the EITI model around the 
world. The Department for International Development and the Foreign Office provided 
financial and operational support to the international EITI and countries implementing 
the initiative,201 and worked with many other countries to persuade them to implement it. 
By 2013, these attempts to disseminate the EITI had come under increased criticism from 
countries targeted by DfID’s and FCO’s diplomacy. British government officials with 
whom I spoke, hinted that many developing countries saw this diplomacy as a 
confirmation of the British neo-Imperialist mind-set: otherwise, why would the 
government promote a transparency policy that they themselves did not implement? Why 
would the government urge others to become transparent, if it itself did not do so? 
Responding to this scepticism, the UK EITI was meant to “send a message” and “give a 
signal” that the government was committed to the principles that it propagated in other 
countries. The very fact of the Initiative’s implementation evidenced, in the words of one 
NGO campaigner, that Britain “not only talked the talk, but walked the walk”. This, in its 
turn, was expected to encourage other countries to join the EITI. 
                                                 
200 House of Commons, Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, Written evidence: Extractive Industries 
Sector inquiry, submitted by the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, EIS 37, 2013, paras. 
8.1, 8.5. 
201 For example, see a recent report on the amount of funding provided by DfID to the international EITI 
and NGOs promoting extractives transparency: “Releasing the Transformational Potential of Extractives 
for Economic Development,” Development Tracker. (Accessed 1 March 2017), available from 
https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203308. 
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No corruption—no interest 
What did the staff of the UK EITI Secretariat make of the tension between the diplomatic 
reasons for implementing the policy, and its domestic dimensions?  
 
One afternoon in early May 2015, Stewart and I were having coffee in the office. The 
room was half-empty; the parliamentary elections were coming in a couple of days, and 
after weeks of preparing to the wave of work that would hit BIS in the first days of the 
new government, many officials used the last calm week of purdah202 to take leave. In 
the previous weeks, I had heard much guesswork about the composition and priorities of 
the new administration, and now Stewart was thinking aloud through various possible 
scenarios: what would happen if Labour won the elections? Or, to the horror of most civil 
servants in the team, who leaned left, the Conservatives? Would the UK EITI be slashed 
in a renewed drive to deregulation? Stewart was confident that whichever party formed 
the government, they would uphold the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition’s203 
support for the UK EITI: “After all the government’s talk about international leadership, 
it would be an embarrassment to leave the EITI. DfID need us to continue influencing 
other countries.” Not to mention the harm that Stewart thought this would do to the 
reputation of the EITI as a whole: “Eddie [Rich, of the EITI Secretariat] keeps telling us 
that our participation has made a great difference to the EITI.” This presumed continuity 
of diplomatic interest proved for Stewart the continuity of domestic implementation of 
the UK EITI. “You know,” he said, recalling the decision to implement the policy, “we 
didn’t give the domestic impact of EITI a second thought when we signed up. It was all 
about international leadership.”  
 
Having heard and read much about this, I had not seen any internal BIS document that 
would show how the domestic civil servants reacted to the DfID and FCO’s diplomatic 
agenda of leadership by example. I asked Stewart about this.  
 
We were sitting at adjacent desks, and he turned his computer screen in my direction. 
Navigating through neatly organised folders and sub-folders, he opened a Word file. Short 
                                                 
202 The period between the dissolution of the parliament and the formation of the new government.  
203 The Coalition government was in power in 2010-15. It was replaced by a majority Conservative one in 
May 2015. 
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numbered paragraphs were here and there broken by tables with numbers running up to 
hundreds of thousands. This was an Impact Assessment of the UK EITI, Stewart 
explained: a formal evaluation of the policy’s estimated costs and benefits, which he 
worked on together with Elizabeth. As he scrolled through the text and pointed to various 
paragraphs, I picked out key words. Leadership… costs… rationale… The Assessment 
noted the “foreign policy effect” of the UK EITI, but was sceptical about its domestic 
usefulness. 
 
According to the EITI Standard, the main aim of the policy was to render transparent 
financial flows between extractive companies operating in a country, and the country’s 
government. In the EITI model, this fiscal transparency was a tool of anti-corruption. It 
was expected to lead to better governance of extractive industries, faster economic 
growth, more investment and prosperity. Ever since its formalisation in 2003, this model 
had been promoted mostly among poor countries, supposedly lacking in the public goods 
that transparency was expected to bring about. The EITI was, so to speak, made for policy 
export; it aimed to create structures of accountability where there had been none. This 
was why the UK government, the World Bank, and the international NGOs such as Global 
Witness, Oxfam, and ONE Campaign promoted the EITI around the world.  
 
But how could this model be useful in Britain? Here, I read in the Impact Assessment, 
corruption was simply “not a problem”,204 and various democratic structures of 
accountability were already in place. Except for the political-diplomatic benefits of 
demonstrating British international leadership, stated the Assessment, there was “no 
economic rationale” for the policy, and whatever political rationale there was, concerned 
international diplomacy. 
 
Stewart printed the document for me, and as I read it line by line on my commute back 
home that evening, I understood what he had meant by saying that the officials had not 
given a second thought to the UK EITI’s domestic impact: the assessment barely 
mentioned the political and economic domestic benefits of transparency promised by the 
EITI model. Rather, it implied that if corruption was not a problem in Britain, then the 
EITI’s transparency was probably of no domestic use either. This reminded me of an 
interview I had in October 2014 with Andrew Naumin, who represented Publish What 
                                                 
204 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, UK EITI Impact Assessment, Unpublished internal 
document, 2013. 
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You Pay UK on the UK EITI multi-stakeholder group. In the interview, I recalled, 
Andrew forcefully made a similar point.  
 
I went back to my interview notes. Andrew read English at university, graduating in the 
1980s. Since the early 1990s, he worked as a writer and editor for various international 
development charities. Drafting their advocacy reports and publications, he eventually 
got involved in campaigning himself, and became the coordinator of the UK branch of 
the PWYP coalition in October 2011. The UK national coalition had 26 members, some 
of them the original founders of the PWYP such as Global Witness, Christian Aid and 
Oxfam GB. Others were large international development charities and small NGOs 
focusing on extractives industries abroad. From its inception as an offshoot of Global 
Witness campaign on Angola, PWYP had grown to some 800 members around the world, 
and at the time of my fieldwork PWYP UK was one among many national coalitions. 
These coalitions acted as coordinating and mobilising organisations; they were 
themselves coordinated by the PWYP International Secretariat, located near the Houses 
of Parliament in London, half a mile away from BIS.  
 
Several members of the Secretariat’s staff described the UK national coalition as 
particularly “strong”: not in terms of the number of its members, but rather the 
consistency of their campaigning and capacity to influence policy. In Andrew’s opinion, 
it was 
strong in terms of levels of commitment, the fact that Global Witness is based in 
the UK, which is kind of in a way the originator of the campaign, willingness to 
resource action, and effectiveness I would say. I’m not […] taking personal credit, 
but simply [saying that] the UK coalition has been very effective, and therefore 
one of the things we take interest in, is: what’s going on in other countries?  
 
In other countries, national PWYP coalitions usually advocated for extractives-related 
policies that concerned those countries only. But in the UK, the coalition’s members did 
not restrict themselves to domestic issues. Where they sought to influence policy in 
London, it was always to affect activities of British companies abroad, rather than to 
increase the transparency and accountability of their operations in the UK.  
 
Talking to Andrew, I wanted to know how this outward orientation of PWYP UK squared 
with the strictly national focus of the UK EITI. All but one of the Civil Society 
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representatives on the UK EITI’s multi-stakeholder group were from PWYP UK 
organisations. Did the way in which they engaged in the UK EITI work reflect the foreign 
campaigning interests of the organisations they represented? I knew that in many 
countries national PWYP coalitions were practically synonymous with the EITI Civil 
Society constituencies. Was it the same in the UK? Andrew responded:  
 
No, it doesn’t automatically follow [that PWYP coalition would represent the 
EITI Civil Society]. For example, in the US, I think the coordinator of PWYP is 
not closely involved in the EITI… But I think one of the differences with the US, 
is that there’s a lot more interest in EITI among the citizens and civil society 
groups in the US, than there is in the UK. Because it’s much more … there’s a 
huge extractive industry in the US. In the UK, it’s basically the North Sea oil and 
gas and that’s it, you know, there’s hardly any coal industry left… We have found 
that in the UK it’s not a huge amount of interest. […] Put it this way: nobody 
suspects very much that oil and gas companies operating in the North Sea are 
cheating British citizens. There is very little intrinsic interest in the UK EITI in 
itself. We are not concerned that revenues are being stolen or mismanaged, 
probably as far as everyone is aware, the system is quite well-regulated and works 
reasonably well… [Emphasis added—TF.] 
 
I will keep returning to Andrew’s comment in order to consider its several implications. 
For now, however, let me note that Andrew had a first-hand knowledge about the lack of 
public interest in the UK EITI. When the BIS officials were setting up the UK EITI and 
needed to convene a multi-stakeholder group, they asked PWYP UK to coordinate the 
Civil Society constituency. At first the campaigners were reticent to do so (perhaps 
because, as I heard from Charlotte Reid-Wills, the head of the Corporate Governance 
team and the chair of the MSG, “they felt that there wasn’t an added benefit of joining 
the UK EITI.” Their campaigns focused on transparency in other countries, said 
Charlotte, and “they didn’t necessarily feel that the UK EITI was the best use of their 
resources”.) But very soon the campaigners agreed to form the Civil Society constituency, 
and Andrew became its coordinator. He sought to recruit participants from beyond the 
PWYP UK networks, reaching out to trade unions205, environmental groups, and 
                                                 
205 He had been on to a promising start with one large trade union representing oil and gas workers, but they 
refused to participate in the UK EITI once they realised that labour was not recognised as a special set of 
collective interests, and would have to be included within the Civil Society. 
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community organisations that could have an interest in extractive industries. But interest 
there was none, except among those who already participated in the PWYP UK coalition. 
As a result, at the beginning of my fieldwork, five out of six Civil Society representatives 
on the MSG were the coalition’s affiliates.206 Organisations from the wider British public, 
who in the EITI model were to be the main beneficiaries of corporate and governmental 
disclosures, turned out to be uninterested in the supposedly enlightening effects of 
transparency. 
 
Andrew’s comment above suggest that even those NGOs who did participate in the multi-
stakeholder group, did so not because they found the UK EITI’s disclosures inherently 
interesting (after all, they did not seem to think that corruption was a problem in the UK), 
but for some other reason. Telling me about this, Andrew explained that: 
  
The reason to get interested is not so much to see if we can find out whether BP 
is cheating the British Government, [but] to help make the UK a good leader in 
this whole debate, by not only talking the talk, but walking the walk. 
 
This explanation points to the ethnographic puzzle that I want to interpret in the rest of 
the chapter. Namely, why was making the UK a “good leader” of the transparency 
“debate” a reason to devote hundreds of hours of campaign time to working on the UK 
EITI? International leadership, as we have seen, was the government’s stated reason for 
signing up to the EITI. But why would the campaigners embrace it? In what follows, I 
will explore the campaigners’ reason to support the UK EITI and seek to make it an 
“international leader” by turning it into an exemplary transparency policy. It will become 
clear that they embraced the government’s rhetoric of international leadership not because 
they were complicit in the government’s diplomatic agenda, but because this agenda 
allowed them to pursue their own goals. The way in which they chased their own aims, 
however, only deepened the paradox of the UK EITI. 
 
I now turn to one example of how the Civil Society representatives negotiated the UK 
EITI rules with their Industry counterparts. Typical of discussions I witnessed during my 
fieldwork, this example is particularly revealing because it demonstrates the structure and 
                                                 
206 The sixth member was an MP who had been long interested in extractives in sub-Saharan Africa. He 
later stepped down from the Parliament, and managed to bring in three other associates into the 
constituency, establishing a faction of the Civil Society representatives rival to PWYP UK. 
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rhetoric of the campaigners’ arguments about the UK EITI, and shows the visions of 
transparency policy which they sought to realise.  
 
Understanding why the campaigners sought to make the UK EITI an exemplary 
transparency policy, will help me clarify just what, if not an intrinsic interest in domestic 
transparency, was at stake for them in the UK EITI. To interpret the case, I will then return 
to my conversation with Andrew. He will help us understand how the entanglement of the 
government’s diplomatic agenda, the campaigners’ interests, and the formal structures of 
EITI implementation, turned the UK EITI into an arena for transnational advocacy 
interventions that sought to shape and use the policy, even if it had little to do with its 
official aims. 
An exemplary policy? 
Translating the Standard 
Andrew claimed that the campaigners had no intrinsic interest in the UK EITI. However, 
this was not at all apparent from how they engaged in its collective governance. Andrew 
and his colleagues, in particular, Gary Dowell and Tim Craigs from Global Witness, and 
Jack Johnson from the Natural Resource Governance Institute, were among the most 
active members of the multi-stakeholder group. They chaired topical sub-groups that dealt 
with particular areas of the EITI Standard, debated with other stakeholders about how 
best to implement the Standard, wrote memos and long emails, and, overall, devoted 
much of their time to UK EITI work.  
 
The character of this work largely depended on the EITI Standard. As mentioned above, 
the Standard is a set of rules about the organisation of collective governance of the policy, 
complemented by a list of requirements about what kinds of disclosure rules should be 
negotiated by the stakeholders. While stipulating the kinds of disclosures that should be 
made, the Standard leaves it up to the national multi-stakeholder groups to negotiate just 
what rules to put in place in order to achieve that.207 This leads to a variety of different 
ways (“experiences”, Elizabeth would say) of implementing the Standard among the EITI 
                                                 
207 For example, the Standard stipulates that under the EITI, companies and governments should report all 
extraction-related payments and receipts, in particular, taxes, licence fees, infrastructural improvements, 
and so on. It provides a general classification of what should be disclosed, but it is up to the national multi-
stakeholder groups to specify which concrete kinds of payments that exist in this country, fit the categories 
of the Standard. 
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countries. As Eddie Rich of the EITI International Secretariat put it to the House of 
Commons’ BIS Committee in late 2013,  
The EITI is a standard, but it is very much a minimum standard. It has seven 
requirements. I always say there are 41 countries around the world implementing 
the EITI and there are 41 models of implementation of the EITI. We [the EITI 
International Secretariat] very much encourage that adaptation. I do not know if 
we are able to say “adaptation”, because it is a standard, but it is beyond the 
minimum standard to use the process as a springboard for having the most 
meaningful conversation in each country.208 
 
The national EITIs are therefore imperfect and modified copies of the EITI model 
(Walford 2015). The differences between the Standard and the concrete social, material 
and conceptual arrangements of policy are, in a sense, differences between the abstract 
and the concrete, which arise from the social mediation of the Standard within the MSGs. 
 
It is useful to understand this process as a work of translation of the official abstractions 
of the EITI into concrete rules of governance and disclosure (e.g. Latour 1996: 86; Mosse 
2005: 9). Translating the Standard, stakeholders have to decide not only what kinds of 
information should be disclosed, but also its level of detail, its temporal horizons and even 
its format. All these issues, as I witnessed while at the UK EITI Secretariat, could be 
contentious and lead to debates and disagreements (most often between the NGO and 
corporate stakeholders). Thus, it is not just the Standard that determines the character of 
the work of translation, but also the interests and agendas of the people involved in 
translating it into national policy.  
 
In Britain, much of this work happened in the first year and a half of the UK EITI’s 
existence. Internal memos and other records provide a good picture of what kinds of 
issues the stakeholders debated the most, and what mattered to whom. It is clear from 
these documents, for example, that the Civil Society were most active in negotiating 
optional areas of reporting, such as beneficial ownership disclosures (see Chapter Two), 
and left other aspects of the Standard to officials and Industry representatives to negotiate. 
Technical discussions about details of disclosure requirements gripped their attention 
                                                 
208 House of Commons, Business, Innovation and Skills Committee, Oral evidence: Extractive Industries 
Sector inquiry, HC 832, 2014, Q 50. 
 143 
only when they could lead to decisions that changed the kind and amount of information 
disclosed.  
 
BIS officials, in particular Charlotte Reid-Wills, talked with irritation about what to them 
appeared as the campaigners’ selective (and by implication, politically motivated) interest 
in the UK EITI. On several occasions, Charlotte told me that Civil Society representatives 
were often most interested in those aspects of the UK EITI, which they could hold as 
exemplary when campaigning for greater transparency overseas.  
 
Charlotte’s is an important insight into the politics of UK EITI negotiations; it takes us 
closer to answering the question of why these representatives of transnational NGOs were 
interested in the UK EITI at all. The flexibility of how the Standard could be translated 
into policy arrangements gave them an incentive to try and influence how the UK EITI 
enacted the Standard. Their selective interest in the optional areas of reporting, however, 
suggests that shaping these arrangements was not a goal in itself, and both Charlotte’s 
comment, and the campaigners’ reliance on the government’s rhetoric of leadership, 
speak to this interpretation. To understand the campaigners’ reasons for attempting to 
influence the UK EITI, let’s explore one case when the campaigners strove to persuade 
their corporate counterparts that the UK EITI should “go beyond” the Standard. 
Making the UK a “good leader”  
In early 2014, in the midst of negotiations about how to translate the Standard, a group of 
Civil Society stakeholders (Andrew, Gary, Tim and Jack) circulated a ‘concept paper’ for 
attention of other stakeholders on the MSG. The paper outlined a number of new, 
additional areas of reporting that the campaigners deemed “relevant to the UK EITI”. 
These additional areas of reporting were not part of the EITI Standard, but Andrew and 
his colleagues argued that Britain “should use its membership of EITI to usher a new era 
of resource governance”: introduce new kinds of transparency rules that would overcome 
the Standard’s limitations. They wrote: 
 
EITI reports establish a reporting methodology for what payments are received, 
yet citizens also require transparency over what payments are due. The EITI 
process cannot currently confirm that companies are paying the correct amount of 
tax, much less whether a Government’s natural resource strategy is securing a fair 
deal for the country. It does not reflect the full extent of the benefit brought by 
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extractive industries to the UK exchequer and to the wider British economy, nor 
whether these benefits are efficiently managed and sustainable in light of 
environmental concerns. 
 
The campaigners proposed that the UK report should disclose all information necessary 
to understand not only what companies paid the government, but what they should pay it. 
This, they argued, was a matter of tax justice and resource stewardship in the context of 
fiscal austerity and climate change (problems that the EITI Standard still does not 
address). This was an argument for a broader conception of extractives’ transparency than 
the one enshrined in the Standard. To support it, the campaigners invoked the 
government’s own official rhetoric of leadership: as “a global leader in transparency,” 
they wrote, “the UK reporting methodology should address all aspects of resource 
management”. Grounding their claim in the moral stance of exemplary leadership, 
implied in the government’s rhetoric, they said that changing the rules of the UK EITI 
was important not only for transparency in Britain, but for other countries too: 
The UK’s EITI report should set a “gold standard” for countries developing their 
extractives potential for the first time; a guide to resource management and 
sustainable revenue flows. […] This will involve a shift in mindset from an 
industry accustomed to operational secrecy, yet it is essential that this shift 
happens.209  
 
Suggesting that the scope of the UK EITI (the disclosures required by the policy) should 
go beyond the minimum of the EITI Standard and extend to new areas of reporting, the 
campaigners argued that this gesture would set a new standard of transparency, which 
was desirable because of its capacity to demonstrate and teach others about the possibility 
of new kinds of transparency. Similarly to Eddie Rich, Andrew and his colleagues 
understood the Standard as a minimum set of rules; if the UK EITI were to lead others by 
example, as the government had said it intended to do, the policy had to go beyond the 
minimum and include new forms of reporting. 
 
These proposals, first discussed at an MSG meeting on 4 February 2014, were met with 
resistance from corporate representatives (“Industry raised concerns that these elements 
                                                 
209 Here and above, all quotes from Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, UK EITI CSO 
Constituency, Concept Paper (For discussion at the April MSG meeting), Unpublished internal paper, 30 
January 2014. 
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were beyond the scope of EITI reporting”,210 state the official meeting notes.) As often 
happened with debates that could prove contentious, Charlotte, the chair of the MSG, 
encouraged the stakeholders to have a separate meeting in a smaller format, where 
interested campaigners and corporate representatives could discuss the NGOs’ proposal 
at length.  
 
This gathering took place in early March 2014,211 and the campaigners used it as an 
occasion to reinstate their arguments. They insisted that transparency of tax—not just the 
tax paid for extraction of minerals, already covered by the EITI Standard, but corporate 
tax arrangements more generally—were a matter of public interest. The public, they said, 
had the necessity to know whether companies paid the “right” and “fair” amount of tax. 
They asserted that there was nothing extraordinary about their insistence on doing more 
than required in the Standard: the UK EITI could go beyond the EITI Standard, because 
other countries had done so already in order to address issues of public interest: 
Certain EITI countries are looking at forestry and environmental issues:212 a 
variety of initiatives and issues are within the coverage of EITI based on what is 
public interest in those countries. Better management of resources and stronger 
accountability is a matter of public interest. Identifying what is useful to different 
UK audiences can inform public debate and is at the heart of the principles.213 
 
Andrew and his colleagues specified their demands: there was a need, they argued, for 
additional company-level disclosures of corporate profits, number of jobs and size of 
investment, and tax incentives. These would help to ensure not only corporate, but also 
governmental accountability, helping citizens to assess “whether the fiscal regime 
implemented by government is appropriate.” The proposal was far-reaching, with a 
potential to re-qualify the UK EITI as a broad platform for corporate and government 
transparency. 
                                                 
210 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, UK EITI, Multi-Stakeholder Group Minutes of the 3rd 
Meeting-Tuesday on 4th February, Official meeting notes, 2014, para. 54. Available from 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150608203213/https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sys
tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/303279/Amended_Minutes_MSG3_V4.pdf 
211 On the Civil Society side, attendees included Andrew Naumin (PWYP UK), Gary Dowell, Tim Craigs 
(Global Witness) and Jack Johnson (Natural Resource Governance Institute), as well as representatives of 
ChristianAid and Tax Research UK and a number of other NGO members. Three senior Industry members 
representing BP, Shell and ExxonMobil joined them. 
212 These are not covered by the requirements or recommendations of the EITI Standard. 
213 Here and below, all quotes are from Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, UK EITI, Concept 
paper: Agreed minutes of meeting of 5 March 2014, Unpublished internal meeting notes, 2014. 
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In the “age of austerity,” suggested the campaigners, state revenues from corporate 
taxation had to be made transparent and put under public scrutiny. They proposed that the 
UK EITI could be used as a “forum to push that forward”, just like in other countries 
national EITIs were used for similar purposes. “In Tanzania [i.e. in the Tanzanian EITI], 
the issue of corporation tax started a debate around incentives and reform”; the “EITI can 
be used as a forum to push that forward the way that in Liberia they used contracts as a 
way to push it forward.”214 Extended corporate reporting of corporate profits, argued the 
campaigners, was the future, and there was “an opportunity in the UK EITI to start 
thinking about what this future of reporting [could] look like. […] The UK EITI is a useful 
test-bed for how we can move forward on this [i.e. new types of reporting], and influence 
in other countries.”  
 
Examples from Tanzania and Liberia demonstrated that it was possible or even necessary 
to introduce new kinds of reporting not mandated in the Standard in order to make the 
EITI process “meaningful”. The UK EITI in itself could be a demonstration for others: 
“Civil society underlined the potential for the UK EITI to lead by example in its EITI 
process.” Leading others by example, moreover, was something that the MSG had already 
sought to do, setting a precedent by opting for several ‘optional’ areas of reporting 
recommended (but not required) by the Standard:  
As an MSG we decided to go forward with that on the basis of maintaining a ‘gold 
standard’ and ensuring that the UK led the way. We should have a more robust 
EITI and should inspire other countries to do the same. We don’t need to wait for 
other international standards to discuss these things as a group. Forestry and audits 
of environmental damage [in other countries] are big step outs and are nonetheless 
reported within the EITI because MSGs in individual countries decided it is in the 
public interest. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Industry representatives disagreed in almost every respect: new forms 
of disclosures would mean more work for their companies in the UK, and if the UK EITI 
indeed inspired other countries to follow suit, then these companies would have to deal 
with such disclosures in other countries, too. They disputed both the notion of public 
                                                 
214 They cited Tanzanian and Liberian EITIs because both countries were implementing disclosures not 
mandated by the Standard, i.e. corporate tax and extractives’ contracts, respectively.  
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interest, and the idea that other countries’ examples could be relevant to the UK.215 They, 
moreover, ignored the campaigners’ claims that the UK EITI should be introducing new 
forms of disclosures to influence other countries. The meeting notes state that the 
discussion ended without much of an agreement. Both parties recognised that it was 
useful to have the discussion, and Industry representatives conceded that problems raised 
by the campaigners were important. They however insisted that the UK EITI was not the 
right forum for them, because it was a domestic transparency policy that had to reflect the 
collective will of all stakeholders. 
 
That the Industry representatives successfully managed to resist the campaigners’ 
arguments, points to the infelicitous character of campaigners’ rhetoric, and demonstrates 
how a division in a collaborative arena of the MSG can in fact undermine new forms of 
transparency. But my point here is different. 
The politics of examples  
According to the meeting notes, the Industry representatives “asserted that civil society 
is trying to meet multiple objectives through these disclosure proposals”. Indeed, the 
campaigners argued that going beyond the Standard was in the public interest. But they 
never defined neither what this interest was, nor who was the public, and at different 
moments, the word seemed to alternatively refer to UK citizens, and to foreign audiences 
who would benefit from the effects of the UK’s exemplary transparency policy. If 
Charlotte suggested that the NGO representatives were interested in performing the UK 
EITI to the foreign, rather than national, publics, the meeting notes I have discussed does 
not allow to say with certainty that this was indeed the case. Rather, the corporate 
representatives’ assertion about “multiple objectives” implies that the campaigners were 
trying to address both audiences, by enacting the UK EITI simultaneously as a national 
policy of transparency, and as a transnational example for other countries. It is difficult 
to say whether they did so genuinely (i.e. because they ‘cared’ about the UK EITI’s 
domestic effects216), and in what follows, I will offer an interpretation of their goals. But 
it is clear that whatever these goals were, the campaigners sought to pursue them by 
                                                 
215 For example, they stated that: “There may have been concepts looked at in other countries but every 
process needs to be considered within the specific country’s context and where people are at that point in 
time. […] The industry constituency has a different view to what civil society describes as the role of the 
EITI and the MSG regarding what constitutes public interest. Civil society’s view of public interest is very 
broad whereas Industry representatives consider public interest within framework of the EITI.” 
216 Invoking the national publics might have helped them justify their agenda of using the UK EITI as an 
example for similar policies elsewhere. 
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holding in view two levels of action at once (Cook 2015: 155-6; Riles 1998), which had 
the effect of reconfiguring the scale of the policy.  
 
In what follows, I will argue that this was possible because of the centrality of the notion 
of example, and the tension between the abstract EITI model and its concrete instances 
(dare I say, examples), to the structures and processes of EITI implementation. By 
focusing our attention on these issues, the campaigners’ unsuccessful attempts of shaping 
the UK EITI demonstrate a more general truth about the politics of EITI, namely, the way 
in which the formal organisation of the EITI allowed for such campaign interventions in 
the first place. Understanding this, in its turn, can reveal just what kind of reason Andrew 
and his colleagues had in shaping the policy that was of no “intrinsic interest” to them. 
 
As I observed during my time at the UK EITI Secretariat, the use of examples was in fact 
a common practice not only for campaigners, but also among government officials 
involved in the UK EITI. This was encouraged and made possible by the very structure 
of the EITI: as Stewart Barber explained to me, the fact that the international Standard 
provided a uniform abstract model of the national EITIs, meant that all countries “go 
through the same issues” when translating the Standard. This points to a dialectic of the 
abstract and the concrete, in which national EITIs are implicated: it is not just that the 
model is abstract, and the examples, concrete. Rather, the examples are simultaneously 
located and general; they can reveal something abstract about the EITI, particularly about 
other examples, in ways that the model cannot (Højer and Bandak 2015).  
 
Thus, in the UK and elsewhere, concrete instances of EITI implementation were often 
used as examples of how to work with the EITI model. Officials at the UK EITI 
Secretariat referred to this as “peer learning.” On many occasions, they were recruited by 
DfID and FCO to present the UK EITI, as a supposedly good example of the EITI, to 
various foreign delegations, keen to learn about ‘good practices’. By the same token, 
particular examples of EITI implementation were routinely brought up in the work of the 
multi-stakeholder group and the UK EITI Secretariat. The stakeholders discussed the 
abstractions of the EITI Standard with constant awareness of examples of its 
implementation elsewhere; the work of translation “occur[red] in knowingly comparative 
terms” (Peck and Theodore 2015: xv). 
 
 149 
Other countries' examples served as a heuristic for demonstrating the range of ways in 
which the Standard's abstractions could be translated into concrete policy arrangements. 
For instance, Andrew Naumin, who was in charge of producing one part of the UK EITI 
report, often referred to the Philippines EITI as a “good example” of an exhaustive, 
illustrative EITI report. Many corporate representatives, however, preferred the annual 
reports of the Norwegian EITI—an example of a concise EITI document without too 
much detail. Similarly, in disputes about interpreting this or that requirement of the 
Standard, stakeholders frequently relied on the demonstrative authority of foreign 
examples.  
 
There were many ways in which knowledge about examples of EITI implementation 
circulated among the stakeholders. For one, the campaigners had privileged knowledge 
of other countries’ EITIs because of their participation in the international PWYP 
coalition, which made them aware of how PWYP affiliates dealt with implementing the 
policy elsewhere. These Civil Society networks worked in parallel to the official 
structures of the EITI. Elizabeth, for instance, learned about other countries’ 
“experiences” of the policy while attending international EITI Board meetings and 
conferences, where the International Secretariat, DfID and PWYP members organised 
workshops and presentations to facilitate peer learning. Knowledge was an explicit object 
of exchange (Riles 2000), and the International Secretariat produced regular newsletters 
and circulars to inform the several thousand participants of the national EITIs about the 
latest developments in the policy, and point to particularly successful examples of its 
implementation. Eddie Rich, a frequent guest to the UK EITI meetings because of his 
British citizenship and London residency, was another source of knowledge about the 
EITI, which he always illustrated with a prolific use of examples.  
 
Giving examples of EITI implementation was a routine form in which practical 
knowledge about the policy circulated.217 As Højer and Bandak (2015) suggest in their 
                                                 
217 This, of course, is not peculiar to the EITI. Geographers Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore argue that such 
lateral mobility of policy knowledge and models is a general condition of contemporary policy-making 
almost everywhere in the world. In their view,  
The modern policymaking process may still be focused on centers of political authority, but 
networks of policy advocacy and activism now exhibit a precociously transnational reach; policy 
decisions made in one jurisdiction increasingly echo and influence those made elsewhere; and 
global policy “models” often exert normative power across significant distances. (2015: 3) 
Although Peck and Theodore do not theorise policy mobility in terms of examples, exemplification is 
central to the empirical material that they deal with. Their book demonstrates that policy advocates, such 
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introduction to a special issue of JRAI on exemplification, examples are persuasive 
because of the demonstrative work that they do; their function is to “induce an imitative 
reproduction” among their audiences (Gelley 1995: 3). In the discussions about the scope 
of the UK EITI, outlined above, we can see how Andrew and his colleagues used foreign 
examples of the EITI to persuade their corporate opponents about going beyond the 
Standard. Here, examples were rhetorical instruments in the “symbolic play” of the MSG 
negotiation. Officials and their stakeholders constantly used foreign examples as cultural 
schemas “to influence and move one another”—schemas that were “themselves plastic 
and mutable, the material of constant symbolic play” (Carrithers 2008: 162, also 2005a, 
b). Such examples were of course neither given nor naturally ready for use: they had to 
be made, framed and emplotted in particular narratives through which the people 
implementing the UK EITI sought to persuade each other (for an extensive theoretical 
treatment of exemplification in anthropology, see Højer and Bandak 2015; also, Coleman 
2015).  
 
And in so far as examples are socially and culturally constructed, Andrew’s and his 
colleagues’ endeavour to introduce new kinds of disclosures into the UK EITI could be 
seen as an attempt to deliberately change the policy to make it a good example of the 
EITI. In their references to the Tanzanian and Liberian EITI, they construed these 
countries’ EITIs as examples demonstrating that the UK EITI, too, could be made more 
than just another translation of the Standard. Whereas in the government’s vision of 
international leadership, the implementation of the EITI was in itself enough to somehow 
lead others by example, the campaigners actively aspired to make it into such an example 
through new forms of transparency that they thought were innovative and, indeed, 
exemplary. In this logic, the policy had to go beyond the Standard in order to become 
worthy of being an example for others.  
 
I have suggested that examples of the EITI model were implicated in a dialectic of the 
abstract and the concrete. Højer and Bandak point out that it is within this dialectic that 
examples gain their power: “The good example/exemplar is always less than everything 
and more than itself and, rather than doing away with general propositions, examples and 
exemplars point to a constant movement […] between the general and the specific” (2018: 
8). Højer and Bandak direct our attention to the logic of exemplarity implicit in the 
                                                 
as, in my case, Global Witness and their PWYP allies, make policies move across borders by framing them 
as examples of ways to deal with some more general problems found in different contexts. 
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campaigners’ arguments. Namely, to how, by being simultaneously concrete (local, 
emplaced) and abstract (general and more widely revealing of the EITI model and its 
examples), the UK EITI could become a good example of transparency for others. I would 
like to propose that for Andrew and his colleagues, the rhetorical power of the example 
in the context of their campaigning and work on the UK EITI, was not just a question of 
verbal rhetoric,218 but of the example’s capacity of “suggesting, proposing, and revealing 
new generalized ‘wholes’, standing for a broader class of phenomena” (ibid.) By paying 
attention to the ‘wholes’ the UK EITI gestured to in this way, we can understand both 
why the campaigners wanted to make the policy into an example for others in the first 
place; and how their doing so, scaled the UK EITI so as to make it simultaneously a 
national policy and a tool of transnational intervention. This is what I turn to in the 
remainder of this chapter.  
The jigsaw of global transparency 
Let’s return to my interview with Andrew Naumin. As you recall, he noted that there was 
little public interest in the UK EITI because there was no suspicion that the North Sea oil 
and gas companies were cheating the government of tax. Explaining why, in spite of this, 
the British transnational transparency NGOs still decided to get involved, Andrew said:  
Where there is interest [in the UK EITI], it tends to be amongst the members of 
the PWYP coalition who see the UK EITI as a kind of an important part of the 
jigsaw of global transparency. Therefore, it’s worth supporting the UK EITI 
simply as another way of reinforcing the movement towards global transparency.  
 
Andrew’s brief comment brings to the fore a vision of extractives’ transparency agenda, 
shared among many campaigners I have talked to. In this vision, the UK EITI is part of a 
larger context, the “jigsaw” of interconnected transparency policies, in which Global 
Witness and its PWYP UK allies were simultaneously involved (Anand 2006). This 
global jigsaw consisted of various national EITIs, as well as mandatory disclosure 
policies in Canada, the EU and US. These policies, as I will explain in Chapter Six, shared 
the same basic principles, resulted from PWYP campaigns, and were all to some extent 
modelled on each other. The national EITIs, of course, also shared the basic structures of 
policy. By introducing new transparency rules into the UK EITI, Andrew and his 
                                                 
218 As a sceptical reader might think, questioning whether the campaigners indeed wanted to make the UK 
an international leader in transparency, or pursued some other goals, justified with references to the 
government’s rhetoric of leadership.  
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colleagues would change not only the UK EITI, but also intervene into the larger jigsaw 
of global transparency in which it was placed. Exemplification was important for this 
intervention, because it was through examples that knowledge about the EITI circulated 
among those implementing the policy. Moreover, creating in the UK a novel example of 
EITI implementation beyond the Standard, these campaigners would then be able to point 
to this example in other countries where they advocated for extractives’ transparency (as 
Charlotte complained they wanted to do). 
 
Andrew’s comment also makes clear that for the campaigners the ‘whole’ to which the 
example of the UK EITI gestured, was not so much the total number of national 
implementations of the EITI, related through the EITI Standard and channels of peer 
learning, but rather all extractives’ transparency policies, in which the PWYP coalition 
participated in one or another way. And because the particular example of the UK EITI 
implied the general whole, introducing new disclosure rules into the former, was a way 
of bringing them into the latter. 
 
This explains why, without an “intrinsic” interest in the UK EITI, Andrew and his 
colleagues still got involved in the policy. Doing so, they endeavoured to use it as both 
an arena for intervention into a larger “jigsaw” of global transparency, and, construed as 
a model example, a tool of such intervention. The proposed introduction of extensive 
reporting of corporate taxation through the UK EITI, would thus be an instrument of a 
wider campaign, in which the UK EITI would serve as a mobile example to point to, just 
as Andrew and his colleagues pointed to Tanzania and Liberia’s examples. Finally, in so 
far as the UK EITI was a copy of the EITI model, introducing and institutionalising new 
forms of reporting which were not part of the Standard, could in itself be a way of acting 
upon and “reinforcing” the model. This also points to the fact that the various extractives’ 
transparency policies were brought into a single movement by the mediating social 
infrastructure of the PWYP coalition. It was only because there was such a coalition, and 
because it was internally coordinated, that acting upon a national EITI in the UK could 
be a way of acting upon other national EITIs, or at least creating a possibility of such 
action. In this way, the involvement in the UK MSG of Global Witness, NRGI and PWYP 
UK, whose main targets of campaigning were overseas, politicised the collective 
governance of the UK EITI in ways that were not predicted by either the Standard, or 
existing views about the politics of MSG negotiations.  
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For example, in their textbook on collective governance, Eddie Rich and Jonas Moberg 
of the EITI International Secretariat, argue that the multi-stakeholder group brings 
together actors with very different interests and agendas. It is a mistake, they imply, to 
see collaboration as devoid of conflict—if anything, conflict is its very fuel (2015: 39). 
“It is inevitable that relationships in collective governance groups are unbalanced. This 
leads to a complex power play in which consensus building is a constant challenge.” (49) 
Describing the multi-stakeholder group as a political space in which stakeholders’ 
multiple interests play out, Rich and Moberg argue that the structure of the group, and the 
requirement of consensual deliberation, force the disagreeing parties into agreement. The 
collaborative set-up of the policy moulds conflicts into cooperation around the 
stakeholders’ common interest in transparency. In the case I have discussed above, the 
NGO stakeholders’ plans to introduce new forms of reporting were indeed undermined 
by corporate representatives’ dissent. The stakeholders had to settle on the lowest 
common denominator, which sabotaged the campaigners’ plan. Contrary to Rich and 
Moberg’s suggestion, this case demonstrates that the campaigners’ interests were not 
intrinsically in the UK EITI as such. Even if at one level their debate with the Industry 
representative was about the proposed new rules for the UK EITI, at another level, it was 
not about the UK EITI at all, but about the campaigners’ attempt to use the policy as both 
an arena and an (exemplary) tool of reinforcing the “global” movement towards greater 
extractives’ transparency.  
 
In other words, the politics of these negotiations had less to do with the policy in itself, 
and more, with how the campaigners sought to entangle it into their larger political 
projects of promoting extractives' transparency. It was ultimately in this way that the UK 
EITI was of interest to the campaigners.  
 
Andrew's description of the transparency jigsaw and the campaigning movement as 
global, challenges the assumed division of policy into domestic and foreign. The curious 
effect of the participatory, collaborative policy-making is that the UK EITI became 
entangled in projects of transnational advocacy in ways that were not predicted by the 
binary of national policy and foreign diplomacy. The government's rhetoric of 
international leadership, I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, justified the domestic 
implementation of the EITI in terms of diplomatic considerations. The national and the 
international became thereby intertwined, but they still remained separate as scales of 
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policy intervention: Elizabeth and her Secretariat staff dealt with the domestic policy 
implementation; DfID and FCO officials promoted the EITI abroad.  
 
In contrast, Andrew’s comment, and my analysis of the negotiations between the 
campaigners and their Industry counterparts above, suggest that the NGO representatives 
became involved in the making of the UK EITI in order to use it both as an arena, and a 
tool for transnational advocacy. It was an arena, because it was a physical and 
metaphorical space of policy-making. By participating in it, the campaigners sought to 
make the policy into a model example of transparency in such a way that gestured to the 
broader, transnational context of interconnected transparency policies. 
 
In contrast, by shaping concrete national rules of the UK EITI, Andrew and his colleagues 
intervened into the larger context of interconnected transparency policies, in virtue of how 
the UK EITI, performatively construed as an example, elicited and suggested the ‘whole’ 
of the global transparency puzzle (Coleman 2015: 149; Højer and Bandak 2015). 
Demonstrating the pragmatic redundancy of such categories as ‘national’ and 
‘international’, ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ policy, this move reveals not so much “the active 
social and political connectedness of apparently different scales” (Smith 1992: 66), as the 
fact that scale is practically and relationally constructed (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). The 
scale of campaigners’ actions here was not an analytical or a pragmatic given, but rather 
itself was a result of the actions and visions they sought to realise (Bauman 2016). By 
seeking to construe the UK EITI as simultaneously a domestic transparency policy with 
strong rules of disclosure, and, in virtue of those rules, a mobile exemplar for others, the 
NGO representatives attempted to make a political intervention simultaneously in the UK 
and elsewhere. They held two levels of action in view at the same time (Riles 1998), and 
this was possible because of the dialectic of the abstract and the concrete in which the UK 
EITI was implicated. In this manner, the “social formations that are temporally or 
spatially distant from the ecology of copresence” (Bauman 2016: 25) of the UK EITI’s 
collaborative arena, became articulated through the situated interactions within this arena, 
implicating what was going in it, in global advocacy projects. Thinking in this way about 
the problems that this chapter has explored, we can begin to understand the scale of the 
policy as produced and contested from within the social world of the policy itself. 
 
My analysis of the interview with Andrew suggests that the campaigners were more 
interested in the UK EITI’s potential as a tool of campaigning elsewhere. To construe it 
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as such a tool, they first needed to see it as an element of a larger context or whole—not 
a mere example pointing only to its own particularities, rather than anything general 
beyond it (Højer and Bandak 2015: 7-8). And if scale is a relational artefact of 
commensuration (Carr and Lempert 2016), then implicating the UK EITI in the “jigsaw 
of global transparency” was an act of scaling, indispensable for Andrew’s and his 
colleagues’ political intervention. Scaling, it can be argued, was here a form of political 
intervention in itself.  
Concluding remarks 
The question of the scale of policy brings me back to the paradox of the UK EITI: a 
domestic policy of transparency driven by the government’s attempts to promote it 
abroad, and the NGOs’ endeavour to make it into a tool of advocacy elsewhere.  
 
Throughout this chapter, I have sought to unpack this paradox and explain how and why 
the campaigners tried to make the domestic policy of the UK EITI into a vehicle for their 
transnational interests. The government’s reason for signing up to the EITI, I have 
demonstrated, had little to do with the policy’s official aim of bringing transparency into 
domestic extractive industries. Rather, this reason was diplomatic, and officials explained 
it through the idiom of international leadership. But if influencing other countries was the 
government’s goal, it was the campaigners, rather than government officials themselves, 
who most often invoked this goal in the discussions about the UK EITI’s domestic rules. 
In the name of international leadership, these campaigners attempted to shape the UK 
EITI from within, performing (in a way very different from the government’s) the UK 
EITI to international audiences. 
 
I asked why the campaigners embraced the government’s diplomatic project, and 
suggested that the answer lies in their vision of their own advocacy practice as a global 
movement for greater transparency. For Andrew and his colleagues, the UK EITI was part 
of this movement, an element of the jigsaw of global transparency interconnected with 
other similar elements. Making the UK EITI disclosure rules more stringent, and 
introducing new kinds of disclosures through this policy, the campaigners would be able 
to reinforce the jigsaw as a whole.  
 
But this vision of campaigning as a global practice, and domestic policy as its arena and 
tool, was not enough for them to make the kinds of proposals that I have described. Rather, 
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it was a confluence of various factors, not least of which the formal organisation of the 
UK EITI as a collaborative arena, in which Civil Society participation was required by 
the Standard, that allowed Andrew and his colleagues from transnational NGOs to get 
involved in the making of the UK EITI. As I have sought to demonstrate, by collaborating 
with government and corporate representatives, these campaigners sought to pursue a 
political project that had little to do with the formal aims of collaboration (Anand 2006). 
 
Another enabling factor was the structure of the EITI implementation, namely, the tension 
between the abstract Standard and its concrete translations, and the role of examples in 
the circulation of knowledge about the policy. Exemplification is important in this context 
because it is wired into the structure of the EITI: as each national EITI is a modified 
replication—an example—of the EITI model. As I have argued, Andrew and his 
colleagues relied on the demonstrative logic of exemplification in order to make the UK 
EITI a vehicle for promoting transparency abroad. Describing how the campaigners 
sought to “do things with examples” (Mittermaier 2015), I have sought to contribute to 
the recent ethnographic explorations of the conceptual and political work of 
exemplification (see papers collected by Højer and Bandak 2015). This led me to suggest 
that for the campaigners, the forging of the UK example of the EITI was a form of 
transnational political intervention in its own right (Krøijer 2015). 
 
Analysing the complexities of policy negotiations, I have demonstrated how the politics 
of collaborative governance of the UK EITI were affected by campaigners’ political 
interests that were extrinsic to the policy. Literature in anthropology of policy is rich with 
examples of policies shaped by multiple interests at work in the social arenas of policy-
making or implementation (e.g. Lea 2008; Mosse 2005; Tate 2015). In the previous 
chapters I focused on how various institutional interests affected the development of the 
EITI’s design. In this chapter, I have explored how this design, when implemented in the 
UK, allowed the NGO representatives to pursue their transnational campaigning agendas 
from within the collaborative space established by the policy. Their attempts to do so, I 
suggested, were informed by a peculiar vision of campaigning as a global practice, and 
explicating this vision, I have argued that the campaigners’ intervention scaled the UK 
EITI in ways that cannot be predicted by the binary differentiation of the scale of policy 
and politics into national and international. Rather, the scaling of policy was in itself a 
kind of political intervention, suggesting that we need to pay attention to the scalar politics 
of governance.  
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In the instances described in this chapter, the campaigners’ attempt to make the UK EITI 
into an example for other countries failed. But explaining what made it possible and what 
was at stake in it, has allowed me to shed light on the manner in which a national policy 
could become shaped by political interests that did not necessarily pertain to its official 
goals, and which made it both an arena and a tool of political intervention styling itself as 
global. In the next chapter, I will build on the arguments I have developed here, in order 
to understand how both the campaigners’ and their corporate counterparts’ involvement 
in the “jigsaw of global transparency” affected the dynamics of their collaboration with 
each other and BIS officials. 
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Chapter Six 
A crisis of collaboration: moral dimensions of collective 
governance 
 
The emergence and spread of the EITI around the world exemplifies the rise of collective 
governance. An organisational ‘device’ assembling collective actors interested in 
transparency, multi-stakeholder collaboration overcomes the incapacity of governments, 
corporations and NGOs to deal with extractives’ corruption on their own (Rich and 
Moberg 2015: 4). Collaboration allows these actors to do more together, and transforms 
their particularistic interests into a common agenda of transparency and accountability. 
Or so, at least, goes the theory of collective governance in extractive industries, proposed 
by Eddie Rich and Jonas Moberg of the EITI International Secretariat. 
 
Defining collective governance,219 Rich and Moberg build on descriptions of 
collaboration as a new mode of governance that “brings multiple stakeholders together in 
common forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making” 
(Ansell and Gash 2008: 543; also Donahue and Zeckhauser 2011). Collective governance, 
in this view, is about extending administrative authority to actors beyond the state (cf. 
Riles 2011). This view invokes a rich literature in the social sciences that has addressed 
a perceived shift from conventional forms of government to new forms of political 
ordering that are less dependent on state institutions (for overview, see Djelic and Sahlin-
Andersson 2006; du Gay 2007: 158-175). The central argument of this literature is that 
new forms of governance emerge to accommodate the growing plurality of mediatory 
bodies between society and the state (Croce and Salvatore 2015: x). By bringing in “other 
agents in the state’s field of relationships” (Clarke and Newman 1997: 29), these forms 
of governance challenge and change the regulatory role and authority of the state.  
 
These conceptualisations of governance offer a useful guide to understanding governance 
not as an analytical solution to the problem of change in conventional modes of 
government, but as an ethnographic problem in itself. This chapter takes a cue from these 
conceptualisations to describe how the participation of corporate and NGO actors affects 
the relations of government and practices of policy-making in a context where collective 
governance is characterised by antagonism and conflict, as well as collaboration.  
                                                 
219 They define the term as “the formal engagement of representatives of government, civil society and 
companies in decision-making and in public policy discussions.” (Rich and Moberg 2015: 4) 
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This chapter contributes to the dissertation’s aim of understanding how the social world 
of policy-making is made and inhabited by government officials and their stakeholders. 
It does so by exploring the political, relational and moral dimensions of collective 
governance (Bear 2015; Bear and Mathur 2015; John 2009, 2015; Telesca 2015). Moral 
considerations and expectations, I suggest, are an irreducible part of collective 
governance, or in fact, any practices of government. My argument is that if we are to 
understand how collective governance takes place, what problems and processes are at 
stake in it, and how they affect civil servants, we need to pay attention to how 
collaboration is informed and reworked not only by relations of power, but also by the 
relational and moral dimensions of collaborative encounters (Brown 2016: 592). 
 
Collective governance, as Rich and Moberg (2015) understand it, is not peculiar to the 
EITI. To explore the problems outlined above, in this chapter I will discuss one 
compelling case of a collaboratively governed policy: the UK policy on mandatory 
disclosures of extractives’ payments to governments. Conceptually, institutionally and 
socially intertwined with the (UK) EITI, the mandatory reporting regulations were 
implemented by BIS officials in close collaboration with the same stakeholders that later 
became involved in the UK EITI.  
 
Similarly to the UK EITI, these regulations were collectively negotiated in a working 
group of stakeholders. Although this collaboration was informal,220 corporate and NGO 
stakeholders were as a matter of fact involved in drafting many policy texts and shaping 
decisions.221 However, there was one crucial difference between the UK EITI and the 
mandatory reporting policy: the latter became a focus of an intense dispute between the 
Industry and the Civil Society.222  
 
The opening-up of policy-making to corporate and NGO stakeholders not only allowed 
for their collaboration, but also fuelled their antagonisms. At the time of my fieldwork, 
                                                 
220 I.e. roles, obligations and authority of different parties were not formally defined, and civil servants 
retained the exclusive decision-making power that they had rescinded in the UK EITI. 
221 This, and the way in which the sociality of their collaboration affected the policy, make the case of the 
mandatory regulations comparable to that of the UK EITI. Indeed, in the dissertation’s Conclusion I will 
explicitly make this comparison to analyse how collective governance challenges the authority of civil 
servants. 
222 Officials used the same constituency titles as in the context of the UK EITI, although there were no 
formal representational arrangements in place in the mandatory reporting working group.  
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these antagonisms led to an open conflict that, in the view of BIS officials, tore the 
relationships built during the months of collaboration. Because of how this mandatory 
reporting policy was socially intertwined with the UK EITI, the stakeholders’ conflict 
about the former eventually hijacked the implementation of the latter. 
 
The main focus of this dispute was the way in which corporate representatives interpreted 
some key ideas of the mandatory reporting regulations in a voluntary, non-binding 
document called the Industry Guidance. BIS invited these corporate stakeholders to write 
the Guidance as a form of weak self-regulation that complemented the law, and in 
campaigners’ view they used it to undermine the mandatory reporting policy. The conflict 
demonstrated the transnational dimension of corporate and NGO lobbying, and the ways 
in which similarly to the UK EITI, the mandatory reporting policy was implicated in 
larger political projects of Civil Society’s and Industry’s advocacy (see also Chapter 
Five). For the officials, however, the conflict laid bare the limits of their authority vis-a-
vis the stakeholders, because while it directly affected the civil servants and their policy, 
its sources and solutions literally lay beyond the government. 
 
This chapter will provide a thick description of the premises and the dynamics of the 
dispute in order to explain why it occurred in the first place, and what it can tell us about 
the bureaucrats’ moral responses to the changing social world of policy-making. I will 
analyse two competing ways of making sense of the conflict: the BIS officials’, who  
described the Guidance dispute as the NGOs’ moral failure to collaborate and discern 
collaboration’s limits; and the campaigners’, for whom the conflict was a moral necessity 
caused by a failure of collaboration.223 My ethnography will demonstrate that the sociality 
of stakeholders’ and officials’ encounters, antagonistic or cooperative, engendered moral 
expectations of engagement and respect. For the civil servants and the campaigners, 
however, these expectations inhered in different orders of sociality. I will argue that they 
significantly shaped the conduct of collective governance, and led the officials and their 
NGO stakeholders to take opposite ethical stances with relation to the conflict. 
 
I begin with a brief account about collaboration in the context of the mandatory reporting 
policy in order to explain how BIS officials involved corporate and NGO stakeholders 
into the making of policy, and why they thought it was a good idea. Adopting the 
                                                 
223 I did not have access to corporate representatives, but analysis of documents and cross-referencing of 
other materials, allows for a fair assessment of their positions. 
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perspective of a participant observer, I will then describe how the Guidance conflict 
erupted, and what it looked like from the perspective of civil servants at BIS. This will 
lead me to explain why the conflict made sense from the perspective of the campaigners’ 
transnational advocacy. I will then explain why BIS officials’ understanding of the 
conflict was so different from the campaigners’. I will conclude the chapter with an 
analysis of what the campaigners’ and officials’ narratives of the conflict as a moral, 
rather than just a political, problem, reveal about the effects and challenges of 
collaborative policy-making. 
Collaborative policy-making 
The mandatory reporting policy  
When the EITI was formalised in 2002-3, its voluntary, participatory set-up turned out to 
be far from the mandatory policy design originally proposed by Global Witness (see 
Chapters Three and Four). Dissatisfied with this distortion of their idea, Global Witness 
and other members of the newly created NGO coalition Publish What You Pay (PWYP), 
continued to advocate for an obligatory policy on extractive companies’ reporting of 
payments to governments. As the EITI gradually normalised and legitimated the idea of 
extractives’ transparency, PWYP grew in ranks and influence. It extended its membership 
and campaigns to many countries, but the founding members of PWYP retained their 
transnational focus (see Chapter Five). These London-based organisations are the key 
protagonists of this chapter.  
 
By the end of 2000s, the advocacy of Global Witness and the US coalition of PWYP 
started to yield policy results. In 2010, rules on mandatory reporting of extractives’ 
payments were included into the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. Known as Dodd-Frank 1504224 the requirement was a landmark 
achievement for the campaigners, and soon became a model for other similar laws in the 
EU and Canada. The key provision of Dodd-Frank 1504 was the requirement that 
resource companies had to publicly report their payments to governments in much greater 
detail than almost in any other form of tax disclosure before that. Whereas most 
corporations report tax as an aggregated sum for all countries of operation, under this law, 
                                                 
224 For section n. 1504 in the law. Otherwise known as the Cardin-Lugar amendments. As I revise these 
pages (in February 2017), the Republican-led US Congress has voted to rescind the executive regulations 
implementing the law. As a matter of pure coincidence, ExxonMobil, whose former CEO Rex Tillerson is 
now the US Secretary of State, has been among the main opponents of extractives’ mandatory reporting.  
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companies had to separately disclose information about payments for single extractive 
operations—‘projects’—, such as one mine or an oil field. With the primary law in place, 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) produced further executive 
regulations to give a technical legal definition of projects.  
 
The detailed disclosures in ‘project-level’ reporting were important for campaigners, who 
claimed they needed as much information as possible to identify corrupt transactions. By 
the same token, they were a great nuisance for large transnational extractive corporations, 
which united in their opposition to the law and the SEC ruling, claiming that such 
disclosures were costly and made them less competitive. Under the aegis of the American 
Petroleum Institute (API), numerous American and European oil companies started a 
legal battle against the SEC, trying to weaken225 the definition of the project and other 
reporting requirements. This corporate opposition to project-level reporting in the US 
would later have effects in the EU and Britain, and I will return to this later.  
 
In 2010 the European Commission set out to develop a new Accounting Directive, 
announcing that it would follow the example of the US Dodd-Frank reforms and introduce 
project-level reporting for extractives. The reporting rules would be included in Chapter 
10 of the Directive, but first the content of the Chapter and the design of the reporting 
regime had to be negotiated by officials representing all EU countries. The task of 
developing the official negotiating position of the UK government befell a small group 
of bureaucrats at BIS: the head of the Corporate Governance team Charlotte Reid-Wills 
and her two subordinates, Mary Lewis226 and Catherine Barnes. This was the same team 
that would later host the UK EITI Secretariat, so as soon as I began my fieldwork with 
the Secretariat’s staff, I realised that the mandatory reporting policy was being drafted in 
the same office. In the team, the mandatory reporting rules were known simply as the 
“extractives”. (The shorthand referred to all components of the policy: Directive’s 
Chapter 10, its subsequent implementation as a piece of UK legislation,227 to which I will 
                                                 
225 Here I follow the campaigners’ use of the adjectives weak/strong. A stronger policy is one that has a 
more detailed and comprehensive set of reporting requirements, which lead to the disclosure of more 
information. 
226 Mary was only involved at the beginning, later taking up work on other aspects of the Accounting 
Directive. It was therefore Charlotte and Catherine who were involved in most of the events I describe here. 
227 In the UK, the final reporting rules from Chapter 10 were enshrined in The Reports on Payments to 
Governments Regulations 2014. 
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refer simply as the Regulations, and finally, the voluntary Industry Guidance interpreting 
the Regulations.)  
 
Through office conversations and interviews, I also discovered that from the very 
beginning of the European negotiations about the reporting rules, BIS officials were 
developing their ideas about the design of the rules in conversation with corporate and 
NGO stakeholders. It was considered good practice at BIS and other departments 
(Maybin 2016) to consult with interested parties within the government and outside of it 
while making the policy. But as Charlotte explained to me, because of the changing 
approaches to government regulation, officials at BIS increasingly engaged their business 
and other stakeholders not only as outside consultants, but as co-authors of policy.  
 
Corporate law and accounting, particularly in extractive industries, was a challenging area 
of specialist policy knowledge, and many officials told me that no-one but corporations 
themselves, knew how best to regulate their conduct. There was an expectation from the 
ministers that BIS would produce less regulation by allowing the subject of regulation to 
govern themselves through such forms of soft law as codes of conduct or guidances, 
checked and approved by the department. This approach to (de-)regulation, with which 
many civil servants at the Corporate Governance team agreed, also favoured collective 
governance of the policy through stakeholders working groups and consultative 
committees. Some officials suggested that such working groups, which included 
stakeholders into the making and management of policy, had an added benefit of reducing 
stakeholders’ opposition to regulation, and prevented their criticism of the government.228 
 
All these factors contributed to Charlotte’s decision to establish an informal stakeholders’ 
working group. She wanted the expert inputs of corporate representatives and was eager 
to work with corporate representatives as long as she had an upper hand in making the 
policy. But internal departmental correspondence also suggests that Charlotte and her 
officials were aware of the American Petroleum Institute’s legal challenge to the 
mandatory reporting rules in the US. The oil company Shell, which participated in the 
API case, was aggressively lobbying the UK government (BIS and the Cabinet Office) 
                                                 
228 As one cynical team colleague at BIS told me, involving stakeholders into some kind of policy work, 
even if most insignificant, allowed them to “opine about crap” and could even be substantively helpful. 
Charlotte made a similar, although politer, point. Maybin (2016) offers an insightful analysis of similar 
political manoeuvres at the UK Department of Health. 
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against strict mandatory reporting rules, threatening judicial review229 if the government 
did not listen to them. Charlotte wanted to avoid a legal challenge. She must have also 
known of Global Witness’ and PWYP coalition’s campaign against the corporate 
attempts to weaken the US reporting regulations. Therefore, when the work on 
negotiating the Accounting Directive began, and the same corporations and NGOs that 
had tried to influence the SEC/Dodd-Frank 1504 rules started to lobby BIS,230 Charlotte 
decided to get these people to “work together” on the policy. She recalled:  
initially they wanted to talk to us separately about the proposals [for mandatory 
reporting] and I wasn't keen about it. So, we had a couple of meetings with all of 
them, one of which the minister came to, basically to try and find some sort of 
common ground that we can get them to talk about to start with. And get used to 
working together. So, once we got over the hurdle of them shouting at each other 
across the table […] it was great. Because otherwise we were in this situation 
where we were trying to negotiate in Europe, and we were trying to handle the 
different views of the [stakeholders here]… 
 
Working together as a group, corporate and NGO representatives would have to negotiate 
a “common ground” with each other and the officials, instead of trying to lobby civil 
servants separately. 
Negotiating a “common ground” 
The recollection above gives a small hint of Charlotte and her officials’ vision of 
stakeholder collaboration. The officials described the work in the group as a process of 
negotiation and exchange, in which the stakeholders argued and formulated among 
themselves what they “wanted”, and the officials decided whether to “give” it to them.231 
The two groups of stakeholders wanted opposite things from the future policy on 
mandatory disclosures, and this in many ways echoed the arguments they had made in 
                                                 
229 A form of legal action against the government which entails a review of all policy decisions and their 
justification. 
230 Note that “lobbying” was my informants’—officials’—word to designate campaigners’ and corporate 
representatives’ attempts at influencing how they worked on and thought about policy. More often than not, 
civil servants reserved the word for attempts initiated by campaigners and corporate representatives, and so 
not for stakeholder meetings that officials organised themselves. I will use the word here for all 
stakeholders’ activity that sought to influence policy, in line with how many campaigners saw the 
supposedly collaborative stakeholders’ meetings as an opportunity to advance their organisations’ goals. 
231 Similarly, transparency campaigners from various London-based organisations whom I spoke to, 
characterised their interactions with officials as a presentation of “asks”—i.e. policy suggestions and 
requests. 
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the US. This meant, in Charlotte’s words, that different policy proposals had to be 
discussed in common, in order to “find a common ground”. Reaching such ground “was 
very difficult, really, because each issue we worked on required some sort of negotiation 
around it.” Many campaigners, too, described these negotiations in the idiom of 
exchange: one party wanted something, the other gave it, or sought a compromise, 
expecting reciprocity. Charlotte’s and Mary’s memories232 of this working group, even if 
a distorted and interested representation of past events,233 give a sense of how exchanges 
and discussions in the group made relationships, gradually resolved some of the 
stakeholders’ differences, and built trust. 
 
And while, in this view, collaboration changed how the stakeholders related to each other, 
it also informed how the officials negotiated the Accounting Directive, shaping the 
technical proposal they made for the extractives’ mandatory reporting regime. Although 
Charlotte, Mary and Catherine did not formally transfer any decision-making powers to 
their stakeholders (as would later happen in the context of the UK EITI), they still 
preferred to consult about, and agree, these decisions with them. They implied that in 
many cases these decisions were in fact collective and consensual.  
 
After the European Parliament passed the Accounting Directive in June 2013 (as 
Directive 2013/34/EU), the working group continued to meet in order to negotiate how 
the Chapter 10 mandatory reporting rules would be transposed into UK law. In parallel, 
this collective of stakeholders, already well-known to each other, gained a new—formally 
separate—existence234 when the UK EITI was announced in summer 2013 and BIS 
officials asked corporate and NGO representatives to officially form the Industry and 
Civil Society constituencies of the Multi-Stakeholder Group. “It was good because I’d 
already got the relationships with the people”—remembered Charlotte, and when I asked 
what she meant by “relationships”, she explained: “I knew them and we’d worked 
together for some 18 months on the Directive […]. So you knew how to work with people, 
you’d built some sort of personal relationship that helped, you know… There was a level 
of trust, a level of understanding. So I think that was good…” Charlotte’s positive 
                                                 
232 Unfortunately, for the lack of space I cannot reproduce these stories here even partially. 
233 In particular, these recollections might have been shaped by the experience of the Guidance conflict 
which tore the relationships that the officials claimed collaboration had made. 
234 Charlotte, who chaired the meetings of the informal working group, also became the chairwoman of the 
MSG. 
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recollections of these relationships would later become the background for her criticisms 
of the campaigners’ behaviour in the Guidance conflict.  
 
She said that the “same people, exactly the same people” were now meeting in two 
formally separate settings—the informal extractives working group, and the formal 
MSG—to discuss two closely intertwined policies on extractives’ transparency. Now the 
stakeholders had to keep separate the roles that they played, and policies they discussed, 
in the context of different meetings. As it will become clear later in this chapter, this 
proved a challenge for the campaigners, who saw both the mandatory reporting policy 
and the UK EITI as elements of the same “jigsaw of global transparency” (Chapter Five). 
 
Collective decision-making and negotiations of policy design were not the only ways in 
which collective governance transformed the practices and relations of government. 
Having involved campaigners from international NGOs and representatives of 
transnational oil companies to work together, the BIS officials opened up their policies to 
the influence of actors whose agendas and interests were beyond the officials’ control. 
With the same stakeholders taking part in both policies, it was only a matter of time that 
disagreements which could not be contained within the relational dynamic of 
collaborative exchange in the context of one policy, would spill over to the other.  
 
In what follows, I will describe how this happened. I will explain how disagreements 
among the stakeholders matured into a full-blown conflict that undermined the 
relationships made during the times of collaborative negotiations.  
The conflict from the perspective of a participant observer 
The signs of the conflict 
I joined the Corporate Governance team in February 2015 at a moment when the seams 
of collaborative governance were becoming visible. The Regulations had been passed, 
but the extractives working group continued to meet. Now, however, the role of the BIS 
officials in the working group changed. Following a public consultation about the 
Regulations, in which the corporate stakeholders opposed the proposed mandatory 
disclosures regime, the civil servants agreed that the Industry would write their own 
Guidance instructing companies about how best to follow the reporting law. It would be 
a document by corporations, for corporations. Whereas Charlotte and Catherine suggested 
to me that such self-regulation was a normal practice, some campaigners suspected the 
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Guidance was a giveaway aiming to soothe the corporate opposition to the law. The BIS 
officials would check if the Guidance was legally correct, and mediate between the NGOs 
and the authors of the Guidance, who had agreed to listen to the campaigners’ feedback. 
This arrangement of roles was one of the factors that later contributed to the conflict. 
 
Officially, the Guidance was being drafted under the auspices of two international bodies: 
the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, and the International Council on 
Mining and Metals. But in practice, its authors were the very same people—a tax director 
from BP, and senior officials from Shell and ExxonMobil, among others—who 
participated in the extractives working group, and whose companies had also been 
involved in the legal challenge against the SEC reporting rules in the US.235 Their history 
of involvement in lobbying against mandatory reporting added to the tensions in the 
working group.  
 
I first witnessed signs of the Industry Guidance dispute in early February. It was one of 
those afternoons when the senior civil servants had left for meetings, and the work in the 
office slowed down. Officials took breaks for tea and discussed the day’s news with each 
other. Chatter and laughter filled the office. Conversations about politics gave way to 
gossip about stakeholders and managers; but as soon as a manager entered the room, 
everyone switched topics.  
 
There she was now, Charlotte Reid-Wills, just returned after a meeting. She crossed the 
room, going straight to Elizabeth: “It was horrible. Gary was quite aggressive. And Tim 
Craigs kept trying to write down as much as possible—they couldn’t take a copy of the 
Guidance out; Industry haven’t finalised it yet… He was quite… legalistic, you know. 
But Jack was more conciliatory…” I could not understand why exactly her meeting had 
been “horrible”, but the names gave a clue: Gary Dowell and Tim Craigs were Global 
Witness campaigners whom I knew; and Jack Johnson worked for a fellow NGO, the 
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI). All three represented the Civil Society 
constituency on the multi-stakeholder group of the UK EITI, and were part of the 
extractives working group. Besides the campaigners, George Cunningham, Director from 
BP had attended the meeting. 
 
                                                 
235 These same individuals represented the Industry in the UK EITI. 
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The meeting, I learned, concerned the Industry Guidance. The document was nearly 
finalised, but to judge from Charlotte’s words, the campaigners were stirring trouble. The 
dispute had been underway since late November, when Mr Cunningham first unveiled a 
draft of the document. Throughout February, the word “Guidance” resurfaced here and 
there in office conversations, and I gradually learned the clues necessary to discern the 
meaning of abbreviations, half-said sentences and cryptic descriptions of what was 
happening in meeting rooms where BIS officials gathered with campaigners and 
corporate representatives.236  
 
Things started to change in the first days of March. In a month, on 30 March, the 
government would enter a period of purdah—the six weeks before the general elections, 
when all but the most essential business would stop, and no stakeholder meetings would 
be allowed until the new government formed in May. Whatever agreements and decisions 
were still pending in the Guidance negotiations, they had to be made by then, because the 
new government was likely to have different policy priorities. Work in the office picked 
up pace, but as the Guidance meetings became more frequent, and officials were ever 
keener for the stakeholders to conclude the negotiations, the progress of the negotiations 
stalled. And for me, the signs of the near-yet-distant dispute became easier to read.  
The problem: an “element of latitude” in a legal definition 
As I talked to colleagues in the office, I realised that the Civil Society representatives 
fundamentally disagreed with how the Industry had drafted the Guidance. Campaigners 
requested changes. The drafters made compromises, but the main paragraphs that 
campaigners found problematic, remained unchanged. The central point of disagreement 
(there were many) concerned that long-contested element of the mandatory reporting 
rules, the definition of the project in the framework of extractives’ project-level reporting.  
 
As with the US Dodd-Frank 1504 rules, project here related to the unit (a mine, an oil 
field) for which companies would have to publicly disclose their payments to 
governments. How this unit was legally defined affected what information had to be 
included in the corporate reports. The technical detail of the definition determined the 
                                                 
236 This seemed typical of an office ethnography. Fieldworkers (e.g. Candea 2010) often describe the sense 
of being in a wrong place at a wrong time, as if the action was happening elsewhere. While this sensation 
is very much inherent to participant observation, it was peculiarly acute in my office fieldwork. Because 
things did happen elsewhere: if not in the virtual environs of MS Outlook, then in meeting rooms and cafes 
in other parts of the building, to which I was not always invited. 
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particular ways in which the law’s formal abstraction of the project differed from the 
realities of extraction and accounting on the ground (Stinchcombe 2001), and thereby 
shaped which realities were legally visible, and which were not (Alexander 2001).  
 
To put it somewhat simplistically, Charlotte’s corporate stakeholders wanted the 
definition to be the least specific and stringent possible, which for the campaigners was a 
sure sign that corporations had something to hide. But the Industry representatives gave 
a different reason: the more detailed the project definition was, and the more information 
had to be disclosed, the costlier the disclosures became for companies. Even a tiny change 
in phrasing could affect the disclosure of billions of pounds of payments.  
 
The Industry had sought to influence the same definition in the US SEC rules and the 
Accounting Directive’s Chapter 10. They failed, but when Charlotte and Catherine were 
drafting the UK Regulations, they tried their luck again. The BIS officials were legally 
bound to follow the text of the Directive, and could not amend the definition. Catherine 
told me that drafting the Regulations, she also sought to “copy-out” the text of Directive 
as much as possible, so as to avoid the Industry and Civil Society lobbying her over legal 
minutiae. The problem was, she said, that “the Directive [was] not crystal-clear. So there 
[was] an element of latitude there.” The ambivalence concerned one element of the 
project definition: the law was not explicit which legal and operational arrangements 
could be construed as a single project, leaving it to the reporting companies to interpret 
it. Drafting the Guidance to prescribe “best practices” of reporting, the corporate 
stakeholders seized on this “element of latitude” in the law to ever so slightly change the 
definition. This change was almost imperceptible to outsiders (See Box 1), but could have 
significant implications for reporting and transparency.  
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When the draft Guidance was presented in the extractives working group in late 2014, the 
campaigners were appalled. They protested that if followed by companies, the Guidance’s 
definition would allow them to report distant and unrelated extractive operations as one 
project, as long as they were covered by contracts with similar terms.237 Multiple 
payments to governments for different, unconnected operations could be lumped together. 
For the campaigners, this small definitional interpretation proposed by the Guidance’s 
drafters defeated the whole purpose of project-level reporting. It promoted the opposite 
of transparency.238  
 
                                                 
237 For example, in Angola, one campaigner from PWYP told me, all extractive operations of a given 
company would often be covered by almost identical template contracts, which would allow them to be 
treated as one project for purposes of disclosure. 
238 As an aside: this interestingly demonstrates that just as it takes a lot of work to make things transparent, 
legal and accounting labour is are also required to produce opacity (Maurer 2005; see also Chapter Two in 
this thesis). 
Box 1. The technicalities 
The Directive and the UK Regulations defined the project as “the operational activities which 
(a) are governed by a single contract, licence, lease, concession or similar legal agreement, and 
(b) form the basis for payments liabilities with a government.” (Reports on Payments to 
Governments Regulations, Reg. 2(1)) This was the unproblematic part of the definition.  
 
But the law also recognised that sometimes several extractive operations could be intertwined 
so that it made sense to report information about them as one. It therefore allowed for 
“substantially interconnected agreements” to be treated and reported as a single project. But 
the law was not clear about what exactly constituted “substantial interconnection”. It stipulated 
that “‘substantially interconnected’ means forming a set of operationally and geographically 
integrated contracts, licences, leases or concessions or related agreements with substantially 
similar terms that are signed with a government, giving rise to payment liabilities.” (Reports 
on Payments to Governments Regulations, Reg. 2(6), emphasis added)  
 
The corporate drafters of the Industry Guidance seized on the ambivalence of the definition’s 
syntax (the unpunctuated or above) to argue, in the Guidance, that substantially interconnected 
agreements could be defined in two ways, rather than one: as either interconnected 
geographically and operationally (e.g. several open mines situated nearby with shared 
infrastructure), or interconnected through legal agreements with similar terms (e.g. several 
mines for which the same model contract was used). 
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Figure 6.1. An excerpt from the draft Industry Guidance (February 2015). Screenshot of 
a document released by BIS under a Freedom of Information Request. 
 
In various exchanges during the winter of 2015, members of PWYP UK, supported by a 
formal letter of opinion from a senior barrister, insisted that the Industry amend the 
Guidance to remove the double basis for “substantial interconnection” in the project 
definition. The corporate representatives, however, maintained that the Guidance was 
legally correct as drafted. BIS lawyers, asked to assess the Guidance, also concluded that 
it was “not incorrect” (essentially meaning “permissible”), but would not affirm that it 
was in the spirit, rather than the letter, of the law. Ultimately, as Catherine later explained 
to me, it all came down to a difference of legal opinions, and opinions there could be 
many . 
Putting pressure on officials  
The BIS officials’ plan was to publicise the Guidance once the document was finalised, 
giving it a weak form of departmental recognition as “best practice” to be followed. Now 
that purdah was approaching rapidly, and Industry had dug in their heels, the NGOs 
shifted their attention to Charlotte and Catherine, seeking to persuade them not to approve 
the Guidance as it was, and to pressure the corporate stakeholders into amending it.239 
The officials objected, saying they could do nothing about the Guidance as long as it was 
not legally incorrect. This was a document drafted by the Industry and for the Industry, 
they said, and it was inappropriate either for the officials, or for the campaigners, to 
demand changes.  
 
                                                 
239 In a variation on the familiar story of exemplarity, given that Britain was the first country to implement 
the EU mandatory reporting rules, and the Guidance was formally authored by two international industry 
organisations, the campaigners were concerned that Industry would try to promote the same guidance in 
other EU countries, holding the UK up as an example or a precedent. 
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The campaigners refused to accept this self-
limitation of officials’ authority, perhaps 
recognising that it had resulted in the first place 
from the bureaucrats’ earlier decision to outsource 
the interpretation of the law to the Industry.240 
PWYP UK and its individual members started a 
publicity campaign on Twitter, addressing BIS as 
responsible for the Guidance. The U2 singer Bono, 
who had co-founded the ONE Campaign,241 wrote 
to Jo Swinson and PM Cameron about the conflict, 
while ONE also encouraged their student members 
from Durham University to personally write to the 
BIS lawyer (a Durham alumnus) that he should 
denounce the Guidance as incorrect. One morning 
in mid-March, officials from the Corporate 
Governance team found activists from ONE at the 
entrance to the department, handing out leaflets 
directly addressed to the team members,242 and 
urging them not to “give in to Big Oil” (Figure 1). 
There was plenty of joking about this later in the 
office, but the civil servants, used to enjoying personal anonymity behind the backs of 
their ministers (Drewry and Butcher 1988), were left feeling vulnerable and exposed. 
Charlotte and Catherine resented that the campaigners addressed them directly, as if the 
officials were personally reticent to reject the Guidance, rather than adhering to what they 
thought were the broader principles of impartial, balanced policy-making, in a politically 
complicated context. 
 
And this context was becoming more complex because of the lobbying. Members of 
PWYP UK sent letters and sought meetings high up in the government hierarchy with the 
BIS minister Jo Swinson, top mandarins at the Cabinet Office, and even the Prime 
                                                 
240 For comparative points about the effects of out-contracting and outsourcing on central or local state’s 
capacity to execute policy, see Agar (2003: 372-9, 388-9) on computerisation and expertise in Whitehall, 
Bear (2015: passim) on port labour in Kolkata, and Fredericks (2012: 137) on waste management in Dakar. 
241 An active member of the PWYP UK and a party to the Industry Guidance talks. 
242 But misstating the name of the team. 
Figure 6.2. The leaflet. Author’s 
photo. 
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Minister himself, while the Industry, particularly Shell, did the same. After each such 
letter or meeting, Charlotte and Catherine received phone calls and emails from Jo 
Swinson’s aides and Cabinet Office functionaries, requesting that they sort out the 
conflict. Catherine told me that both the Industry and the Civil Society “knew how to get 
to power” and had had “a lot of access” to different senior bureaucrats and special 
advisors at the top of the Whitehall ladder, and had managed to persuade them to put in a 
word for their causes. As a result, Charlotte and Catherine often received contradictory 
requests from within the government about dealing with the Guidance dispute. 
 
I recall one day in late March, when it all got a bit too much for Catherine. Having 
received another email from the Cabinet Office about dealing with the campaigners, she 
sighed and turned to Stewart and me:  
— Cabinet Office gotta decide what they want: either the Guidance agreed with NGOs 
by the end of the next week, or us listening to Shell’s demands to approve it!  
 
She had explained that the Industry and the Civil Society had lobbied different parts of 
the Cabinet Office, who were now issuing conflicting requests to BIS, and said: 
— Anyway, this is not EITI! They [the stakeholders] don’t work together [here]. It’s 
Industry’s Guidance! NGOs can provide feedback, but they can’t expect to have a final 
say… 
 
Stewart shot back:  
— Yeah, EITI got the NGOs used to thinking that that’s how policy works! But it’s not! 
Now they’re expecting the same level of engagement, the same collaboration on the 
extractives [i.e. in the Guidance negotiations]… 
 
Catherine was dismayed at the campaigners’ demands and tactics:  
— And now the director of Global Witness is going to have a phone call with [John Smith, 
an anti-corruption Director] at Cabinet Office… Do these people ever stop?!  
 
Catherine was frustrated that the campaigners refused to accept that her hands were tied 
and she could not influence the drafting of the Industry Guidance, unless it was legally 
flawed in a way that was not a matter of different opinions. There had been mistakes and 
tactical reinterpretations in earlier drafts, which went against the department’s approach 
to the mandatory reporting law. Then, Charlotte had demanded that the Guidance be 
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changed. But now, Catherine felt that there was very little that she could do without 
imposing an executive decision on either the Industry, or the campaigners. She resented 
the requests from the Cabinet Office that were pushing her in that direction. Overall, many 
members of the team, even those not involved in the Guidance talks (although following 
them with great interest), thought that Charlotte and Catherine were being dragged into a 
conflict not of their own making, and which they could not resolve if they were to 
maintain their chosen position of benevolent facilitators of stakeholder collaboration.  
 
In Catherine’s opinion, the campaigners, vitiated by the UK EITI, presumed they had a 
right to influence or veto the Guidance, whereas neither the Industry, nor the officials, 
thought so. This expectation, she thought, was an abuse of privileges of collaboration, 
and had resulted from the campaigners’ failure to discern that even participatory policy-
making had its limits. As I will demonstrate later, from the campaigners’ perspective this 
expectation was a normal consequence of the sociality of their encounters with the 
officials and corporate representatives. Catherine, however, was put in an impossible 
position, because she could not resolve the conflict without undermining the principles of 
collaboration that had made it possible in the first place; yet, continuing the negotiations 
only further hindered the relationships built during the many months of working together 
with the stakeholders. 
The boycott 
Things got worse the closer purdah approached. Understanding that the officials were 
unwilling to intervene on either side of the conflict, the campaigners decided to use the 
last leverage that they had: the UK EITI. As one officer from the PWYP International 
Secretariat told me, participation in the UK EITI was the only thing besides publicity that 
gave the campaigners “a bit of power”. He explained that unlike corporate lobbyists, 
whose channels of access to the government, and bargaining powers with it, were 
multiple, campaigners often had little choice but direct confrontation.  
 
Successful implementation of the UK EITI, in which the government was so invested, 
and for which Charlotte was responsible as Elizabeth’s manager, depended on the NGO’ 
continuous participation.243 If they withdrew, the policy would collapse without quorate 
                                                 
243 Stakeholder participation was one of the Standard’s requirements. 
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MSG meetings. Towards the end of March, officials received an email from a senior 
manager at the ONE Campaign, which threatened to do just that:  
Over the past few weeks, we’ve become extremely concerned that BIS will 
approve (openly or tacitly) guidelines drafted by companies working in the 
extractives industries that we consider illegal. […] The situation is so serious that 
civil society representatives are considering withdrawing from the EITI process in 
protest.244  
 
The outcome depended on the stakeholders’ meeting with minister Jo Swinson, scheduled 
several days before purdah. The minister would hear the arguments of both parties and 
decide what the department would do about the Guidance stalemate. Charlotte and 
Catherine had high hopes that the NGOs and the Industry would at last come to an 
agreement. Come the day of the meeting, however, the NGOs requested that Jo Swinson 
reject the Guidance as illegal. Charlotte and Catherine remembered, with disbelief and 
dismay, that the minister, who was projected to lose her seat in the Parliament after the 
elections, was prepared to do that, and only eventually gave in to the officials’ 
exhortations not to ruin the department’s relationship with the Industry.  
 
Short of “rejecting” the Guidance, the minister nevertheless decided that BIS would 
neither officially approve, nor welcome, the document.245 For the time being, and until 
the new government came to power, this was the end of BIS’ involvement in the Guidance 
negotiations. The minister cancelled an upcoming meeting of the UK EITI to spare the 
department the embarrassment of a boycott, which set off the policy’s schedule by some 
three months. As I will show in Chapter Seven, this caused great worry to Elizabeth Pierce 
of the UK EITI Secretariat. But for Charlotte and Catherine, who felt increasingly 
embattled by what had become of their collaboration with the stakeholders, Jo Swinson’s 
decision, and purdah’s prohibition on any meetings with stakeholders, brought great 
relief.  
 
In my discussion so far, I have explained how the collaborative working group came to 
shape the UK mandatory reporting policy, and how the stakeholders’ collaboration was 
                                                 
244 ONE Campaign to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, email, late March 2015. 
Emphasis added. 
245 She encouraged the stakeholders to keep negotiating and working together, but given that purdah was 
about to begin, BIS officials would be unable to mediate their meetings. 
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then undermined by a conflict about legal interpretations of the one key element of the 
reporting regime. This conflict put a strain on the stakeholders’ relationships with each 
other and the officials, and as will become clear in what follows, the social dynamics of 
the dispute defined the participants’ moral evaluations of it as a crisis of trust. 
 
As time passed, and Charlotte and Catherine gained distance from the dispute, they 
reflected on what had gone wrong. They evaluated the actions of different stakeholders, 
and came to reassess the negotiations as a moral failure. More precisely, from their 
perspective it was the campaigner’s moral failure to collaborate, temper their 
expectations, and make compromises. Campaigners shared this view of the conflict as a 
moral crisis, but for completely different reasons. For them, confrontation and boycott 
were inevitable outcomes of the way in which the Guidance debacle symbolised their 
long-term adversarial relations with the Industry. I will explain these opposite views in 
the remaining part of the chapter. 
The conflict from the campaigners’ perspective 
“The same people” 
With time, I managed to speak with several campaigners from Global Witness and PWYP 
about the Guidance conflict. They seemed to have a certain urgency to explain themselves 
and demonstrate that their boycott of the UK EITI and aggressive campaign tactics were 
justified, or even inevitable. They maintained that their persistence in the negotiations and 
refusal to reciprocate compromises, which so alienated the officials, were only legitimate 
reactions to the Industry’s tactics. These explanations worked in a discernible moral 
register of justifications and attributions of responsibility (Lambek and Solway 2001). 
Here, I want to present an account of one of the campaigners, Tim Craigs, whom I knew 
better than others, and whose commentary on the dispute expressed many of the themes 
and sentiments described by his colleagues, but in richer detail. To give more depth to 
Tim’s account, I will also refer to other campaigners’ explanations. 
 
Tim was in his mid-thirties and worked for the Global Witness’ Oil Campaign. A 
colleague of Mike and Bernard (sleuths from Chapter Two), he built on their 
investigations in his work. Tim wrote campaign texts, drawing on his specialist 
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knowledge of natural resource law, and represented Global Witness in the UK EITI 
meetings and the extractives working group.246 
 
For one of our meetings, which usually happened in a small Italian cafe next to the offices 
of Global Witness in the City, Tim brought copies of two submissions to a BIS public 
consultation about implementing the extractives’ mandatory reporting rules. One was 
from Shell, the other, from PWYP UK. Together, he said, they would help me understand 
what had gone wrong between the Industry and the Civil Society.  
 
The consultation, I noted, had taken place six months before the Industry first presented 
a draft Guidance to the working group. But that was exactly Tim’s point: the dispute 
between the campaigners and the Industry had begun much earlier. To grasp why the 
Guidance conflict began and developed the way it did, one had to read it as a part of a 
longer history of competing attempts to influence extractives’ transparency policy in the 
US, EU, and Britain. Reflecting on this on one occasion, Tim half-jokingly said that this 
ongoing confrontation with the Industry lobbyists was what made his job exciting. He 
said:  
it does feel a bit like a game. If you actually look at the guys in the EITI room 
we’re sitting in, they’re the same guys who were campaigning on the 
Accounting Directive, the same guys who were campaigning on SEC rules [that 
is, the US Dodd-Frank 1504 rules]. And the same individuals are doing the work 
for Industry on these issues. We’re campaigning on all of them, from the 
NGOs… so basically, everything you see in these debates, it has a wider context. 
You know that someone is saying something in their advocacy because it will 
help them somewhere else. So, the stuff that’s been discussed in the UK setting, 
will find its way over to the SEC [the US Security and Exchange Commission] 
if it’s helpful for them to do it.  
  
Tim insisted that the antagonism between the campaigners and the corporate 
representatives not only had a history, but also a “wider context”. Seen this way, the 
dispute unfolded on a larger scale than the altercations in the Guidance meetings. It was 
this way of scaling (Bauman 2016) the conflict as something unfolding beyond the 
                                                 
246 In this he reflected the typical sociology of transparency NGOs, whose employees usually came into 
campaigning—an interdisciplinary profession par excellence—from backgrounds in academic or applied 
research, journalism and law. Similarly to most of his colleagues, Tim had a social science degree from one 
of the top universities of the Russell group.  
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“interaction order” (Goffman 1983) of the working group meeting, that from Tim’s 
perspective gave the dispute a peculiar ethical connotation and made collaboration with 
the Industry increasingly difficult. Let me discuss this in more detail.  
 
Speaking of a “wider context”, Tim referred to Global Witness’ and PWYP’s long-
standing campaign for extractives' transparency, which Andrew Naumin called the 
“jigsaw of global transparency” (see Chapter Five). In this context, the campaigners 
sought to lobby governments of different countries to influence the national 
implementations of the EITI and the mandatory reporting rules in the US, UK, EU and 
Canada, while seeking to counter lobbying by the “same people” from the same extractive 
companies. 
 
These “same people”, Tim said, played the same “game”. On the one hand, the metaphor 
pointed to the predictability of participants’ tactical repertoires and patterns of action; on 
the other, it highlighted the inter-relationship of particular instances of play (Telesca 
2015). Whether it was the UK EITI, Chapter 10, or the Dodd-Frank 1504 rules, the game 
remained the same: influencing the reporting rules to increase the amount of information 
disclosed, and resisting the Industry’s attempts to do the opposite. Crucially, winning the 
game in one country, helped to win it in another, because of how the policies could be 
(and were) used as model examples for one another. 
 
Similarly to how the campaigners saw the UK EITI as relevant to their campaigning on a 
global scale, here too, the game and its stakes were beyond the formal control of UK 
officials and ministers. Once stakeholder collaboration became the key modality of 
developing the British mandatory reporting policy, the BIS officials were limited in what 
they could do about the concerns from elsewhere that their stakeholders brought into the 
meeting room.247 Charlotte resented this; Elizabeth (as we will see in Chapter Seven), 
sought to resist it through different forms of personal detachment. But for Tim, this was 
simply how things were because that was how transparency campaigning operated. And 
as I will demonstrate, it was this transnational logic of the game that led him and his 
colleagues into the conflict. 
                                                 
247 Archival materials suggest that officials routinely paid attention to Industry's and Civil Society's 
positions with regards to, say, the US mandatory reporting rules, and briefed their superiors about it. But in 
their own dealings with the stakeholders they insisted on separating between the UK mandatory reporting 
policy and other policies in the UK and elsewhere where the same stakeholders were involved. 
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“The same arguments” 
Tim corrected himself: competing with the Industry lobbyists was a game, but a serious 
one. At stake was whether or not billions of dollars of resource payments would be made 
transparent. More concretely, the campaigners and the corporate lobbyists sought to 
influence elements of legislation and policy documents. One example of this was the 
stumbling block of the Guidance dispute—the definition of the project, the practical and 
symbolic significance of which for the campaigners can only be understood in relation to 
how they perceived even the smallest elements of a policy as part of a larger movement 
towards transparency. Having played the game time and again, Tim and his colleagues 
were familiar with the arguments of their opponents. Echoing their own attempts to make 
the UK EITI into a model example of transparency policy, Tim observed:  
Basically, the companies’ priority on Dodd-Frank 1504, and on the Accounting 
Directive, and on EITI, overlap to an extent. Because some companies are 
required to report under all three, or will be reporting when the rules are finally 
passed. Also, the American oil companies, I think it’s fair to say, don’t want to see 
a strong precedent set in the UK, because it’s gonna make it harder for them to 
oppose transparency in other countries. Because if American NGOs can point to 
an example of transparency rule in the UK, then it will be harder for the companies 
to make their argument… The arguments that are usually used against 
transparency is that data is commercially confidential, or there’ll be competitive 
disadvantage, or it’s illegal in some countries—we don’t think that any of that is 
true. And the existence of an example in the UK which demonstrates that none of 
this is true, makes it very hard for them to argue for this in the US. So companies 
try to assure that nothing too strong comes out of this in the UK. That’s the kind 
of… dynamic. We work on arguing for this… on the same standards everywhere. 
If they overlap, it’ll be easier for companies who are caught by more than one 
[reporting regime]; it’s easier for us to use the data if they all say the same thing.  
 
The fact that the copying of foreign examples led to similar policies in different countries, 
was not a problem for Tim, —if anything, it was a desired outcome of transnational 
campaigning. The problem was, he suggested, that corporate lobbyists relied on the same 
tactic, trying to weaken (rather than strengthen, as campaigners did) reporting 
requirements in certain jurisdictions, and use that as an argument against stronger policies 
elsewhere. Explaining to me the claims in Shell’s submission to the UK consultation, Tim 
said that lobbying against mandatory reporting rules in many jurisdictions, corporate 
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representatives repeatedly used the same arguments. The campaigners sought to disprove 
these arguments, and felt irritated that their counterparts brought them up again, even after 
the campaigners thought they had disproven them. This was the cause of the Guidance 
conflict, said Tim.  
 
First, opposing the Dodd-Frank 1504 rules in the US, a group of oil companies,248 
represented by the American Petroleum Institute, filed a lawsuit against the Security and 
Exchange Commission. The legal challenge delayed the implementation of the rules, and 
the API hoped to force the Commission to change the rules to weaken its definition of the 
project and allow exemptions to reporting.249 Their legal action was eventually successful, 
but it did not make the SEC change their rules in the way that the Industry wanted.  
 
As the US court case was unfolding, many of the companies represented by the API 
sought to lobby officials in Brussels and London about the Accounting Directive’s 
reporting rules, and later about the UK law implementing them. BIS officials told me that 
the SEC/Dodd-Frank regulations had been a model for the mandatory disclosures regime 
in the Accounting Directive. Now, corporate lobbyists were suggesting that exactly 
because the EU rules had been modelled on the US ones, and because the API challenged 
the SEC’s rules in court, the EU reporting regime had to be put on hold until new reporting 
rules were produced in the US. They also sought to persuade EU officials to broaden the 
definition of the project and introduce exemptions.250 Tim and his colleagues sent letters 
to, and held meetings with, the EU bureaucrats, to persuade them that these corporate 
arguments were flawed. Eventually, Brussels rejected the Industry’s suggestions.  
 
In spring 2014, when BIS launched a public consultation about implementing the EU 
mandatory disclosures rules in the UK, the same people from the Industry once again 
                                                 
248 BP, Shell and ExxonMobil among others. 
249 The SEC/Dodd-Frank 1504 reporting rules, just like the EU and the UK ones, had extraterritorial reach: 
companies registered in the US or traded on US stock exchanges, had to comply with them. In companies’ 
view, this could result in a conflict of law in countries where companies were prohibited from disclosing 
their payments to governments by confidentiality agreements. Several countries were cited, among them 
Cameroon, China and Qatar. The case of BP in Angola (see Chapter Three) was well known, and companies 
claimed the needed to be exempt from reporting payments to governments of these countries in order not 
be thrown out of business by governments opposed to transparency. However, both campaigners and 
policymakers in London and Brussels claimed that companies failed to produce legally convincing evidence 
that there was such risk. 
250 To be more precise, these lobbying attempts were going on simultaneously in Brussels, and in the UK 
extractives working group convened by Charlotte.  
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made requests about delaying the reporting regime, introducing exemptions, and diluting 
the project definition. By this time, Tim said, the campaigners knew what to expect, and 
anticipating the Industry’s arguments, prepared parallel consultation responses to rebuke 
them. The BIS officials again rejected the corporate requests, confirming the 
campaigners’ sense of victory over the Industry. 
 
The situation in the UK, however, was peculiar because the BIS officials had agreed that 
the Industry would produce their own Guidance to the Regulations.251 It was then that the 
corporate representatives seized on the legal ambivalence in the Regulations to redefine 
the extractive project. For the campaigners, this was the final straw. Tim complained: 
We’re cynical about this by now. Because at every stage there has been a 
revision of laws, or rules, or guidance, or whatnot. There’s always been some 
attempt from someone in the Industry to try and wreck the mandatory reporting 
rules. […] At every stage Industry’s tried to water this down. And we’re seeing 
the same arguments in the transposition process as in Europe, [just] in different 
ways. […] So we thought we’ve won that argument, and it’s come back at—
every—bloody—stage in this discussion. […] And a cynical point of view is that 
companies are doing this because they are making payments which they don’t 
want to see the light of day. 
 
This, Tim explained, was the wider context of the Industry Guidance conflict. The way in 
which he and his colleagues perceived their interactions with the Industry as part of a 
global transparency “game”, informed their understanding of the corporate lobbying 
tactics as a morally flawed failure to collaborate, and justified confrontation and boycott. 
Let me explain how. 
A moral crisis  
Describing the campaigners’ struggle against the “same arguments” repeated by the 
“same people”, Tim was explaining why it had become morally impossible for the 
campaigners to maintain peaceful collaboration with the Industry in the way that 
Charlotte and Catherine wanted them to. The Industry’s arguments, he said, were “plainly 
wrong”: “wrong in ways that go to the heart of what we’re trying to achieve here [as 
campaigners]. We fought very hard for project-level reporting; and suddenly [projects 
                                                 
251 Tim suggested that this was so because the officials were wary of Industry bringing up a legal challenge 
against the Department in a similar manner that they had done in the US. 
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are] going to be aggregated, on spurious bases.” Some of Tim’s colleagues, enraged by 
the Industry representatives’ refusal to change the Guidance, allowed themselves to raise 
voice and personally attack their counterparts in stakeholder meetings. Tim admitted that 
these expressions of anger were a step too far, but also recognised that the anger was 
legitimate. I could see he was angry too, many weeks after Jo Swinson and purdah had 
left the dispute in suspension. His anger was not just a reaction to how the Guidance 
hijacked the campaigners’ aspirations about project-level reporting. Rather, it had to do 
with their moral expectations of respect and recognition resulting from the sociality of 
collaboration and dispute. 
 
What Tim found most reprehensible about the corporate lobbyists’ actions, was their 
repetition of the same “defeated’’ arguments, which for him demonstrated their blatant 
disregard for rational debate. Because if one’s statements had been proven false, he 
reasoned, how could they be repeated again, and again, in encounters with the same 
people, about essentially the same policy? And if earlier the campaigners could rebut the 
Industry’s lobbying in other fora, there was little they could do with the Guidance because 
of how it had been construed as a piece of Industry’s self-regulation into which the 
officials refused to intervene. The Guidance so infuriated the campaigners because it 
symbolised their lack of power vis-a-vis the corporate lobbyists who evidently neither 
shared the campaigners’ vision of collaboration (in which a defeated argument could not 
be brought up again), nor recognised the validity of campaigners’ own claims. From Tim’s 
point of view, it was only just that the discussion about the Guidance could no longer be 
contained within the limits of polite debate in the collaborative working group. In this 
logic, conflict was the only way out because the corporate representatives had rejected 
the very relational premise of the debate—the understanding that one ought to make 
compromises if proven wrong.  
 
This was why the campaigners from PWYP UK found it increasingly meaningless to 
continue the negotiations with the Industry, and to participate in the meetings of the 
collaborative working group. The very fact that they would still have to be negotiating 
about project definition and exemptions after having repeatedly “won the argument” 
about them, was for Tim a testament to the failure of collaboration. For this reason, Luke, 
a senior colleague of Tim’s, did not think that the campaigners’ boycott would have any 
effect on their relationship with the Industry:  
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The relationship with the Industry has always been… in a mess, anyway. On the 
one hand, we’re having to collaborate on the EITI, on the other, we’re being totally 
shafted on the Guidance process. So that’s what that [boycott] was about. [It was 
about] Saying: “Hang on, we can’t have… we’re not going to pretend this is one 
thing when it’s… when it’s the same discussion with the same people”. I think it 
does get to a point where we have to just… call out what we see as a double 
standard! 
 
For Luke, ceasing to negotiate with the corporate representatives and boycotting the UK 
EITI was not only a political necessity, but a moral one: it had become a matter of the 
campaigners’ personal ethical consistency. Likewise, Tim insisted that the problem with 
the Industry Guidance had transcended the acceptable limits of difference of opinion, and 
become a moral problem of personal dignity and respect for self and others:  
The reason for [the boycott of the MSG] was that things had come to such a point 
with the Guidance, that it was just a total breakdown of good faith and trust 
between us and the people who were representing the Industry constituency. 
Because they’re the same people having these debates with us on the Guidance. 
We thought we were treated in, really, a not good-faith way by the Industry people 
with regards to the Guidance… So it was very… very hard to sit in the room on 
EITI and [work] on a multi-stakeholder report when you know that they have 
taken you for a ride on the Guidance. That’s how it felt… So this was a point at 
which we said, okay, right… is there a limit to how we can wear different hats 
here? […] That was the last straw. We didn’t feel we were [treated correctly] on 
the Guidance. 
 
From this perspective, it was morally necessary for the campaigners to refuse to negotiate 
about the Guidance and put an ultimatum to the officials. Tim was sorry for how their 
decision to boycott the UK EITI alienated the officials, who, he recognised, were caught 
in the cross-fire. But he also thought that the boycott was inevitable if the campaigners 
were to preserve their moral credibility vis-a-vis what they perceived as utter disrespect.  
 
Seen as a result of a longer history of interactions between the “same people” in the NGOs 
and the companies, the Guidance conflict did not appear as the campaigners’ failure to 
collaborate and make compromises. If anything, in Tim’s story it was the Industry 
representatives who had failed to do so because they did not honour the unwritten rules 
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of debate and good faith. Implicit in Tim’s narrative of the conflict was the campaigners’ 
expectation to be treated with respect—an expectation that had arisen from the sociality 
of their collaborative encounters with the corporate representatives, but which, they 
thought, was ultimately not honoured. Crucially, he and others saw their participation in 
the BIS’ working group as part of a long-term adversarial relations with the Industry, and 
it was from this sociality of the transparency “game”, that their expectations had emerged. 
Invested in seeing the UK mandatory reporting policy as a part of a wider context of the 
“movement towards global transparency” (Andrew Naumin’s phrase, see Chapter Five), 
the campaigners could not but attribute the responsibility for the Guidance conflict to the 
Industry.  
 
Tim’s explanation of the conflict reveals the importance of moral expectations to the 
practices and relations of collective governance. As he talked about the campaigners’ 
decision to boycott the UK EITI, I thought about how different it all looked from the 
perspective of the civil servants at BIS. They had no stakes in seeing it as a part of a long 
history of antagonistic encounters, many of which had happened outside of the UK, and 
did not directly concern British policy. Charlotte and Catherine were preoccupied with 
getting the mandatory reporting regulations off the ground. Collaborative work on the 
policy entangled them in relationships with their stakeholders which they wanted to 
maintain. I could see why they were so frustrated by the NGOs’ resistance to the 
seemingly minor technical detail in the Guidance. The detail could not but appear 
insignificant, and the resistance irrational, as long as the officials remained focused on 
the immediate context of their professional goals and everyday interactions with the 
stakeholders.  
 
I have sought to explain why the conflict made sense, and was morally justified, for Tim 
and his colleagues. Charlotte and Catherine, too, framed the conflict as a moral crisis, but 
this framing did a very different kind of ethical work for them. In the next section I explore 
why they understood it so differently from the campaigners, and what their explanations 
of the conflict can tell us about their responses to the challenges and effects of collective 
governance on practices of policy-making.  
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The conflict from the officials’ perspective 
Differences of interpretation 
Several months after the abrupt end of the Guidance dispute, Charlotte and I sat down to 
talk about it in the office. Charlotte was bitter that things had turned out this way. I 
remembered how stressed she had been before purdah about the relentless stream of 
campaigning and her superiors’ conflicting demands. Although she insisted that she had 
“got over” her “disappointment” with the NGO campaigners, it was evident both from 
her implicit praise of the harmonious stakeholder collaboration before the dispute, and 
her painstaking attempts to distance herself from the conflict during our conversations, 
that some of that disappointment still lingered. I asked her about why the conflict had 
happened. She explained:  
Now, I think in retrospect, what happened there, was that Civil Society’s 
expectations of what working with the Industry meant, were different from what 
the Industry organisations had actually committed to do. And I think that’s 
partly—I know you’re after the specifics, but I think it’s quite important to make 
this more general point first—I think it’s because, to a certain extent, the Industry 
organisations have become victims of the collaborative approach that Government 
had taken with the organisations… And, I think, because of that [approach], the 
NGOs expected that the collaboration would continue into the work on the 
Industry Guidance.  
 
On an earlier occasion, Charlotte had told me how her collaborative work with the 
stakeholders had led her to develop relationships with them, and built trust among them. 
Recall my discussion of the relations of collaboration as a form of exchange—exchange 
that, I suggested, led to expectations of reciprocity and recognition. Now Charlotte was 
suggesting that it was these expectations, taken too far, that had undermined the Guidance 
negotiations. Her NGO stakeholders, she said, had failed to see the limits of collaboration 
and expected that the Industry would cooperate, where they did not have to. 
 
Catherine, with whom I spoke about the dispute around the same time as with Charlotte, 
also thought that the campaigners’ expectation of extensive collaboration made it difficult 
for them to compromise about the Guidance. She blamed this on their misunderstanding 
of the terms on which they related to the Industry in the working group. Glossing this 
misunderstanding as a matter of differences of opinions, she recalled:  
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We had a meeting [in late February] with the Industry and Civil Society where 
they both present their views. It got quite heated. [John Doe from an NGO] got 
very upset—visibly angry. And I thought, Industry [representatives] were quite 
measured, and [settled on] quite a lot… and Gary Dowell, from Global Witness, 
got angry too, saying: “We’ve been arguing for this [mandatory, project-level 
reporting] for 10 years, and now you’re trying to undermine it with this shoddy 
Guidance!..” They were quite aggressive in the meeting and they said: “This is 
the starting point, we want this to be a starting point with the Guidance, and you 
have work with us, we have to agree.” And… I don’t think anybody had ever 
said that the Guidance had to be agreed with the Civil Society. That’s a 
difference of interpretations. Clearly, somewhere along the line, Civil Society 
[had] thought that they would be agreeing the Guidance with the Industry. 
Whereas Industry didn’t [think so].  
  
Similarly to Charlotte, Catherine insisted that it was Industry’s Guidance: a document 
they had prepared for their own constituency, and shared for comments with the NGOs 
only out of their good will. Stressing that the campaigners had misunderstood the 
Industry’s intention, and abused their benevolence, Catherine implied that the problem 
was nothing else but a matter of subjective differences of interpretation. This view 
ignored the differences of power between the corporate and NGO stakeholders (e.g. the 
fact that Shell, should things come to that point, could afford to bring up and pay for a 
legal challenge against a government policy, whereas the campaigners could not), as well 
as the broader context of their competition for political influence on the government. But 
narrow as it was, this framing of the conflict focused Catherine’s account on the problems 
of infelicitous interactions and misunderstandings within the bounded context of the 
working group. As I want to suggest, seeing the problem as inherent to this interactional 
context (rather than, say, a transnational transparency “game”), had consequences for how 
the officials understood the moral implications of the dispute. 
 
The difference of legal opinions about the Guidance’s (re-)definition of the project was a 
similar matter: “It can be interpreted the way Industry interpreted it…”—she said: “It’s 
not incorrect. It [also] might be interpreted as far as Civil Society wanted to go; but it’s 
not—our lawyers feel that [Industry’s interpretation] is not incorrect. Another QC 
[lawyer] might think it is, and yet another might think it isn’t.” These being mere 
interpretations subject to legal debates, the appropriate position for her and Charlotte, as 
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government representatives, was to stay out of such discussions. The government’s role, 
she said, was to make law, not to interpret it: “it’s not for us to do that. […] The law has 
been made, it’s there to be interpreted [by others].”  
 
From Catherine’s perspective, the campaigners’ attempts to get the officials to intervene 
into the drafting of the Guidance were inappropriate, because it was not the government’s 
role to stand within the field of relative differences of opinion (see Chapter Seven). The 
campaigners, however, did not think theirs was an interpretation—for them, it was a fact 
that the Guidance was incorrect, but neither the BIS lawyers, nor Charlotte and Catherine, 
shared this view. This perspective on the conflict as a matter of different interpretations 
led the BIS officials to seek distance from the dispute, appropriate to their view of 
themselves as an impartial authority. The officials’ moral commitment here was to 
objectivity, as they saw it, but from the campaigners’ point of view, officials’ abstention 
from action confirmed that they were biased towards the Industry; this made them 
suspicious that the bureaucrats were secretly negotiating with the Industry.252 Yet bias was 
exactly what the officials were trying to avoid by not intervening on either side. “So how 
do you bring that together? How?”, asked rhetorically Catherine, saying that she saw no 
reasonable way out of the dispute. 
 
The only way out, it seemed, was to overrule either the NGOs’ or the Industry’s demands 
with a clear decision that asserted the department’s authority vis-a-vis the stakeholders—
just as the campaigners had demanded. Doing so, however, could ruin the department’s 
relationships with the powerful Industry stakeholders, whom the officials did not want to 
alienate because of a possible legal action of the corporations against BIS. Moreover, any 
intervention would likely contradict the very principles of collaborative policy-making 
on which the relationships with the stakeholders were based. Projecting their own sense 
of impasse, Charlotte and Catherine, and their colleagues in the team who listened to their 
regular briefings about the extractives, lamented the campaigners’ insistence on BIS’ 
intervention as “irrational”. 
Obligations and complaints  
Catherine also suggested that if the dispute was a matter of interpretive differences, then 
it was inappropriate for the campaigners to insist that their interpretation was the correct 
                                                 
252 This suspicion led Bernard from Global Witness to submit a Freedom of Information request to BIS, for 
detail of all meetings between the officials and representatives of large oil companies.  
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one. They could only do so at the expense of others’ views. This contradicted the spirit of 
collaboration, according to which each party was expected to take account of the relative 
positions and differences, make compromises to adjust, or resign if these were impossible. 
On the one hand, this was an ultimate failure to collaborate (a failure that, as Charlotte 
suggested, could have resulted from excessive expectations engendered by collaboration 
itself). On the other, this failure indexed the campaigners’ disregard for obligations to 
their counterparts, incurred in the process of collaborative exchange. 
 
Remembering the misunderstandings and disagreements among the stakeholders, 
Catherine occasionally punctuated her story with asides about the manner of the 
stakeholders’ interactions. Just as she had been upset about the campaigners’ behaviour 
during the conflict, now, too, she found their actions “aggressive”, in contrast with the 
“measured” conduct of the corporate representatives. These complaints expressed 
expectations of civility, tempered argumentation and reciprocal compromise that 
stemmed as much from the cultural form of the meeting (Schwartzman 1989; Yarrow 
forthcoming), as from the spirit of collaborative work that the officials wanted to uphold. 
The campaigners’ departure from these norms during the conflict, demonstrated to 
Catherine that they had broken both the unwritten rules of collaboration, and the unspoken 
moral expectations arising from these.  
 
In Charlotte’s opinion, the campaigners’ threat to boycott the UK EITI was the apotheosis 
of this moral crisis of collaboration. When I asked her whether the campaigners’ actions 
had disrupted trust and relations253 within the working group, she gave me an extensive 
reply, stuttering and pausing for reflection:  
I think, I think it’s unfortunate that civil society have chosen that route, I think 
that…. [Pause] Well, you know… [pause] It is… What can you say… I think that 
[some representatives of] Industry had fairly low expectations of Civil Society’s 
behaviour. They certainly felt that Civil Society won’t ever be going to be satisfied 
or you know, work with them, so… Even through this whole process, a lot of it 
was to encourage people to work together and see some benefit from it. So I think, 
that sort of behaviour… especially when it was about an unrelated… it was an 
unrelated argument, [the disagreement about the Guidance] wasn’t an EITI 
argument… I know that it’s the same people, but it wasn’t an EITI argument. […] 
                                                 
253 Elizabeth used these words to describe what had happened. 
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I think it does set it back a bit—it sets back that relationship. Because, you know, 
when you disagree with people, you can’t just sort of… Well, adults generally 
don’t sort of behave like that, and sort of refuse to speak to people in any venue 
whatsoever. It’s not very professional, really. […] So they basically just chose to 
turn their back on EITI because they were having a problem with the Industry 
Guidance on the Directive— it’s not a way to negotiate, it’s not a way to build 
that relationship… You can say that you aren’t happy, that you don’t agree with 
people without actually refusing to talk to them. […] Certainly the Industry people 
I’ve spoken to about it, seem to feel that it’s, “What else can you expect of them?” 
[…] And then I sort of think, that’s a set-back too, you know. I mean, we’ve tried 
[to make collaboration work]… If you don’t respect the other people around the 
table, then you know you [can’t have a conversation]. (My emphasis — TF.) 
 
Evocative and communicative, Charlotte’s silences and pauses only highlighted that she 
felt that the campaigners’ boycott was damaging to the relationships in the working group, 
which she so valued. For her, the boycott was an irrational (“not adult”) failure to engage 
in an appropriate form of negotiation. Whereas the campaigners’ explanations focused on 
a wider context of the transparency “game”, Charlotte framed the conflict as an outcome 
of the relational context of negotiations. As a result, she could not accept that it could 
have resulted from rational political calculations, let alone from a sense of moral wrong 
that Tim had sought to communicate. For her, the cause of the dispute lay not so much in 
a substantive disagreement or incompatible political agendas, as in a moral flaw of the 
campaigners’ characters. This flaw, she implied, manifested itself in their lack of respect 
for the expectations of others, inability to behave appropriately and engage in rational 
argumentation.254 She conceded that it was the campaigners’ job to be “loud” and create 
spectacular publicity, but even this was to emphasise that the boycott and “aggressive” 
campaigning were not a result of legitimate, politically situated disagreements 
underpinned by a disparity in means of influence, but a trait that characterised who 
campaigners were as people and professionals.  
 
Although Catherine and Charlotte did not dispute that it was the Industry’s refusal to 
change the Guidance that had provoked the campaigners, they still placed the 
responsibility for the conflict with the NGOs. Catherine told me how the Industry 
                                                 
254 Granted, Charlotte attributed some of this view to members of the Industry and thus distanced herself 
from it. But from other occasions it was understandable that she herself thought as much. 
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members had changed their position and made small compromises to appease officials 
and the campaigners, whereas the campaigners had not. If the stakeholders’ group 
functioned through a process of exchange, then according to the officials’ logic, the 
campaigners had failed to properly participate in this exchange by reciprocating a 
compromise: this was a moral failure. The comment above demonstrates the officials’ 
ethical commitment to a particular process of negotiation, underscored by an ideological 
commitment to the broader ‘public good’ of appropriately balancing the lobbying interests 
of the stakeholders.255 Because the campaigners had insisted on their being right in a 
manner that upset the officials’ balancing, and because the campaigners’ behaviour 
undermined the due course of the process of negotiations, Charlotte and Catherine 
thought that the conflict was ultimately their fault. 
In place of conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed how the UK extractives’ mandatory reporting policy was 
affected by a dynamic of collaboration and conflict between the corporate and NGO 
stakeholders, in order to explore the relational and moral dimensions of collective 
governance. I have demonstrated that concerns about morality of social relations were not 
coincidental to the practices of collective rule at BIS, but constitutive of them. 
Contributing to anthropological studies of governance that have explored complexities of 
relations of political ordering between state and non-state actors (e.g. Anders 2009; 
Chalfin 2010; Ferguson 1990; Gupta 2012; Li 2007), my ethnography suggests that power 
is not all there is to governance. In line with recent ethnographic studies of bureaucracies 
(Bear 2015; Bear and Mathur 2015; Brown 2016; John 2009, 2015), it shows that to focus 
on power only, would be to miss something very important about the way in which 
collective governance operates within, and challenges, structures of government. 
 
I have argued that moral expectations of fair treatment, recognition and respect, informed 
how the BIS officials and campaigners navigated and made sense of relationships of 
collective governance. These expectations, however, led these people to very different 
interpretations of the Guidance conflict. Both parties described the dispute as a moral 
crisis of collaboration, precipitated by one party’s failure to honour their obligations and 
behave how others expected them to. But if for the campaigners these obligations and 
expectations inhered in the longer history of their relationships with the representatives 
                                                 
255 See also Chapter Seven on the question of balancing between the stakeholders’ perspectives. 
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of the Industry, for the officials they resulted from the “interaction order” (Goffman 1983) 
of the collaborative working group itself.  
 
In other words, at stake was the commitment to two different visions of ethics, two 
different versions of what a good form of collaboration was. If for the campaigners this 
was a commitment to a particular perspective on transactions between them and the 
Industry representatives, for the officials it was a commitment to a certain process of 
negotiation. Tim claimed that the conflict had to be seen in a “wider context”. In a way, 
however, the officials’ narrative can be also seen as invoking a wider context, albeit 
differently construed: not a context of an international transparency “game”, but one of 
the bureaucratic ideas about impartiality and proper relations with stakeholders.  
 
Both narratives invoked visions of an open and consensual decision-making process, in 
which there were ethically right and wrong ways of acting, but they did so differently, 
and therefore attributed responsibility for the conflict to different people.  
 
We have seen, through Tim Craigs’ narrative of the dispute, that the officials’ way of 
talking about the conflict as a moral problem was neither a necessary, nor the only 
possible one. I have suggested that the campaigners were invested in seeing the conflict 
in a larger context, because that was the context in which they understood their own work, 
and its political and moral significance. But what kind of commitment informed the 
officials’ focus on the interactional context of the Guidance negotiations? What was at 
stake for them in this explanation? Addressing these questions, this section brings 
together the main themes and arguments of this chapter in order to understand what the 
case of the Guidance conflict, and the campaigners’ and officials’ explanations of it, can 
tell us about the effects of collective governance on relations and practices of government.  
 
Tim depicted the campaigners’ anger and their aggressive tactics as a justified and, indeed, 
inevitable reaction to the moral failures of the corporate lobbyists. In a similar way, when 
the officials blamed the Civil Society for the conflict, they not only attributed 
responsibility for it, but also defined the limits of their own agency in the dispute. 
Charlotte’s redescription of the conflict first as campaigners’ failure to collaborate, and 
then as their flaw of character, displaced the problem of the dispute from the dimension 
of situated political differences, into the dimension of relative interpretations, and then 
onto the terrain of absolute, a-contextual (for a lack of better terms) moral difference. The 
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effect of this redescription was to erase the officials’ agency from the narrative of the 
conflict: first, it suggested that there was little that the officials could do within the 
collaborative framework which granted legitimacy to different interpretations of the law; 
and then, it made them appear even more powerless in the face of the irrational boycott 
that in any case was not a response to a particular political problem, but a manifestation 
of the campaigners’ belligerent character. (Because: whatever you do, “what else could 
you expect of them?”) This was a way to state that the solution to the conflict was well 
beyond the reach of acceptable means of interventions available to officials. 
 
There is an interesting parallel between the civil servants’ own construction of their 
agency as limited, and the manner in which collective governance of the policy affected 
the practices and relations of government, restricting Charlotte and Catherine in how they 
could go about their work.  
 
Promising to reduce opposition to the mandatory reporting policy by incorporating the 
stakeholders into the making of the regulations, collaboration in fact made the civil 
servant vulnerable to stakeholders’ agendas, interests, and conflict. As long as officials 
wanted to perpetuate their collaboration with the stakeholders (once started, ending it 
would cause much criticism for the government), they had to carefully navigate these 
people’s complexly articulated sensitivities about the policy. Collaboration also 
engendered expectations which further affected the relationships among the participants 
in the working group. 
 
These political, relational, and moral constraints of collaboration did not reduce the 
bureaucrats’ authority per se. Rather, they made the context of policy-making strikingly 
more complex. Once the officials invited the representatives of transnational companies 
and NGOs, they could do little about the concerns and adversarial histories that these 
people brought with them into the meeting rooms at BIS. These backgrounds, of which 
the officials were not always aware, shaped the stakeholders’ interactions in ways that the 
civil servants could not affect. As my description of the competing lobbying claims and 
orders from the Cabinet Office suggests, stakeholders’ access to, and strategic use of, the 
different institutions and levels of the government, added to the complexity of policy-
making, and put further pressure on the officials. All this changed how exactly the 
officials could exercise their authority vis-a-vis the stakeholders, making it necessary to 
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negotiate decisions, and calculate and factor in stakeholders’ agendas much more than 
would have been necessary otherwise. 
 
In this context, we can interpret the officials’ narrative of the conflict as a response to the 
ways in with their capacity to act and make sense of their work, were diminished by the 
new complexity of collective governance. The appealing moral simplicity of Charlotte’s 
and Catherine’s explanations of the conflict stand in stark contrast to this complexity. The 
officials’ explanations focused on a very narrow interactional context, and referred to 
expectations and obligations arising from this context, and this allowed them to clearly 
attribute the blame for the dispute, and redefine their own agency in it.  
 
Unlike Charlotte and Catherine, who located the problems with the Guidance within the 
order of situated interactions in the meetings, in Tim’s version of the events, the 
antagonism had a history, and this history unfolded on a different scale than the officials’ 
recollections. And while similarly to the officials Tim saw the dispute in a distinctively 
moral light—as a breakdown of collaboration and “good faith”—the differences of scale 
and perspective gave Tim’s story markedly different ethical connotations. His 
synecdochical depiction of the conflict as a part of a wider adversarial context, or “game”, 
suggested that the Guidance dispute had originated in events and concerns far beyond the 
control of the BIS officials. It was perhaps because of this that the civil servants focused 
their explanations in the context of interactions directly available for their evaluation, 
without recognising the many ways in which they lacked control over the Guidance 
conflict, and ultimately, their policy.  
 
In the next chapter, I will focus on the attempts of the officials in the UK EITI Secretariat 
to prevent the Industry Guidance conflict form spilling over onto their policy. We already 
know from this chapter that these attempts were futile. Exploring them, however, can 
teach us something important about the role of official formality in maintaining the 
relational infrastructures of policy on which the implementation of the UK EITI relied, 
and which were threatened by the Industry Guidance conflict. 
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Chapter Seven 
Maintaining relationships: impartiality and consensus in the 
UK EITI 
 
In the Introduction to this dissertation, I describe the EITI as a participatory policy 
organised around a set of collective forms, such as the multi-stakeholder group and the 
three stakeholder constituencies. Mandated by the EITI Standard, these forms establish a 
relational infrastructure that frames and enables negotiations among the representatives 
of many organisations, who bring in their own interests and agendas into this arena of 
collective governance (see Chapter Five). As a condition of successful validation of 
national EITI implementation, the Standard also requires that deliberation within the 
multi-stakeholder group happen by consensus, and that all constituencies continuously 
participate in the policy. This structurally gears the implementation of the EITI towards 
the maintenance of relationships among stakeholders.  
 
This description is a rough simplification, but the point I want to make is that the 
implementation of the EITI, as I observed it in London, is explicitly imagined and enacted 
as a process of negotiation of the divergent interests of the three constituencies. In so far 
as the EITI Standard prescribes a blueprint not only for what a national EITI report should 
consist of, but also what the social infrastructure of the policy must be, relational 
complexity is built into the very structures of policy-making. In a sense, it is both a 
condition and an objective of the policy to establish and maintain such social forms as the 
multi-stakeholder group, with its constituencies and meetings of different kinds. The 
sociality of the (UK) EITI is further complicated by the explicit requirement of constant 
and equal participation of all constituencies, without which collective decisions will not 
be deemed valid. The voluntary nature of the EITI in Britain meant that deliberation 
happened by consensus, and so participants of the UK EITI meetings were always busy 
negotiating not only the EITI rules, but also relationships with each other. It was obvious 
to all participants, that the success of the policy depended on these relationships. 
 
What happens, then, when disagreements and unruly sociality of collective governance 
threaten to unmake the possibility of consensus by undermining the relationships that 
hold the multi-stakeholder group together? This is the ethnographic problem that this 
chapter examines. I approach it from the perspective of the civil servants at the UK EITI 
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Secretariat, whose job it was to mediate between the stakeholders, manage their 
relationships among each other, and support the multi-stakeholder group as a whole.  
 
The previous chapter has examined the case of the Industry Guidance conflict, exploring 
how a collaborative space of the extractives working group became an arena of a dispute 
that at the end of March 2015 led to the NGOs’ boycott of the UK EITI. Throughout 
February and March, I watched the conflict at a distance, from the offices of the Corporate 
Governance team. I sought to understand what was going on through Charlotte’s and 
Catherine’s comments about it in the office and occasional discussions at the fortnightly 
meetings of the Corporate Governance team. Elizabeth, Aimée and Stewart from the UK 
EITI Secretariat did the same. And as the dispute developed and the prospect of its 
resolution became more unlikely, the Secretariat officials grew increasingly anxious, 
discussing far-fetched scenarios of how this conflict could affect the UK EITI, and 
drawing up contingency plans. 
 
Although the Reports on Payments to Governments Regulations and the UK EITI were 
formally separate as policies, they were historically, conceptually and socially 
interconnected, in particular through the participation of the same corporate and NGO 
stakeholders. Initially, this interconnection had not been problematic (in fact, it was 
sometimes desirable for the BIS officials, and I will describe how, in this chapter). But as 
the Guidance dispute threatened to undermine relationships among the stakeholders in 
the context of the extractives’ mandatory reporting policy, Elizabeth and her staff sought 
to prevent the conflict from “contaminating” the UK EITI and undoing the ties of 
collaboration that held the multi-stakeholder group together.  
 
From the previous chapter, we know that their attempts were futile. In this chapter, 
however, I take them as an ethnographic entry point to explore the larger problem of how 
the staff of the Secretariat maintained the relational infrastructures on which the 
implementation of the UK EITI relied. As Chapter Five demonstrated, the design of the 
(UK) EITI created uncertainties around its implementation in the UK. Some of these 
uncertainties had to do with the translation of the Standard’s requirements into national 
UK EITI rules. Others, however, flowed from the fact that the collaborative set-up of the 
policy brought together representatives of many organisations with multiple interests and 
agendas, engendering complex social relationships which overflowed the formal 
dimensions of collaboration. (Thus, Chapter Five described how the NGO stakeholders 
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in the UK sought to turn the UK EITI into an arena and a tool of transnational 
campaigning interventions, thereby informally subverting the official aims of the policy.) 
Because most of the work on the policy had to be done within this complicated and often 
unpredictable social context, and this work had to be done within a defined period of time, 
Elizabeth and her staff at the Secretariat sought to contain and govern the unruly sociality 
of multi-stakeholder collaboration.  
 
Exploring how these officials sought to order this sociality, and maintain the relationships 
necessary to keep the UK EITI going, this chapter sheds light on the role of formality in 
organising the social world of policy-making. From the previous chapters, the reader 
might have realised that this world was in constant flux, and that the many agendas of its 
protagonists subverted and undermined the policies that had to be governed through 
collaboration. A question to which I have paid less attention, perhaps, is how order and 
stability are achieved in this dynamic world (Alexander 2001: 467). To address this 
question, I analyse how officials at the Secretariat dealt with the threat of the Guidance 
conflict engulfing the UK EITI. Their attempts, I suggest, were focused on keeping the 
two policies separate by emphasising that the positional identities of the stakeholders in 
the context of the UK EITI meetings were different from those in the context of the 
extractives working group. Another important tactic was to attempt to control what was 
said publicly in formal meetings. As such, these attempts point to a more general 
imperative for the Secretariat and its stakeholders, namely, avoiding divisive arguments 
in the context of formal assemblies. This reveals a repertoire of formal practices to which 
the civil servants were committed in their work. I analyse two groups of these practice. 
One concerns impartiality, detachment, and keeping to official roles and formal 
boundaries of policies when there was a danger of relationships getting blurred by 
conflict. The other concerns practices that bring people together in formal meetings in 
such ways as to produce consensus, avoid conflict, and consolidate their relationships as 
participants of official process of collective governance of the UK EITI.  
 
Anthropologists studying policy and project work in national and international 
bureaucracies, diplomatic bodies and non-governmental organisations, have 
demonstrated the importance of concerns about organisational form, processes of 
coordination and replication, and the non-linear relationship between policy and practice 
(Fresia 2013; Holm Vohnsen 2011; Lea 2008; Mosse 2005; Neumann 2012; Riles 2001). 
Building on this work, I suggest that the focus on management of disputes reveals 
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something more general about the social world of policy-making that I observed: namely, 
the way in which the work of the Secretariat and the meetings among the UK EITI 
stakeholders, reflexively focus on enacting and maintaining the very matrix of formal 
relations through which the implementation takes place (Lea 2008; Mosse 2005). The UK 
EITI is interesting in this context because the formal organisation of the policy (on which 
below) makes social coordination and maintenance of relationships into explicit 
objectives of the policy on par with the substantive work that this coordination enables.  
 
Beginning with the Secretariat officials’ responses to the threat of the NGO boycott of 
the UK EITI, I suggest that when faced with a threat of open conflict among stakeholders 
in meetings, the Secretariat officials sought to avoid mentioning disagreements and 
disputes, or denied their knowledge thereof. Although one might interpret this 
communicative strategy as organisational concealment and opacity (as some of my 
informants would do), I argue for a different interpretation. Namely, I posit that these 
strategies should be understood as officials’ commitment to bureaucratic 
professionalism—in this case, by insisting on enacting formal arrangements prescribed 
by the structure of the UK EITI, and maintaining detachment that was key for 
organisational objectivity. Situating my ethnographic case in a broader context of how 
arguments are dealt within, and through, the formal organisation of stakeholder meetings, 
I demonstrate that avoidance of conflicts and maintenance of social relationships among 
stakeholders, can be traced to the requirements put on the implementation of the UK EITI 
by its very organisation around an infrastructure of collective forms, voluntary 
participation and consensus deliberation.  
 
I begin with an ethnographic vignette that demonstrates one strategy through which 
officials at the UK EITI Secretariat sought to deal with the threat of the conflict. I then 
situate this vignette in a broader analysis of the UK EITI meetings. I conclude with a 
reflection on the importance of maintaining social relationships, in the context of a policy 
that puts multi-lateral negotiations at the centre of its implementation. 
Keeping the policies separate 
On the morning of Wednesday 25 February 2015, Charlotte Reid-Wills came by to the 
part of the office where Elizabeth, Aimée, Stewart and I usually sat, to talk with us about 
a meeting. In two days, Charlotte said, she and Catherine would be hosting a meeting 
between the representatives of oil companies and lobby groups, and the members of the 
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Publish What You Pay coalition. The purpose of the meeting was to negotiate a way out 
of the Industry Guidance dispute, which had reached the point where both parties refused 
to scale back their demands and to recognise each other’s requests as valid. For the first 
time, the senior management of the NGOs and companies would attend a meeting of the 
working group meeting. Charlotte wanted someone from the Secretariat team to come 
along to take formal notes. She said:  “I don’t want detailed notes… Just bullets, to cover 
myself.” Bullets were bullet point notes. Unlike the UK EITI meetings, which were 
usually documented in detail, most assemblies of the working group went unrecorded. 
This facilitated the negotiations, and the fact that Charlotte wanted to have an official 
record of the meeting suggested she was anticipating the gathering to be confrontational: 
a record of who said what could be used as a protection against possible legal or 
disciplinary action, should either side in the conflict decide to turn against the officials.256 
 
Charlotte looked at all three of us, awaiting an answer. Aimée kept shtum and so did I, 
difficult as this was. I was curious about the meeting, and it could be a chance to observe 
negotiations that many informants had told me about, but to which I had had no access. 
My facial expression must have given away my interest, for as Charlotte spoke, I felt 
Elizabeth’s heavy look on me, trying to dissuade me from saying anything. “So,—
Charlotte finally asked,—would Aimée or you, Elizabeth, be able to come?”  
 
“I think,—Elizabeth said calmly,—it’s important to keep the EITI separate from [the 
Regulations].” It was better, she implied, if someone else than her or Aimée went. This 
(keeping the policies separate) was something she had already said on multiple occasions 
when Charlotte or Catherine mentioned the Industry Guidance.   
 
“And… What about Taras?”—asked Charlotte. She couldn’t see that Elizabeth, fixed with 
her eyes on me, was slightly shaking her head. Elizabeth responded before I had a chance 
to: “But it’s your day off on Friday, isn’t it?” 
 
It was, indeed, and so I had to give up on the idea of observing the meeting. Charlotte 
went off to ask someone else for the favour, and bemused, I quietly asked Elizabeth to 
explain what it was all about. “I don’t know! I don’t want to know! Because when Global 
                                                 
256 The bullets, like many forms of official documentation (Gitleman 2014: 2), aimed at a possible adverse 
future (cf. Strathern 2006), in which they could serve as evidence of the meetings’ proceedings. 
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Witness campaigners come up to me at an EITI meeting asking how’s the progress on 
[the Regulations], I can say,—she shrugged her shoulders,—I can say, ‘I don’t know!’” 
 
The incident perplexed me. It seemed paradoxical at first: Elizabeth’s will to ignorance 
appeared unusual for a civil servant, and in fact seemed to contradict both her actions in 
other contexts, and her idea about what it meant to be a good civil servant. Did Elizabeth 
really not know? What could her knowledge or ignorance do if demonstrated to the 
stakeholders, and how did that relate to her desire to keep the Industry Guidance conflict 
separate from UK EITI? Finally, why would she want to keep separate policies that she 
herself had deliberately sought to align earlier? These questions open up the incident to 
analysis, and I begin with the last one. 
Alignment and separation 
Before the Industry Guidance conflict, the overlap between the extractives’ mandatory 
reporting policy (the Regulations) and the UK EITI was never a problem, except that it 
caused regular confusion among officials and their ministers. (So much so that when 
writing submission to ministers, Catherine and Elizabeth would often include 
disambiguation clauses explaining the differences between the policies.) As I have 
suggested, this overlap had several dimensions.  
 
Historically, the policies originated from the same campaign of Global Witness. In many 
ways, the NGO’s continued advocacy for the mandatory reporting policy was a result of 
how the UK government officials had transformed this idea and turned into what became 
the EITI (see Chapters Three and Four). Conceptually, therefore, there were many 
similarities between the requirements of the two policies—a result of both the historical 
connection between them, and deliberate attempts of officials drafting the reporting rules 
in the Accounting Directive, and the UK Regulations, to “align” them with the EITI 
Standard where possible. In the UK, such alignment was to a great extent a result of the 
government’s approach to corporate regulation. Most extractive companies operating in 
the UK, would have to report under both the UK EITI and the Regulations. Understanding 
regulations and disclosures as a “burden” on companies, BIS officials and their corporate 
stakeholders wanted the reporting rules and forms of both policies to be as similar as 
possible. This would make it cheaper for companies to comply with the policies. The 
NGOs supported this, because as Tim Craigs suggested (see Chapter Six), having the 
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same information reported in the same way under different policies, allowed the 
campaigners to compare the data, and enhanced transparency.  
 
The BIS officials decided that because the Regulations were legally binding, and the UK 
EITI wasn’t, the latter would be aligned with the former where possible, and where the 
UK EITI multi-stakeholder group consented.257 As a result, the Regulations became a 
constant, and often contested, point of reference for all parties of the multi-stakeholder 
group.  
 
Whenever the Industry members of the MSG made implementation proposals for the UK 
EITI which the Civil Society saw as “weaker” than the Regulations, the Regulations were 
put in as an example: the UK EITI could not be weaker than the law. The Industry 
representatives similarly invoked the Regulations to object to Civil Society’s proposals 
which they perceived as excessively demanding or going beyond the minimum 
requirements of the EITI Standard. The corporate and the NGO stakeholders, and 
sometimes even Government representatives, used the Regulations as an exemplar to be 
replicated through the UK EITI rules, making the process of “alignment” into a subtle 
political struggle—one of the many that unfolded between NGO campaigners and 
representatives of extractive companies. 
 
Alignment was therefore a deliberate goal for the civil servants and a source of 
negotiation rhetoric for both the Industry and the Civil Society. Keeping the two policies 
separate in this way had never been a problem. But, as Chapter Six demonstrated, the 
overlap between the policies was also social. Both the UK EITI and the Regulations were 
implemented by civil servants from one team, and the head the team, Charlotte Reid-
Wills, chaired stakeholder meetings on both UK EITI and the Regulations. The 
stakeholders themselves were “the same people”. The officials and stakeholders 
participating in both policies understood that despite the overlaps and alignment, the two 
policies were officially distinct, which also meant that the formal roles played by officials 
and their stakeholders in the contexts of the two policies, were separate, too. Before the 
Guidance dispute, this separation of roles had been diligently observed. Now, Elizabeth 
was worried that the stakeholders would stop honouring this separation of positional 
                                                 
257 For example, the reporting threshold in UK EITI —the sum of company’s payments to the (UK) 
government that triggers the obligation to report—was chosen to be the same as the threshold dictated by 
the Regulations, at £ 86,000 per year. 
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identities. Similarly to Tim Craigs, they understood that “there [was] a limit to how long 
you can pretend you’re wearing different hats when meeting the same people.” 
 
Elizabeth once told me that in some other countries, notably Germany, EITI Secretariats 
were completely independent from government institutions, and staffed by consultants. 
In the UK, however, it was part of the Department for Business. Elizabeth was all too 
aware that her Industry and Civil Society stakeholders knew that she, Aimée and 
Stewart258 worked in the same office with Charlotte and Catherine. (Some of the 
stakeholders took it as an indication that the Secretariat’s staff were also working on the 
mandatory reporting policy, which was not the case.) In Elizabeth’s opinion, this put an 
extra emphasis on the need to demonstrate the Secretariat’s independence from the 
agenda of the department, and the Government constituency of the UK EITI more 
broadly. Let me explain this in more detail, because grasping the logic of representation 
and separation at work within the UK EITI, will help us better understand why it was 
important for Elizabeth to keep her policy separate from the Regulations/Industry 
Guidance, and why feigning ignorance was a way to do so. 
Difference and detachment  
The notion of independence was an important structuring ideal in the EITI Standard and 
Elizabeth’s work of implementing it. The Standard mandated that the Industry and the 
Civil Society constituencies had to remain independent of government influence, 
although it was not always clear whether that meant the influence of government officials, 
or representatives of the Government constituency. At the same time, the Secretariat had 
to be independent of the constituencies, in particular the Government, because its role 
was to support and represent the multi-stakeholder group as a whole, and not the interests 
of its constituent parties. For Elizabeth and her staff, this implied coordinating the work 
of the stakeholders without being seen as constantly favouring the interests of any of 
them. To do so, the officials sought to cultivate and perform certain forms of impartiality 
and detachment (Candea, Cook, Trundle and Yarrow 2015), which I want to briefly 
describe here. 
 
Elizabeth’s job (and so also Aimée’s and mine) was to mediate between different 
stakeholders and make sure that negotiations among the members of the multi-
                                                 
258 And me, too, in so far as I was formally attached to the UK EITI Secretariat for the duration of my 
fieldwork at BIS.  
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stakeholder group progressed and were not disrupted by disagreements. She was a skilful 
diplomat, and being “independent” for her meant performing impartiality—detaching 
herself from partial opinions and interests of any of the constituencies, while moving 
between them all the time. As a government employee, Elizabeth had to particularly 
carefully distance herself from appearing as a part of the Government constituency in the 
UK EITI meetings. This can be understood as a fulfilment of the bureaucratic ethos of 
neutrality and virtuous detachment that has historically characterised the British civil 
service (du Gay 2000), and which Elizabeth regularly emphasised in our conversations. 
But there was more to this than just bureaucratic neutrality: the Secretariat officials’ 
demonstrations of independence were inflected by their understanding of the MSG as a 
space of difference. 
 
It is worth recapitulating here that the multi-stakeholder group was explicitly imagined 
as a space of collective representation, and the constituencies were recognised as having 
their particular interests expressed and transcended in the process of collective 
governance (Rich and Moberg 2015). The members of the MSG therefore acted within 
the group not as private persons, but as holders of office259 or positional identities (Irvine 
1979) who spoke and acted on behalf of their constituencies. Differences of constituency 
interests were commonly expressed during the negotiations about how to translate this or 
that requirement of the Standard into policy (see Chapter Five for examples). Expressing 
an opinion about a matter under negotiation, the stakeholders were expected to do so in a 
way that reflected the stance of their constituency. (On several occasions, one confused 
Civil Society representative said something that was expected of an Industry stakeholder, 
and Elizabeth commented, in private, that this person was “doing the Industry’s job for 
them”.) 
 
The point here is that whereas the multi-stakeholder group was formally a space of 
difference, in order to remain independent and impartial, the Secretariat officials had to 
avoid being seen as representing any party in particular.260 This entailed, among other 
                                                 
259 Office here means not the structured office of a bureaucrat (du Gay 2008; Weber 1978), but rather the 
generic term denoting a persona (La Fontaine 1985), a social role or a status (Fortes 1962: 57), which are 
distinct from the “whole” person of the individual. 
260 As with bureaucratic formality (Alexander 2002; Stinchcombe 2001) and moral codes more generally 
(Laidlaw 2014: Chapter 4), the separation of the personas of the Secretariat and government official, which 
had to be made explicit in formal MSG meetings, was often muddled in other, less formal, contexts. 
Members of the Secretariat still took part in so-called “officials’ meetings” (preparatory meetings of all 
civil servants who attended MSG meetings) at which the officials coordinated their common position as a 
Government constituency. As far as I observed during my fieldwork, Industry and Civil Stakeholder did 
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things, not saying or doing anything that could be perceived as expressing or advancing 
the interests of one of the constituencies (unless such acts were explicitly marked as 
reporting the view of others, and made in the interest of mediation among the 
stakeholders—see below), because this was the prerogative of constituency 
representatives. 
 
Serving the MSG as a whole, the Secretariat officials had to demonstrate their impartiality 
by recognising, and giving equal attention to, the interests, problems and perspectives of 
the stakeholders. To borrow Paolo Quattrone’s term (2015: 428), it can be said that 
Elizabeth’s and her staff’s performances of impartiality were predicated on demonstrating 
“in-difference”—that is, on being “in the middle of difference” constituted by distinct 
interests and agendas of the constituencies. 
 
Because one of the main ways in which the Secretariat supported the MSG as a whole 
was by mediating among its members in situations of disagreement, being in the middle 
of difference often entailed moving between, reporting, and even arguing for, the 
stakeholders’ points of view (even when one did not agree with them261). This had to be 
done, however, in such a way that the mediator was not seen as consistently favouring 
either side in the negotiations. In this context, detachment from, and indifference to, 
constituency agendas, could be demonstrated through what Stewart referred to as 
“balancing” between the perspectives. This balancing, he said, entailed giving equal 
attention to the stakeholders, informally exchanging information with all of them (rather 
than just one party), etc., and its express purpose was to bring the stakeholders closer to 
consensus. In this sense, as Hannah Knox and Penny Harvey (2015) point out in relation 
to practices of detachment in engineering practice, indifference did not reduce social 
complexity—one could say, difference—, through bureaucratic rationality (cf. Graeber 
2012; Handelman 2004; Herzfeld 1992). Rather, it allowed the civil servants to navigate 
                                                 
not know what was discussed at officials’ meetings, nor did they know that the Secretariat staff participated 
in them. At MSG meetings, however, Elizabeth would stay aside and not demonstrate her support of the 
position of the Government Constituency that she would have been negotiating with other civil servants 
just a week earlier. Because there were not enough officials to represent the Government in the work on the 
UK EITI, Elizabeth sometimes had to participate in sub-group meetings, explicitly representing the 
Government. In such cases, she would at times change “hats” (as she said), and make clear when she spoke 
as a representative of the government constituency (or BIS), and when, as a member of the UK EITI 
Secretariat. This can be understood as an instance of balancing between the different positional identities 
or perspectives of the stakeholders—see below.  
261 As Rich and Moberg write, the Secretariat officials “will have to make the case for some of the stupid 
[suboptimal] ideas themselves as part of a mediation role” (2015: 55). 
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and negotiate the relationships among the UK EITI stakeholders, while recognising, and 
in fact making use of, their complexities.  
 
This is why, when Charlotte asked Elizabeth to attend the Industry Guidance meeting at 
the end of February, Elizabeth refused immediately: if her Civil Society and Industry 
stakeholders saw her (or Aimée, or me) at the meeting, not only would this undermine 
the formal separation between the policies, but the stakeholders would also perceive the 
Secretariat as being squarely on the government’s side of difference. Elizabeth therefore 
wanted to avoid being seen as involved in the Guidance dispute, or as supporting the 
position of the Department for Business in it,262 because she thought this could undermine 
both the Secretariat officials’ ability to remain impartial, and broker the collaboration of 
the stakeholders.  
Feigning ignorance  
But how could claiming ignorance of the conflict demonstrate impartiality and 
indifference; and how would these forms of bureaucratic objectivity allow for separating 
the two policies? Given the social overlap among the stakeholders in the context of the 
UK EITI and the Regulations, Elizabeth wanted to prevent any disagreements among 
them from being carried over into the UK EITI meetings. To understand what role 
ignorance could play here, I take one insight from the emergent anthropological literature 
on ignorance:263 namely, that people come to chart spaces and possibilities of social 
relations and action through their (claims to) ignorance as much as through their (claims 
to) knowledge. This usefully directs attention away from the cognitive status of ignorance 
that Elizabeth claimed, and towards the performative character of the claim itself (Austin 
1962; Duranti 1986); in other words, to what Elizabeth would be trying to achieve by 
saying that she didn’t know about the Industry Guidance work if her stakeholders asked 
her about it.  
 
                                                 
262 Elizabeth also thought that Charlotte Reid-Wills, as the Chair of the MSG, had to be equally impartial. 
She suggested that Charlotte’s participation in the Industry Guidance talks, and the way in which she had 
to support the departmental position in them, made such impartiality impossible. 
263 The main theme of this anthropological (and related social science) scholarship is that ignorance should 
be understood not as an inverse of knowledge, but “as a substantive historical phenomenon that in each 
particular case might incorporate certain knowledge, logics, ethics, emotions, and social relationships.” 
(High, Kelly and Mair 2012: 3). Scholars argue that ignorance can be productive (Sedgwick 2008: 4); have 
strategic uses (Heimer 2012: 1); become intertwined with personal and organisational action (Luhmann 
1998; McGoey 2007); and can be ethically desirable for how it inflects social relations (Chua 2008). 
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I want to suggest that for Elizabeth, the issue was not about not knowing about the 
conflict, but rather about not being seen as knowing about it. If Elizabeth or any of her 
staff—i.e., me or Aimée —, went to a meeting where the stakeholders gathered to discuss 
the Industry Guidance, neither of us would be able to claim ignorance of the conflict. 
Elizabeth thought that this could make her own policy into an arena where the conflict 
was discussed, which in its turn could polarise and politicise the UK EITI negotiations in 
ways that had nothing to do with the official aims of the policy.  
 
Interestingly, however, Elizabeth simply could not afford not knowing about the 
Guidance conflict if she were to do her job well. She constantly communicated with the 
stakeholders. Managing relationships between and among them, was an important part of 
her job, and she always tried to anticipate how particular people would react to certain 
policy innovations, and what would be the best ways to overcome their potential 
resistance. This diplomatic work required not only knowing what interests these people 
stood for in their social roles of constituency representatives, but also being informed 
about their traits of character and interpersonal conflicts that transcended their official 
personae. While claiming the opposite, Elizabeth had to know about the Industry 
Guidance conflict, because the dispute had started to shape the interpersonal relationships 
among her stakeholders. Accordingly, she sought out information about it from her 
colleagues participating in the negotiations, in order to know what to say, and what not 
to say, and to whom, in the context of the UK EITI. Knowing about the conflict was 
important for Elizabeth for the same reason that claiming ignorance about it, was. She 
was afraid that the conflict could polarise the stakeholders to such an extent that they 
would no longer be able to distinguish neither between their positional identities (or 
“hats”) with regards to the two policies, nor between the policies themselves.  
 
The meeting in which Elizabeth refused to participate, came and went, and far from not 
wanting to know, she tried to squeeze the last drop of gossip from Charlotte and 
Catherine, who had visited it. At the meeting, it turned out, Andrew Naumin, the 
coordinator of PWYP UK and the Civil Society constituency of the UK EITI, hinted to 
Charlotte that if the companies refused take into account the NGOs’ comments about the 
Guidance, the Civil Society would disengage from the UK EITI process. NGOs’ boycott 
would effectively undermine the implementation of EITI in so far as the Civil Society’s 
participation was necessary for the due process. It would also, Elizabeth reasoned with 
Aimée and Charlotte, “break the relationship” between the stakeholders from Industry 
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and Civil Society. This only reinforced Elizabeth’s desire to keep the two policies 
separate, for now the threat of the collapse of this separation was becoming ever more 
serious.  
 
The following week, Elizabeth and I were preparing to a meeting with the Andrew 
Naumin and other stakeholders. The meeting was one of the so-called sub-group 
meetings, at which the stakeholders would discuss one part of the first UK EITI report, 
called Contextual Information. I was going to the meeting because I helped Andrew and 
others to draft the Contextual Information section. Although Elizabeth did not contribute 
to this work, she usually attended the sub-group meetings in order to be informed about 
the progress of the policy, and learn about any potential disagreements that she could help 
resolve. 
 
Representatives of all three constituencies were to attend, and Elizabeth was concerned 
that some of the people who had been present at the Industry Guidance meeting the 
previous Friday, would come to our sub-group meeting. As usual, Aimée, Stewart, 
Elizabeth and I sat down to discuss different potential scenarios. The main question was 
whether the attendees who had also been present at the Industry Guidance meeting, would 
be able to keep the two policy areas separate and not “confuse” the imperative of 
cooperating on EITI, with their assumed desire to argue about the Guidance. (In other 
words, whether they would only act and relate to each other in their EITI personas, while 
keeping them separate from their Industry Guidance personas.) For us (Elizabeth and me), 
as for the stakeholders, this entailed acting as if the “same people” in the room were not 
actually the same, at least in their official capacities. I asked Elizabeth for advice on how 
I should behave in view of the Guidance debacle.  
 
“We, we don’t know anything about it,” —she said, intentionally posturing as if to stress 
that if I knew something, I had to pretend I didn’t. She continued: “Just look perplexed 
about it all. We need to keep the two policies separate, the [Regulations and the Industry 
Guidance] have nothing to do with EITI, and should not influence our policy.”  
 
Despite all the overlaps between the two policies, now their formal separation had to be 
upheld and explicitly performed in the context of the UK EITI assemblies. Given how in 
the past the two policy areas had not been kept separate conceptually, keeping them 
separate socially now meant feigning ignorance about the tense relationships among the 
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stakeholders in the context of Industry Guidance. In a situation when the Civil Society 
threatened to boycott UK EITI, it became much more important to show that EITI had 
“nothing to do” with the Industry Guidance. The demonstration of our ignorance,264 if 
required, would make clear that we only related to these people in their roles/personas as 
EITI stakeholders. It would also make clear to them that we, the members of the 
Secretariat, acted in just that capacity, and not as civil servants dependent in their mandate 
on the official position of BIS. Similarly to how the UK EITI had to be kept separate from 
the Regulations and the Industry Guidance conflict, we had to demonstrate that we were 
“separate”—independent—from Charlotte and Catherine, who were involved in the 
Guidance negotiations.  
 
Separation had to be demonstrated by implication. As I have suggested, in the context of 
the UK EITI, stakeholders’ interventions in, and opinions about, matters of policy, were 
routinely expected to express a collective interest of their constituency. One’s speech and 
acts thereby also indexed one’s belonging to, and representation of, a constituency. By 
the same token, taking a perspective on the Guidance conflict could index what collective 
interests (NGOs’, companies’, government’s) one represented, and this was exactly what 
Elizabeth and I had to avoid. “Not knowing anything” about the conflict, and “looking 
perplexed”, precluded the very possibility of having an opinion about it, which implied 
Elizabeth’s (and mine) separation from the interests of other BIS officials involved in the 
dispute. Ignorance of the conflict was a demonstration of detachment and impartiality par 
excellence (Mair 2015). It was a demonstration of our being “in the middle of difference”. 
 
Ready to appear confused and not know about the Guidance conflict, I went with 
Elizabeth to the Contextual Information sub group meeting. I was waiting for something 
to happen, which would unravel the usually heated, but non-confrontational discussion 
about the future EITI report—an underhand comment, a stab in the back, an overt 
reference to the Guidance—but nothing materialised. The meeting went as usual. After 
all our speculations and thinking about how to behave should anything happen, that 
normality in itself was a reason to look perplexed. We did not have to feign ignorance of 
the conflict, for the meeting went without a single mention of the Industry Guidance. 
Those in the room who knew about the conflict, stayed silent; some others simply did not 
come, perhaps not to be present in the same room with their opponents. The stakeholders 
                                                 
264 I suspect that Elizabeth framed it in terms of “not knowing”, rather than “hiding knowledge” or 
dissimulation because of the negative overtones of the latter two. 
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seemed to be playing their roles of UK EITI representatives well, separating the UK EITI 
from their disagreements about the Guidance. 
 
As Chapter Six has demonstrated, the Secretariat officials’ attempts to keep the UK EITI 
separate from the Guidance conflict did not prevent the NGOs’ boycott of the policy. Over 
the course of my fieldwork, however, I realised that these attempts were part of a larger 
repertoire of practices through which the Secretariat officials sought to manage the 
relational complexity of the multi-stakeholder group in order to prevent disruptive 
disagreements, maintain relationships, and facilitate collaboration and consensus. In what 
follows, I sketch out this repertoire in order to better understand the role of formality in 
organising the collective governance of the UK EITI.  
Management of disagreements among stakeholders in UK EITI meetings 
The implementation of the UK EITI was organised around regular meetings of differing 
form and thematic focus, as well as work done privately by the stakeholders in-between, 
and in preparation to, the meetings. With respect to participation and purpose, the 
meetings were of two kinds: sub-group meetings where a sub-set of the representatives 
from the multi-stakeholder group with relevant expertise discussed particular issues—
e.g., technical aspects of proposed petroleum tax reporting rules of UK EITI, or the UK 
EITI communication strategy, or disclosures of beneficial ownership of extractive 
companies. There was a number of topical sub-groups, each of them with its own Chair 
appointed from among the stakeholders; as a rule, each sub-group met at least once in-
between the meetings of the multi-stakeholder group. These, then, were the second kind 
of meetings; they occurred every two months. The entirety of the MSG—some 30 
people—gathered in order to negotiate and agree decisions that, it was commonly 
understood, needed to be consensual. Only statements made and recorded during the 
MSG meetings had an official validity, which made these four-hour long assemblies into 
something of a ceremonial, celebratory performances (Lamp 2015) where no real 
negotiation—with display of disagreements and attempts to transcend them—could 
happen.  
Making consensus 
The movement between these two kinds of meetings provided for an institutional space 
where most if not all decisions could be agreed through a gradual resolution of 
differences. Deliberation in these meetings happened by consensus, and although there 
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was a mechanism to go to a vote, Elizabeth proudly told me that they did not have to 
resort to voting a single time. If that had happened, she reasons, she would have felt that 
she failed as a coordinator of the MSG: the group as such existed for the sole purpose of 
“bringing people” with different interests together so that they could negotiate. Voting 
would mean that one part of the group prevailed over another, which for Elizabeth, whose 
Secretariat supported the MSG as a whole, was unacceptable.  
 
To avoid voting on matters that could not be immediately resolved, stakeholders met in 
sub-group meetings. In virtue of their focus on particular elements of EITI 
implementation, sub-groups allowed more time for discussion than MSG meetings. Sub-
group gatherings were, Elizabeth put it once to me, the “level” at which arguments took 
place: “The idea is you have the argument at the sub-group level, and figure out why the 
one side doesn't want what the other wants, and try to reach a compromise.” If the sub-
group as a whole reached a compromise—for which it could take a number of meetings, 
one-to-one telephone calls between Elizabeth and the relevant stakeholders, and informal 
conversations among the stakeholders—, it made a recommendation for the whole of the 
multi-stakeholder group. 
 
As I have observed myself, the absence of a communal recommendation from a sub-group 
indeed resulted in prolonged and usually unhelpful debates at MSG meetings: the 
meetings normally lasted for four hours and could not accommodate the kind of 
discussion that was necessary to resolve all disagreements; for practical reasons, 
discussions had to be returned back to the sub-group level; but now in addition to group 
discussions in an sub-group a meeting, there would also be informal one-to-one talks in 
email conversations and on the telephone, in which stakeholders sought to resolve their 
disagreements. There would be a prolonged period of to-ing and fro-ing, as constituency 
delegates would report back from sub-group meetings, in order to seek support for 
particular decisions from their constituents.265 By the time the sub-group as a whole made 
a recommendation, all major disagreements would be ironed out. In Elizabeth’s words, 
“When [a recommendation] comes to the MSG, the path has been smoothened for a 
decision” to be taken by general consensus.  
 
                                                 
265 Each constituency also held preparatory gatherings (like the officials’ meeting I referred to above), at 
which they coordinated their common position—something that allowed the constituency to speak in “one 
voice”, and thus become “stronger”, as a campaigner from Publish What You Pay once told me. 
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All this points to the fact that consensus had to be actively built. This seems typical of an 
EITI Secretariat official. In their book on collective governance, Rich and Moberg write 
that consensus needs to be constructed:  
It is time-consuming but it is core to the success of collective governance. To avoid 
lack of consensus [in meetings], a significant percentage of a governance 
entrepreneur’s [i.e. a coordinator like Elizabeth] time will be spent on one-to-one 
conversations with the members of the collective governance group and their 
constituencies, providing background information, facilitating working groups and 
committees, getting opposite views to talk to one another before coming into the 
board room, hosting networking opportunities to relax board members with one 
another socially, and so on. (2015: 45) 
 
Similarly to the mediation among the stakeholders, which Rich and Moberg describe, and 
which I have discussed in the previous section, the formal organisation of the meetings 
facilitated the building of consensus because of how it ordered their relations and 
interactions. 
Avoiding conflicts and organising the meetings 
Because consensus had to be made, the Secretariat officials and their stakeholders were 
careful not to unmake it, or preclude its possibility, with their own words. In both sub-
group and MSG meetings, participants were as a rule very careful in talking about topics 
considered divisive (i.e. ones which no amount of negotiations in UK EITI fora could 
resolve, for example, opinions about the role of oil companies in the climate change, or, 
for that matter, interpretations of the Industry Guidance266). Sometimes (as suggested by 
Elizabeth’s desire to be able to claim ignorance suggests), they preferred not to mention 
disagreements that, as they felt, could not be resolved, or disguise them through vague, 
metaphorical or passive speech (Brown and Levinson 1987; Duranti 1994).  
 
This avoidance of conflict could be attributed to the voluntary nature of the UK EITI and 
the lack of institutional mechanisms of constraint, which made it impossible for any 
particular party to impose their will on others, turning dialogue, persuasion and tactical 
compromise into the main forms of transcending difference. This adds to my previous 
explanation of Elizabeth’s insistence on keeping the Industry Guidance conflict out of the 
                                                 
266 See Chapter Five for an example. 
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UK EITI: the latter provided no mechanisms for resolving stakeholders’ disagreements 
about the former—because these were two officially separate policies and the separation 
had to be upheld and enacted formally; but also because voluntary negotiations were the 
only way to deal with conflict within the UK EITI, and this was failing in the Guidance 
meetings already.  
 
Avoidance of conflict and “dangerous talk” (Brenneis and Myers 1984) sometimes made 
the multi-stakeholder group meetings (more than the sub-group ones) seem like ritual 
performances aimed at enacting the ideal collective form of the multi-stakeholder group 
where different constituencies—not individual persons!—“talked to each other” 
(Charlotte) to reach consensus. But however much MSG meetings seemed to be scripted 
and predictable, there always was an element of surprise, precisely because they were 
large gatherings of people with very different agendas and characters. (“If people weren’t 
people, implementing UK EITI would be easy. It would go according to plan,” Elizabeth 
noted once.) Spontaneous discussions and disputes, sometimes with personal undertone, 
often erupted from underneath the semblance of cooperative discussions. This was 
exactly the kind of situation that Elizabeth feared would happen at the sub-group meeting 
where I was instructed to pretend not to know anything about the Guidance Conflict, 
should the matter be mentioned. If anything, both sub-group and MSG meetings were all 
too unpredictable, calling upon the meeting chair to impose discipline, and cut 
conversations and remarks perceived to deviate from the formal agenda (Schwartzman 
1989). Maintaining a situational focus of the meetings (Goffman 1963; Irvine 1976) on 
implementation work was necessary for pragmatic purposes. But it also contributed to the 
appearance of the UK EITI meetings as formal gatherings, whose attendees interacted in 
their official capacity of constituency representatives. 
Ordering through writing 
Both sub-group and MSG meetings were recorded in writing—minuted. The sub-group 
minutes were much less detailed in comparison to MSG minutes, and, crucially, were 
only a form of documenting group recommendations and proceedings with the aim of 
later demonstrating them to the multi-stakeholder group. Sub-group minutes were never 
published—only circulated to all members of the multi-stakeholder group in advance of 
the MSG meeting. In contrast, MSG minutes were much more detailed. Aimée, who 
prepared them, sought to capture all discussions that took place in the assembly. This way, 
the discussions were represented to wider audiences. Stakeholders had to be careful not 
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to talk themselves and constituencies they represented into positions from which it would 
be difficult to extricate themselves later.  
 
As Elizabeth once observed, regarding a careful ambivalence of statements of one 
Industry representative, the talk at the MSG meeting was performed as much to the 
audience in the room, as to various audiences beyond it through the minutes. Since the 
MSG meetings took place under the Chatham House rule, minutes recorded participants’ 
affiliation, but not their name. In the final minutes, one could read phrases such as 
“Industry stressed” or “Civil Society recognised and agreed”. In this way, events and 
decisions documented in the minutes, were redescribed as artefacts of the 
relational/interactions dynamics resulting from the gathering of the representatives of the 
three constituencies, rather than private individuals. The minutes formalised the assembly, 
ordering and representing its sociality through categories of the official EITI structure. It 
can be said that the minutes were an extension of the celebratory performances (i.e. 
announcement of compromise, reporting of implementation progress etc.) that took place 
in the meetings, and tended to emphasised agreement and collaboration among 
constituencies as collective bodies.  
 
Given this publicity of multi-stakeholder group’s meetings,267 it is perhaps unsurprising 
that most discussions that unexpectedly emerged or erupted from underneath the chill of 
formal play, were “taken back” for sub-groups to (re)consider, sometimes with 
extraordinary sub-group meetings arranged in order to work out an “option” for consensus 
and explicitly avoid having discussions at an MSG meeting. Disagreements that were 
accidental or not important enough to be taken back, were often not mentioned in the 
minutes at all. 
 
But they could be, if Elizabeth and Aimée decided to “shame” someone by mentioning 
their misbehaviour in the minutes—a situation that happened once. Documentation of 
meetings through minutes in itself was a way to regulate and tone down the discussion, 
in view that whatever was said, could be recorded for the future (recall Charlotte’s plan 
to take minutes of the Industry Guidance meeting; something similar also happened in 
the EITI context). This echoes Lisa Gitelman’s (2012: 2) suggestion that the process of 
                                                 
267 The MSG meetings were also open to members of the public who applied to attend in advance. 
Journalists, however, were not usually admitted, because it was recognised they could observe, and write 
about, disagreements and arguments.  
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documenting, and documents resulting from it, operate with an implicit “horizon of 
expectations” that is “accountability”. Gitelman writes: “documents help define and are 
mutually defined by the know-show function, since documenting is an epistemic practice: 
the kind of knowing that is all wrapped up with showing, and showing wrapped up with 
knowing.” (2012: 1) 
 
In this respect, official MSG meetings represented the sociality of collective governance 
of the UK EITI, and did so in a way that emphasised collaboration, consensus and order, 
rather than disagreement, politicking, and unruly debates, which sometimes occurred in 
these assemblies. On several occasions, I heard from Aimée, Elizabeth and their Industry 
stakeholders that MSG minutes were “aspirational”: they upheld a vision of what a 
meeting should have looked like, rather than what it actually did.  
 
They minutes redescribed what happened in the meetings, constructing sanctioned 
representations of the sociality of the UK EITI, which, despite Aimée’s declared desire to 
record everything that happened, were purged of any mention of divisive arguments.  
Similarly to how stakeholders’ consensus was constructed through backstage mediation 
and several rounds of meetings, and to how the avoidance of conflict reinforced this 
consensus and maintained relationships on which it was based, official minutes of the 
MSG meetings integrated the multi-stakeholder group through writing by formalising its 
procedures and recording them for posterity (cf. Alexander 2001). 
Concluding remarks: maintaining relationships 
The various kinds of formality (the architecture of meetings, control of meeting 
procedures, official minutes), through which official order of the collective governance 
was achieved, might at first seem unrelated to my discussion of detachment and 
impartiality in the first part of the chapter. Such an impression would be misguided.  
 
The problem that I have described in the vignette, was about dealing with a threat of a 
conflict that could not be resolved within the official structures of the policy, and yet could 
undermine its very existence by “breaking relationships” (Elizabeth) among the UK EITI 
stakeholders. (In fact, it did—for a short while; see Chapter Six) 
 
In so far as the UK EITI had to maintain a working multi-stakeholder group, in which the 
three constituencies participated voluntarily and equally, and as long as the policy-making 
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work (drafting of papers, negotiations etc.) was done mostly not by the civil servants, but 
by the stakeholders themselves, maintenance of relationships among them was necessary 
for the policy’s progress. The relational complexity of the UK EITI was a result of the 
policy’s organisation according to the EITI Standard’s blueprint, which prescribed that 
the implementation had to happen through an infrastructure of collective social forms, 
such as the three constituencies with their representatives, the multi-stakeholder group, 
and the Secretariat. This structurally engendered complexity led to a very real social 
necessity to avoid conflicts or resolve them outside of the main formal arena—the MSG 
meeting—in which the work done elsewhere was formally ratified, and progress 
celebrated. 
 
The formal structure of the UK EITI turned the maintenance of relationships among the 
stakeholders from an implicit condition of policy work (Lea 2008; Mosse 2005), into its 
explicit goal—at least for Elizabeth and Aimée, whose role it was to manage and mediate 
such relationships. It is in this context that we should understand Elizabeth’s 
preoccupation with avoiding the “contamination” of UK EITI discussions with the 
Industry Guidance conflict. As I have suggested, Elizabeth perceived her job as managing 
her own relationships with stakeholders, relationships among them, and her relationships 
with them in view of their relationships among each other. These relationships were not 
confined to those entailed by the positional roles that individuals assumed when 
representing their constituencies. She wanted to know about their personal characters and 
antipathies, for example to avoid seating two people who disliked one another next to 
each other in meetings. At the UK EITI Secretariat—and the Department for Business 
more generally—I found that contrary to critiques of social scientists (e.g. Graeber 2012; 
Herzfeld 1992; Scott 1998) who describe bureaucratic knowledge as reductive and 
operating through almost automatic simplification, civil servants I worked with 
developed intimate understanding of social environment they inhabited. This was an 
indispensable aspect of their work, rather than something that happened in spite of the 
officials’ practices of formality. Far from blinding them to the relational intricacies of 
collective governance, official formality allowed the bureaucrats to successfully engage 
with these, while also ensuring that the official structures of the UK EITI were 
reproduced, and stakeholders achieved consensus. 
 
For the Secretariat officials, the ability to do their work professionally depended in many 
cases on being able to navigate social relations with/among their stakeholders with great 
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care and subtlety, which would be difficult without good knowledge of personal 
biographies, characters and predilections. For this very reason, minimising opportunities 
for conflict—through bureaucratic indifference or detachment, separation of policies, and 
manufacturing of consensus in formal meetings—was important in so far as professional 
relationships among stakeholders had to be maintained.   
 
As the Industry Guidance conflict was becoming ever more bitter, the possibility of its 
resolution through negotiations waned. It was exactly the kind of situation that had to be 
avoided in the context of the UK EITI. This chapter, then, has explored the practices of 
formality through which the officials of the UK EITI Secretariat sought to maintain the 
relational infrastructures which underpinned the collective governance of their policy. 
Beginning with the Secretariat’s attempts to prevent the Industry Guidance conflict from 
engulfing the UK EITI, I have shown that demonstration of detachment and impartiality 
was central to the Secretariat officials’ role as mediators among the stakeholders. These 
officials had to stay in the middle of the stakeholders’ difference in order to bridge it, and 
make consensual deliberation possible. Detachment and impartiality, I have proposed, 
were part of a larger repertoire of formality, with which officials sought to navigate, 
manage and mediate the relational complexities of collective governance. All these 
practices have to do with bringing people together in meetings, and maintaining 
relationships among them, to make and consolidate group consensus through which the 
UK EITI is governed.  
 
These practices are informed by the structural focus of the UK EITI on stakeholder 
participation and consensual deliberation, and are key to preventing and managing 
disputes and disagreements. I have argued that stakeholders try to avoid arguments that 
can break relationships among the stakeholders beyond the possibility of reconciliation; 
and that the formal organisation of UK EITI meetings contributes to dispute resolution. 
The impartial mediation of the Secretariat officials, the presence of different “levels” of 
meetings, avoidance of conflict and consolidation of consensus through writing, all order 
the sociality of collective governance in ways that validate the official ideal of the UK 
EITI as a collaborative project.  
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Conclusion: the effects of collective governance 
 
This thesis has explored the changing social world of policy-making in the British central 
government. To explore new forms of governance that engage international corporations 
and non-governmental organisations into the making of state policies in the UK, it has 
focused on the case of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. In particular, it 
has examined the emergence of the EITI’s collaborative model 1999-2003, and its 
implementation in the UK a decade later.  
 
This archival and ethnographic exploration of policy-making has led me to argue that the 
UK EITI exists a part of a social and institutional context in which it draws on existing 
social relations and makes them anew; and that to understand this world, we need to 
explore how the projects of anti-corruption campaigning come to articulate with the 
political and institutional agendas of the central government bureaucracy. Thus, in 
Chapters Two and Three, I explored how Global Witness campaigners constructed claims 
about corruption and its structural relation to secrecy and transparency, and how these 
claims came to inform their attempts to influence government policy. Chapters Four and 
Five dealt with the emergence of the collaborative model of the EITI 2002-3, and some 
effects of its implementation in Britain in 2013-15. Chapters Six and Seven further 
explored the sociality of collaborative policy-making, by focusing on the UK EITI’s sister 
transparency policy, the frictions resulting from stakeholders’ disagreements about it, and 
the UK EITI Secretariat officials’ attempts to contain these frictions by insisting on 
official formalities.  
 
The EITI poses a challenge to conventional understandings of policy. As a set of official 
abstractions, the rules of the EITI Standard primarily govern not the production of 
transparency in extractive industries as such, but relational infrastructures of collective 
governance where this production is negotiated. It is the genealogy and functioning of 
this dimension of collective governance of transparency that I have explored in this thesis. 
As a result, I have not focused on the UK EITI rules for transparency or their effects on 
companies and government institutions. Deliberately limiting the scope of inquiry in this 
way, I have revealed the relatively poorly understood questions of the sociality of policy, 
namely, how and by whom policy is ‘made’ and governed; and how the agendas, 
commitments and ethical projects of those who make it, and their relations with each 
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other, both shape policy models and their enactments, and are themselves transformed by 
them. 
 
By bringing together the main analytical threads of my dissertation, in this conclusion I 
want to approach the central problem of my ethnographic inquiry, namely, the effects of 
collective governance on the relations and practices of policy-making. To address this 
issue, I present one last ethnographic example to describe how Elizabeth and Charlotte 
understood the ways in which the formal collaborative set-up of the (UK) EITI challenged 
their authority. Revisiting the core arguments of the thesis—about the relations between 
official abstractions and practices of policy; the sociality of policy; and expert practices 
and ethical projects informing policy and inflecting its governance—I will offer an 
alternative interpretation of collaboration’s effects on practices of government. This 
discussion will then allow me to restate the contribution of this dissertation to the 
anthropology of policy and the state. 
 
*** 
Soon after I joined the UK EITI Secretariat for fieldwork, Elizabeth Pierce asked me to 
write a speech about her policy. I suggested that we record a mock interview, which I 
would then use as the material for the text. And so, one day in early March 2015, cups of 
tea and folders of papers in our hands, we went to a meeting lounge across the corridor 
from our office at BIS. Sounds of traffic were coming through the large windows 
overlooking Victoria Street; across the room, several groups of people were leisurely 
discussing their work, sitting on low sofas. I put two identical print-outs—a speech plan 
I’d prepared the previous day—on the formica table between us, and we started the 
recording.  
 
Elizabeth explained that she wouldn’t normally use a script for a presentation, but now 
wanted one to “hold on to”. On many occasions, before she would present the UK EITI 
to outside visitors, I saw her jot down a schematic plan—“bullets”—of main points to 
make, which she would then expand on with great ease. This time, however, the speech 
had to be some 40 minutes long. It was a lecture to students and academics at a university 
in Scotland. As part of the UK EITI Communications Plan, Elizabeth had several such 
lectures planned to “raise awareness” about the policy and possibly recruit someone from 
her academic audiences to “engage” with the future reports of the UK EITI reporting.  
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Elizabeth said that in wanting a script, she was merely being cautious: as a representative 
of BIS and the UK EITI Secretariat, she had to speak on behalf of many other people, and 
did not want to say anything odd, or reveal too much about the internal tensions and 
disagreements of the policy. On an earlier occasion, I saw her do just that. “I will not say 
anything controversial”, she had warned me before we began our very first interview, yet 
almost immediately proceeded to tell me that the UK EITI was full of tensions among the 
stakeholders; that the Civil Society constituency was represented by the “wrong” NGOs 
who were more interested in international transparency campaigning than in the domestic 
impact of the UK EITI; and that certain people on the MSG were constantly creating 
trouble and misbehaving. As I saw during my fieldwork, such tensions were an 
indispensable element of collective governance in the context of the UK EITI. Chapter 
Five demonstrated that as a collaborative space, the multi-stakeholder group was an 
inherently political site, which brought together groups of people with very different 
interests. The infrastructure of collective forms—the three stakeholder constituencies, 
which met regularly in assemblies of different kind and function—was geared to 
mediating stakeholders’ differences, and to resolving disagreements. But if it was part of 
Elizabeth’s daily job to deal with such disagreements and tensions, she preferred not to 
disclose them to outside audiences during an official presentation of the policy. 
 
As a way of beginning the interview, I suggested that Elizabeth explain how the EITI 
compared with other policies she had worked on before. “You’ve got to work a lot with 
other people,” she began, reiterating how the implementation of the EITI Standard 
established a collaborative set-up in which Elizabeth had to work with officials outside 
her department, as well as with Civil Society and Industry stakeholders. But that, she said 
to my surprise, was no different from what she had been used to at her previous job.  
 
Before joining the Corporate Governance team, Elizabeth had worked at the National 
Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD Guidelines for Multi-National Enterprises, located at 
the Department for Business. The OECD Guidelines, to which the UK adheres, provide 
a set of non-binding principles and standards for corporate social responsibility. Working 
at the NCP, Elizabeth handled complaints of alleged human rights and environmental 
abuse, filed against transnational corporations registered in Britain by various activist 
groups. She said that while at the NCP, she worked more with civil servants at DfID and 
FCO, than with her colleagues at BIS. Similarly, “working across government” was an 
 219 
important part of Elizabeth’s job at the UK EITI Secretariat, and in this respect, the UK 
EITI was not that different from her previous work.  
 
As my historical exploration of the EITI’s early development demonstrated, cross-
departmental coordination and negotiations are a normal part of the “village life” (Heclo 
and Wildavsky 1976) of Whitehall civil servants. Chapter Four described how the 
collaborative model of the EITI emerged 2002-3 out of a dynamic of negotiation and 
conflict among different departments of the UK government, and between government 
officials and their counterparts in the World Bank, other G8 governments, and extractive 
corporations and NGOs. I argue that diplomacy and navigation of intricate institutional 
relations are inherent to large bureaucratic organisations that government departments 
are; and this cannot but affect not only how policy is made by negotiation, but also what 
this policy ends up being. My description sheds light on how the model of collective 
governance—which Elizabeth and her colleagues ended up implementing in 2015—
emerged from Global Witness’ original policy proposal, which underwent a series of 
conceptual transformations and displacements as government officials tried to 
accommodate various institutional interests within the government. The sociality and 
politics of writing and talking the policy proposal into existence required that the proposal 
have support within the government, but also among the potential international partners. 
Government departments and other institutions (such as the World Bank) that participated 
in this negotiation, differed in specialisation, remit and political influence; their support 
hinged on the policy proposal’s coherence with their respective institutional imperatives. 
As a result, the policy design had to accommodate a multiplicity of interests, while 
remaining practically implementable. 
 
The most important of these transformations that the EITI proposal underwent in this 
period, was one that saw it change from a voluntary disclosures mechanism, implemented 
by a government, to a multi-lateral partnership in which governments and companies 
could make commitments to transparency. This shift effectively freed the Cabinet Office 
functionaries from the need to agree the proposal with their dissenting counterparts at 
DTI. If the design of the policy was informed and shaped by institutional relations, so it 
also changed these relationships and opened possibilities for new connections and 
disconnections. Thus, once the planned policy was turned into a multi-lateral partnership 
(on the suggestion of World Bank officials, who themselves were planning a similar 
policy in parallel), Cabinet Office functionaries had to find potential partners and recruit 
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their support. This led to further transformations of the policy, because, in order to 
broaden its appeal, the speculative design of the policy was amended several times to 
make it ever more inclusive of multiple agendas of new supporters.  
 
These negotiations were organised through a working group that included representatives 
of the UK government, extractive companies and NGOs—Global Witness and their allies 
from the PWYP campaign. As a result of discussions in this collaborative group, and later 
again within the departments of the UK government, the negotiated design of the EITI 
became transformed into a policy defined by general principles of participation and 
collaboration, rather than concrete disclosure rules. Finally, the participatory multi-
stakeholder forum in which these discussions took place, provided the model for how the 
emergent partnership should be organised.  
 
When the government signed up to the EITI in 2013, Elizabeth and her team were tasked 
with implementing the model of collaborative governance the basic structure of which 
had emerged a decade earlier out of the complicated dynamic of disagreement and 
compromise between the DTI officials and their counterparts at the Cabinet Office and 
DfID.  
 
*** 
Back in the meeting lounge where we were now talking, Elizabeth recalled how difficult 
the first cross-departmental meetings about the UK EITI were. Not because the officials 
were not used to meeting with their counterparts from other departments—that was a 
normal practice, she said—but rather, because the formal set-up of the EITI challenged 
the “usual ways” of making policy in the government. “This is what’s different about the 
EITI”, added Elizabeth. “Usually, policy is done differently: you have a problem, you 
devise a solution, you consult with stakeholders, and take away from the consultation 
what you need to make a decision. But the decision is yours.” With the EITI, there was 
none of that: decisions had to be made collectively, by consensus. “You go through a 
process of consultation within the Government constituency, you work out a common 
position, and present it to the MSG.” Her comment pointed to the fact that the 
Government was just of the three constituencies, whose voice in the making of the policy 
was formally equal to those of the Civil Society and Industry. Explaining that as a result 
of the formal structure of the EITI, officials did not have the control over the policy that 
the government had signed up to implement, she said: 
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There was some nervousness [among government officials] about working with 
a multi-stakeholder group and not being totally in control, and having to 
compromise and move your position. From the government’s angle, it’s quite 
difficult to take a step back and let the Industry and Civil Society work it out, 
because sometimes it’s not the most important thing in our world—we’ll step in, 
of course, when it is important… 
 
This “nervousness”, she said, was typical among government officials of other countries. 
Speaking to her colleagues in Norway, she had discovered very similar tensions between 
different departments about who was responsible for what. In the case of the UK EITI, as 
Elizabeth explained, these tensions gradually eased and disappeared when civil servants 
got used to working in the multi-stakeholder group. 
 
Charlotte Reid-Wills, comparing her working group of stakeholders negotiating the 
mandatory reporting policy (see Chapter Six) with the UK EITI multi-stakeholder group, 
said she found the UK EITI more challenging:  
Charlotte: Whatever happened with the Directive [during the negotiations], in 
the end it was our decision, it was the government’s decision. I could listen to 
those views [of stakeholders], and I could try and get people into some point of 
agreement. But in the end, I made the decision. I said, Okay, it looks as if it will 
work for the majority of people. If they had actually two divergent views, and 
we couldn’t find our way through, I decided what we gonna do.  
Taras: So, was it easier this way? 
Charlotte: It’s always easier to make the decision yourself [laughs]. So I made 
the decision, I made a recommendation to the ministers, we negotiated it that 
way… It’s always easier to make your own decisions [laughs again]. […] But 
certainly for me, personally, it was initially quite hard in the meetings [of the UK 
EITI], to allow other people… to not have that decision-making role myself. 
That was actually quite difficult. It’s a very different way of… You can influence 
it [the decisions of the MSG], but in the end, the group has to agree, whereas 
before [in the working group on the Directive], the group didn’t have to agree. 
It’s very different with EITI, it’s a more consensual challenge, a very different 
way of working. It may not appear very different. But in reality, it is. 
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As both Elizabeth and Charlotte commented, one of the challenges of the EITI 
collaboration was in how it affected the way in which government officials could exercise 
their authority. Executive decisions could no longer be imposed on other stakeholders, 
and most aspects of the policy had to be negotiated and agreed upon collectively in the 
course of the multi-stakeholder group and sub-group meetings. That was, as Charlotte 
pointed out, the formal difference of collaboration in the context of the MSG, from that 
in the informal working group of the extractives’ mandatory disclosures policy. In this 
view, the challenges of collaboration to conventional forms of bureaucratic policy-
making lay in its effects on the forms and powers of official decision-making. 
 
*** 
Contrary to the contrast that Charlotte drew between the challenges of collaboration in 
the Accounting Directive working group, and in the UK EITI multi-stakeholder group, 
my ethnography in Chapters Five and Six suggests that the challenges and effects of 
collaboration are comparable in both cases. I argue that these have to do not so much with 
how formal and informal ways of collaboration change the authority of civil servants, but 
with how collaboration with representatives of transnational oil companies and 
international NGOs, made the officials vulnerable to forms of political practice and 
contestations of power— “games”, as Tim put it—, which played out at different scales 
simultaneously. Moreover, in the case of the EITI, the formal organisation of 
collaboration and its logic of collective representation and bargaining, occluded this 
scalar complexity of the politics of collective governance.  
 
Chapters Five and Six described the social organisation of the collaborative arenas of the 
MSG and the informal working group. In particular, they depicted how collaboration is 
underpinned by a logic of collective constituency representation, which in the case of the 
EITI, is formalised through the Standard. Chapter Six told the story of a collaborative 
working group’s establishment in 2010, as remembered by Charlotte and Catherine, in 
which representatives of corporations and NGOs competed with each other and 
negotiated with officials about the new European rules on mandatory disclosures. The 
NGO and corporate lobbyists had by then participated in similar discussions in the US 
and in Brussels—they were playing the same “game” of contesting the mandatory 
disclosures rules. Participants of this game, played over and over again, were the “same 
people”, and much to the campaigners’ disappointment, they repeated the same 
arguments, too. The rooms at BIS where these campaigners met with their corporate 
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counterparts and government officials, were just one of the stages where the game of 
extractives’ transparency campaigning took place. But as Chapter Six described, it was 
exactly because corporate lobbying and NGO campaigns on extractives’ transparency 
regulations happened simultaneously in different locations and jurisdictions that, in each 
of these, they tried to argue for the same changes to the planned regulations. Each such 
stage, or instance of policy, whether it was in the US, Canada, or Brussels, could serve as 
an example for other instances elsewhere. Campaigning in the UK was, for Global 
Witness and their PWYP allies, a way of “reinforcing the movement towards global 
transparency”, as Andrew Naumin of PWYP UK put it to me.  
 
Chapter Five dealt with a similar problem of the collision of scales. It explored the 
apparent paradox of the UK EITI as a national policy for extractives transparency which 
both the government, and the NGOs participated in, because they wanted to present it as 
an example of transparency abroad. The chapter described how, in seeking to make the 
UK EITI an exemplary case of EITI implementation to which they could point in their 
campaigns overseas, Civil Society stakeholders argued for new forms of disclosure that 
were not part of the EITI Standard. In this way, the meetings of the UK EITI stakeholders 
were turned into an arena where the NGOs made political interventions orientated 
towards their campaigning goals elsewhere. The UK EITI, for these campaigners, was 
“an important part of the jigsaw for global transparency”—not because of how it made 
the North Sea oil and gas companies transparent, but because of new disclosure rules that 
it codified.  
 
In both of these cases, the space of collaboration had been set up for the stakeholders to 
discuss and negotiate relevant transparency policies. The same participants represented 
corporations and NGOs, which operated simultaneously in many jurisdictions, and 
engaged in negotiations of many similar transparency policies overseas. As we have seen, 
the discussions among stakeholders about both the Regulations/Industry Guidance and 
the UK EITI, were informed by long histories of disputes, interests and agendas that were 
not inherent to the policies under negotiation but instead concerned policies and 
campaigns abroad. We have also seen that, in this process, the collective governance of 
both policies, was a result not so much of collaboration, as of dispute or outright conflict: 
confrontations whose stakes had little to do with formal objectives of the policy. Chapter 
Six, in particular, described how this conflict was not only about contestations of power, 
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but also about trust, good faith, expectations of fair treatment and rational discussion, 
concerns that point to the moral and affective dimensions of collective governance.268 
 
Instead of limiting officials’ authority by redistributing decision-making powers and 
forcing them to make collective deliberations, these complexities of collaboration (which 
had to do both with who participated in this collaboration, and how collaboration was 
formally organised as a process of collective bargaining among groups representing 
particularistic interests), affected BIS officials' control over their transparency policies by 
introducing new problems and concerns over which officials had no control by definition. 
Civil servants recognised and lamented this, but their jurisdiction was clearly limited and 
they were bound to reproduce the policies as national interventions cut off from what the 
NGOs saw as a global jigsaw of interconnected policies. The problem, therefore, was a 
result of the formal framing of collaboration and the ways in which it was blind to the 
complexity of stakeholders’ interests and scales at which these were pursued.  
 
Paying attention to these issues, my ethnography has demonstrated that that the effects 
and limits of collaborative policy-making as it was practised in the context of the UK 
EITI, lay in the sociality of collaboration. It has suggested that conflicts and frictions 
among stakeholders occurred because of the formal arrangements and social dynamics of 
collective governance, rather than in spite of them.  
 
*** 
This thesis began by questioning the coherence of Eddie Rich’s narrative of the EITI’s 
history. My ethnography led me to focus on organisational contexts in which the policy—
the (UK) EITI—was made and negotiated. This has allowed me to demonstrate the 
practices and relationships among various people and institutions, which underpin policy. 
I have shown how these practices and relationships both sustained the official policy 
representations and forms, and were affected by them. Throughout this dissertation, I have 
shed light on the “hidden transcripts” (Scott 1990) of policy, exploring the agendas of 
various actors involved in it, and disjuncture between official policy models, and 
                                                 
268 In the case of the UK EITI, there was one further aspect to this complexity of scales and social relations 
which squared uneasily with how government officials saw and organised the process of collaboration. It 
had to do with the fact that equal stakeholder participation and collaboration were inscribed as formal 
requirements of the EITI Standard, which produced further interdependencies among the stakeholders 
because if any side withdrew from collaboration (as the Civil Society temporarily during their boycott), the 
whole policy would collapse. 
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practices, that these agendas generate (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005). My task has 
been to understand the social organisation of policy-making without seeking to presume 
that the processes of organising and ordering (Law 1995) the UK EITI falls neatly within 
the assumed boundaries of formal organisations.  
 
But my ethnography has also gone beyond uncovering the hidden transcripts, agendas, 
and disjuncture by demonstrating the ways in which official policy forms and models are 
intertwined with various kinds of practices—be they those of producing knowledge about 
corruption and theorising solutions to it (Chapters Two and Three); coordinating 
departmental policy agendas (Chapter Four); or negotiating a slippery terrain of conflict 
by enacting bureaucratic detachment and impartiality, while seeking to pursue knowledge 
of individual characters and relationships (Chapter Seven). My ethnography demonstrates 
how domestic policymaking in contemporary Britain (particularly, the making of the 
policy on extractives’ transparency) happens not only within government institutions, but 
also in advocacy organisations; how it is informed by moral and political agendas of NGO 
campaigners; how various kinds of knowledge become incorporated into the policy; and 
how domestic departmental concerns come to inform policies that become mobile 
transnational standards. It has demonstrated how the institutional set-up of policy that 
puts various scales of action in relation (think of the ‘global’ EITI Standard and its 
national replications), connects specific moral projects and knowledge practices of 
campaigning with otherwise unrelated diplomatic arenas (Chapter Five).  
 
In particular, this thesis has taken as its central problem and object one official form of 
the (UK) EITI, namely, collaboration, through which the policy is collectively governed, 
in order to understand how collective governance happened, and what was at stake for 
various people involved. This has led me to unpick the various apparent ironies and 
paradoxes of the (UK) EITI:  
• Although the EITI was a mobile and supposedly global policy model (“standard”), 
it had emerged, on the one hand, out of very concrete knowledge practices and 
moral considerations of Global Witness campaigners, and on the other, from 
parochial agendas and disagreements within the UK government.  
• The UK EITI was shaped by multi-directional diplomacy in institutional contexts 
that one normally does not associate with national policy-making. When it was 
rolled-out in Britain, the UK EITI structured the context of policy negotiations in 
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ways that simultaneously gestured to domestic policy concerns, other similar 
policies in the UK and elsewhere, and international development diplomacy.  
• Despite being a policy officially aiming to make domestic extractive industries 
more transparent and accountable, the UK EITI was implemented by the 
government mainly to encourage other countries to adopt the Standard. At the 
same time, it was supported by the NGOs who sought to strengthen what they saw 
as a global jigsaw of transparency policies.269 
• Finally, it was a policy that was brought to a halt (albeit temporarily) because of 
a complicated history of disputes between the NGO and corporate stakeholders, 
which per se had nothing to do with the UK EITI.  
 
This dissertation’s attention to the paradoxes and ironies of the (UK) EITI has highlighted 
the complex and fragmented nature of government policy (Shore and Wright, 2007, 2011; 
Holm Vohnsen, 2011). Juxtaposing a genealogical reconstruction of the UK EITI’s model 
of collaboration with a detailed description of how this model was put into practice in 
2015, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the complex and non-linear relations 
between policy and practice (Mosse 2005). Whereas recent research on state 
bureaucracies has explored the material and documentary mediation of the state (Hull 
2012; Mathur 2015), my ethnography highlights the centrality of relational concerns, 
mundane diplomacy, interpersonal and institutional ties to the making of policy and day-
to-day business of the central government. And while the anthropology of policy has 
tended to take policy texts and models as given (Holm Vohnsen 2012 and Lea 2008 are 
rare exceptions), this thesis shows how official formalisations of policy models emerge 
at the intersection of situated practices, epistemic and relational commitments of 
government officials and anti-corruption campaigners. Drawing on recent ethnographies 
of governance, management and the state (Bear 2015; Bear and Mathur, 2015; Brown 
2016; John 2009, 2015; Telesca, 2015), this dissertation has argued that relations of power 
are not the only relations of governance; collaborative policy-making, because of its 
relational dimension, is informed by diverse moral projects and ethical commitments, the 
breach of which can lead to the break-up of collaboration. 
 
                                                 
269 This calls for a further exploration of the problem of scale in the context of government—a problem that 
I have only briefly explored (Chapters Five and Six), and that requires further ethnographic detail. 
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The EITI’s collaborative model was put into practice in an already very complex 
organisational context, where much of what officials were doing was about navigating 
relationships with others and figuring out agendas. The EITI’s model further complicated 
that situation. Institutions of government are always maintained and run through 
collaboration among their various inhabitants (Page 2003). But the way in which 
collaborative governance was organised in the context of the UK EITI, opened up policy 
and the state to influence not only by different kinds of lobbying organisations, but also 
at different levels of the state simultaneously.  
 
Collective governance has had, in this context, unpredictable effects because it granted 
corporate and NGO representatives access to various levels of the government 
bureaucracy (Chapter Six), and allowed them to act out agendas that sat uneasily with the 
goals of policy pursued by the bureaucrats. Collaboration and agreement, which, as I have 
argued, have to be performed in the context of the UK EITI (Chapter Seven), create and 
mobilise reference points and official representations of policy that narrow down 
decision-making possibilities for (some of) the collaborating parties (Chapter Five). In 
this manner, collaboration transforms policy-making because it brings into play social 
interests, relations, and practices, which are rarely associated with state bureaucracies. 
 
At the same time, the framing of collaboration can also leave out of view powerful 
agendas that these outside actors bring in. These agendas can create problems in policy-
making contexts, the solutions to which are beyond the reach of government officials, 
leaving these officials without effective mechanisms of controlling the various ways in 
which the NGOs and corporations seek to influence policy. The ways in which this 
collective governance is formally organised in the context of the UK EITI, restrict the 
government’s control over the policy that it makes by redefining its role as one of the 
three equal societal constituencies with its own partial interests that need to be 
transcended in the name of transparency, this new public good. 
 
Through an ethnography of the UK EITI, my dissertation has demonstrated how policy 
models can have effects within the very contexts of their negotiation in the central 
government, yet result in processes of governance unfolding beyond government and 
outside of government officials’ control.  
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